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ABSTRACT 
 
The motivation for undertaking research on the topic of piracy began when the Straits 
of Malacca was declared a war-risk zone in 2005 due to escalating numbers of piracy 
incidents being reported, particularly by the International Maritime Bureau. As the 
Straits is one of the busiest straits in the world and of great significance for global 
seaborne trade, piracy and armed robbery in the Straits have a devastating impact on 
the world economy. While customary international law, the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 Convention) and other international and 
regional instruments have established principles and guidelines governing piracy, 
they are argued to be inadequate and insufficient to deal with contemporary piracy. 
Since the legal status of the Straits, determined in the early chapter, is that of ‘straits 
used for international navigation’, which comes under part III of the 1982 
Convention, it is the primary responsibility of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (the 
littoral States) to ensure the continuous safety and security of ships transiting the 
Straits. In view of the fact that the issue of piracy in the Straits gained global 
attention, the efforts to suppress piracy are discussed at each level, namely 
international, regional and national levels. Before embarking on the issue of piracy in 
the Straits, a general discussion on the historical development of the International 
Law of the Sea and the definitional and jurisdictional issues of piracy is undertaken. 
Then, the thesis examines regional responses to the problem of piracy.  Since an 
individual state is an important nucleus in international law, the Malaysian policy and 
legal framework are highlighted at the end of the thesis to determine the extent of the 
efforts undertaken by Malaysia especially the MMEA, and to examine whether the 
existing Malaysian law is adequate to suppress and prosecute piracy and armed 
robbery against ships. The thesis ends with a conclusion and recommendations for 
overcoming the problems. Due to the scarcity of local commentaries on this topic, it is 
believed that a study of this kind could provide an interesting contribution to the 
existing literature and may contribute to the current debate, especially on the issue of 
the Somali pirates who were detained on the high seas and are currently standing trial 
in the Malaysian High Court. 
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PART I 
 
INTRODUCTION  
AND  
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA:  
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA BREADTH, REGIME OF 
STRAIT AND PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS  
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Advances in shipping technology, international sea-borne trade and the economic 
growth of developing countries in Asia have boosted the significance of the Straits of 
Malacca
1
 as an international waterway. In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the safety of navigation and the security of the Straits has become an important agenda 
item for watchdogs beyond the littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
2
 
As straits used for international navigation, the strategic and economic importance of 
the Straits for the stakeholders
3
 particularly coastal
4
 and flag states
5
 are crucial.  
 
The question of navigational rights through and over international straits and the 
extension of the limits of the territorial sea had previously been contentious issues. A 
                                               
1  It should be noted that in this thesis the phrases ‘the Straits’ and ‘Straits of Malacca’ refer to 
both the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait unless otherwise stated. Malaysia is at the 
northern entrance to the straits and Singapore is at the southern entrance, which is the narrowest 
part of the Straits; thus both form the Straits: AG Hamid, ‘Maritime Terrorism, The Straits of 
Malacca and the Issue of State Responsibility’ (2006) 15 Tul.J.Int’l & Comp.L 155-179, 155. 
2  In the context of the Straits of Malacca the term ‘littoral states’ refers to the states bordering the 
Straits, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. 
3
  Stakeholders in the context of safety and security of the Straits of Malacca are referred to the 
coastal or littoral states, flag or user states including the shipping and insurance companies as 
well as maritime trade related industries. 
4  The term ‘coastal state’ refers to a state whose sovereignty ‘extends beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic state, in its waters, to an adjacent belt of sea 
described as the territorial sea. Such sovereignty extends to the column of air space over the 
territorial sea and to its seabed and subsoil’: Art 2 of the 1982 Convention. When the issue of 
strait is discussed it may also refer to as ‘strait state.’ A ‘strait state’ refers to a state bordering a 
strait used for international navigation as defined under Art 37 of the 1982 Convention: See  M 
George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, Petaling Jaya 2008) 
3. 
5  A ‘flag state’ is a state which has granted to a ship the right to sail under its flag. This rule is 
derived from Art 6 of the 1958 Convention and Art 92 of 1982 Convention. It also refers to a 
state that, within the terms of Art 94 of the 1982 Convention, effectively exercises its 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag: 
See George (2008) 3. It may also be referred to as a ‘user state.’ 
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joint statement by Malaysia and Indonesia in 1971 against the internalization of the 
Straits was seen as a deprivation of freedom of navigation to the maritime states.
6
 
Thus, the regime of transit passage in the 1982 Convention which guarantees ‘the 
freedom of navigation and over-flight solely for the purpose of continuous and 
expeditious transit’7 for foreign vessels and aircraft provided they respect the 
‘sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the 
straits’8 was introduced to compromise the competing interests of both the littoral 
states and other users of the Straits. It is apparent that the 1982 Convention has 
successfully concluded a compromise regime of transit passage in the strait that used 
for international navigation. However, the advantage of strategic location of the Straits 
of Malacca, coupled with high density of traffic in this narrow and shallow waterway 
has caused serious problems for the littoral states in that they have become a piracy 
hot spot.  
 
Piracy is not a new phenomenon. Pirates have been treated as outlaws and ‘the enemy 
of all mankind’ or ‘hostis humani generis.’9 The customary international law 
recognised the right of all states to capture and punish the perpetrator under the ambit 
of universal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the lack of international enforcement 
mechanisms to exercise such a right has made the international law of piracy, to some 
extent, unenforceable. Obviously, this is not an issue for international law of the sea 
alone. It has it roots in the basic discussion on international law itself.  Azubuike, for 
example, has questioned whether the international law is really a law as it is difficult 
                                               
6  M Leifer, Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia (vol.2, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, The  Netherlands 
1978) 93. 
7  Art  38 (2) of the 1982 Convention. 
8  Art 39 (1) (b) of the 1982 Convention. 
9  The Case of the S.S Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ, (Ser. A)  No.9, 70 (The Lotus Case). 
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to implement.
10
 Goldsmith and Posner also share this view when they claim that 
international law is merely a set of guidelines and does not create legal obligations.
11
 
Meanwhile, O’Connell argues otherwise. She relies on Grotius’ theory that regards 
international law as ‘law superior to other domestic law which may be enforced 
through the sanctions.’12 It is noteworthy that Grotius theory on the freedom of the sea 
has becomes the basis of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982 Convention).
13
 
 
Despite the existence of an established rule of customary international law on piracy, 
the 1982 Convention had included several provisions on piracy. Yet, nearly 30 years 
after the adoption of the 1982 Convention issues of maritime safety and security, 
particularly the risk of piracy and armed robbery at sea and its nexus with maritime 
terrorism, remain unsolved. The definition of piracy in the 1982 Convention which 
limits the application of the term ‘piracy’ merely to unlawful or violent acts that occur 
on the high seas with the motive of private gain become a matter of concern among 
scholars.
14
 This definition excludes similar acts of violence that occur in the territorial 
seas from the ambit of international law of piracy. Likewise the definition given by 
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) that considers ‘piracy’ as an activity 
that occurs on the high seas. If the incident occurs in the territorial seas of a state, it is 
merely known as ‘armed robbery against ships’ as stated in the IMO’s Code of 
                                               
10   L Azubuike, ‘International Law Regime Against Piracy’ (2009) 15 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp.L 
43, 43; JL Goldsmith and EA Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2005) 193-
195;  ME O’Connell, The Power & Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory and 
Practice of Enforcement (OUP, Oxford 2008) 2. 
11    Goldsmith and Posner (2005) 2. 
12   ME O’Connell (2008) 6. 
13  Cross refer to Chapter 2 (para 2.1.1) on the Controversy over Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum. 
14  Cross refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.2.2.2) on Piracy under the Regime of United Nations for 
discussion on Art 101 of the 1982 Convention. 
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Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships.
15
  Meanwhile, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s definition on piracy 
has not made any distinction on the location of the attacks.
16
 Nonetheless, the broad 
meaning of piracy by the IMB, has invited uneasiness among the littoral states. Since 
this narrow Straits mostly encompasses their territorial seas, such acts, if occurring in 
the Straits are clearly not acts of ‘piracy’ as defined under international law.  
Moreover, the term ‘piracy’ in international law has a legal implication which confers 
universal jurisdiction to any state to pursue the perpetrators as they are considered as 
an enemy against mankind. 
 
This situation has, more or less, portrayed the inefficiency and inadequacy of present 
international law of the sea especially in dealing with the modern threat of piracy 
which, according to some commentators, needs to be replaced or amended.
17
 In fact, 
the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Act (SUA Convention)
18
 and the Protocol of 2005 
to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol) have been created with 
                                               
15  Armed Robbery is defined as: 
(i) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends and   directed against a ship, or against persons or property on board such 
ship, in a place within a Contracting Party’s jurisdiction over such offences;  
(ii) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts 
making it a ship for armed robbery against ships; 
(iii) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraphs (1) 
or (2). 
16  ‘An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or 
any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that 
act.’ 2010 IMB-PRC Annual Report. 
17  RC Beckman ‘The Piracy Regime under UNCLOS: Problems and Prospects for Cooperation’ in 
RC Beckman, JA Roach (eds.) Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN: Prospects 
for Cooperation (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 2012) 18; Keyuan Zou, ‘Seeking 
Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at sea’ [2005]  59 J.Int’l Aff. 117,131;  Some of them 
have questioned whether this international law of the sea is really a law:  see L Azubuike, 
‘International Law Regime Against Piracy’(2009) 15 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp.L 43, 43. 
18  Adopted on 10 March 1988 (entered into force on 1 March 1992). 
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the intention to overcome the shortcomings of the 1982 Convention on the rules 
pertaining to piracy and other maritime crimes such as maritime terrorism. The scope 
of ‘unlawful acts’ in the SUA Convention is wider than that in the 1982 Convention as 
it covers any unlawful and intentional act of violence against a person on board a ship, 
or endangering the ship or damaging maritime navigational facilities regardless of the 
whereabouts of the offence committed.
19
 However, the question remains, whether it 
has solved the problem of piracy particularly in the Straits of Malacca?
20
  It is an 
established rule of international law that a treaty only creates legal obligations on the 
contracting states.
21
 The SUA Convention concentrates on the enforcement 
mechanism or appropriate action of the contracting states to deal with these maritime 
crimes. It has been suggested that, the SUA Convention is not an effective mechanism 
to contain the problem of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. This is due to non-
ratification by the key littoral states namely Malaysia and Indonesia to that 
Convention. Certainly, as they remain outside this treaty, the rules on the obligations 
of the contracting states of SUA Convention to prosecute or to extradite alleged 
offenders could not be imposed on them.  
 
In most cases international law will rely on municipal law to implement its rules and 
principles. O’Connell pointed out that ‘the difference between the international and 
municipal crime of piracy lies in the exercise of jurisdiction.’22 This view is also 
shared by Beckman when he argues that the law of piracy is determined by 
                                               
19   Art 3 of the 1988 SUA Convention provides that ‘Any person commits an offense if that person 
unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or 
any form of intimidation.’ 
20  Cross refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.3) for further discussion. 
21  Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 6th ed (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2003) 13. 
22  DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea (vol. 1, Clarendon Press Oxford 1982) 966. 
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international law, nevertheless the mechanism for its punishment is still subject to 
domestic law.
23
 Goldsmith and Posner apparently share this view as they believe that 
domestic law sanctions are more effective than international law’s sanctions.24  Thus 
to argue that existing international law is inadequate to suppress piracy and armed 
robbery against ships might depend on a state’s capability and willingness to enforce 
its power and employ its assets towards this end.  
 
In the context of the Straits, the pressure and burden to suppress piracy and armed 
robbery, although is the roles of every state, have been felt especially by the littoral 
states. The alarming increase in contemporary piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca 
and its designation as a war risk zone by Lloyds List in July 2005
25
 has prompted all 
littoral states and international instruments to strengthen the preventive measures to 
response to this. As one of the important straits in the world, the issue of piracy in the 
Straits has been sensationalised and thus, has been given attention by the international 
community.  
 
Sittnick criticised Malaysia and Indonesia for not being able to secure the Straits and 
thus should be held responsible for the dramatic increase of piracy in the Straits.
26
 
This accusation is unfounded. Although, the littoral states have argued that there are 
                                               
23  RC Beckman ‘The Piracy Regime under UNCLOS: Problems and Prospects for Cooperation’ in 
RC Beckman, JA Roach (eds.) Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN: Prospects 
for Cooperation (Edward Elgar Publishing, Oxon 2012) 18. 
24  JL Goldsmith and EA Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2005) 193-195. 
25       Yann-Huei Song ‘ Regional Maritime Security nitiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security 
in the Straits of Malacca: Littoral States’ and Regional Responses’ in Sea’ in Wu 
Shicun and Keyuan Zou (eds), Maritime Security in the South China Sea, Regional 
Implications and International Cooperation  (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy 
Studies Series, Ashgate, Surrey)109-134, 119. 
26  TM Sittnick ‘State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Persuading 
Indonesia and Malaysia to take additional Steps to Secure the Strait’ (2005) 14 Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal 743, 761-767. 
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no ‘piracy’ incidents in the Straits since most of the Straits encompass their territorial 
seas and there is no high seas area, they have continuously fostered the surveillance 
and enforcement capacity to secure the Straits.  
 
Malaysia, as one of the littoral states in the Straits, has relentlessly tried to ensure and 
maintain maritime security and safety in its area either through cooperative 
mechanisms bilaterally, trilaterally or regionally or by enhancing its internal military 
and legal capacity. Malaysia has participated in several discussions and seminars 
organised by IMO, ASEAN, ARF and ministerial meetings that promote cooperative 
mechanism among stakeholders to enhance safety and security in the Straits. Although 
until now it is not a party to the SUA Convention due to several national reasons,
27
 the 
adherence and efforts of Malaysia in implementing security measures proposed at 
international and regional level can be seen in the strengthening of its legal framework 
and enforcement mechanisms. The establishment of the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency by the 2004 Act (MMEA Act) is a prudent action taken by 
Malaysia to bolster its enforcement capability. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA) in many instances has successfully cooperated with the enforcement 
bodies of its counterparts; namely Indonesia and Singapore, to suppress piracy or 
armed robbery in the Straits. The tripartite security arrangement under the codename 
‘MALSINDO’ is one of the most successful cooperative actions taken by the three 
states. The improvement of enforcement action by these states would finally lead to 
the execution of the pirates in the local court. If the perpetrators are caught in the 
                                               
27  Interview with Mohd Helmy Ahmad, Principal Assistant Secretary, Maritime Security and 
Sovereignty Division, Prime Minister’s Department (Putrajaya, 20 February 2009, 11 November 
2010, 10 January 2011). 
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Straits but within the territorial sea of Malaysia, they are normally punished under the 
Malaysian Penal Code or the 1971 Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act.  
 
In a nutshell, the research background merely provides an overview of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. Since, the Straits is an important waterway to global 
trade, the thesis will study the holistic approach of  international law and international 
instruments, regional bodies and also state, particularly Malaysia, on this issue. It is 
aimed to determine to what extent international law, the regional cooperative 
mechanism as well as the Malaysian legal framework has adequately dealt with the 
issue. It is apparent that all states have to have a robust legal framework and consistent 
policy which is parallel with the spirit of international law to curb the problem of 
piracy and armed robbery against ship. This is to ensure that if the pirates or armed 
robbers are caught, states have sufficient domestic law to punish them.  
 
Kasmin pointed out that the effectiveness of enforcement agencies is evident by a 
reduction of illegal activities in their area of responsibility.
 28
 In other words, rampant 
criminal acts in one particular maritime area would mean that there is a lack of 
enforcement capability in securing that area.   Since the effectiveness of law and 
enforcement capability is usually measured by looking at the fluctuation and trend of a 
crime, the thesis provides an analysis of the trend of piracy and armed robbery from 
the year 2001 to 2010 according to the annual report of the Piracy Reporting Centre 
(PRC) of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).  It is noteworthy that, despite the 
IMB definition of piracy is controversial as it is not defined in accordance with 
                                               
28         Sutarji Kasmin, Efficiency Measurement of Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agencies (UKM,            
Bangi 2009) 216 and 224. 
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international law;
29
  the annual report of piracy produced by the IMB has been relied 
by most of the media and stakeholders in the world.  
 
Although in the theory of criminology, a statistical data is normally used to design 
crime prevention programs and to evaluate effectiveness of law,
30
 the piracy report of 
the IMB in the thesis is merely employs for the purpose of getting a general sight and 
as an additional support to the argument on the issue of adequacy of piracy law and 
cooperative mechanism that have already been implemented.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION  
It is surprising that there is a relative scarcity of academic literature written from the 
perspectives of the three littoral states, particularly from Malaysia and Indonesia. Thus 
the thesis is intended to provide holistic understanding of the issues on piracy and 
armed robbery against ships from the perspective of Malaysia. Many commentators 
have criticised the existing law of piracy and put forward a hypothesis that the current 
international law of the sea is no longer relevant and adequate to deal with the issue of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in the more sophisticated and contemporary 
world.
31
  However, despite the sharp increase in piracy incidents worldwide in recent 
                                               
29   IMB defined piracy as ‘An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent 
intent to commit theft or other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act’: See 2009 ICC-IMB-PRC Annual Report. 
30  LJ Siegel, Criminology: Theories, Patterns and Typologies (11th edn Wadsworth, Belmont 
2013) 6-7.  
31  RC Beckman ‘The Piracy Regime under UNCLOS: Problems and Prospects for Cooperation’ in 
RC Beckman, JA Roach (eds.) Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN: Prospects 
for Cooperation (Edward Elgar Publishing, Oxon 2012) 17; GR Constantinople ‘Towards a New 
Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident’ (1986) 26 Va.J.Int’l L. 724, 745-748; EC Stiles 
‘Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy’ (2004) 27 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L.Rev 299, 322; PA Buhler, ‘New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a Revised 
Definition of Maritime Piracy, (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J 61,67; CH Crockett ‘Towards A 
Revision of the International Law of Piracy’(1977) 26 DePaul L Rev. 78,84; (Graham Gerard 
Ong-Webb ‘Ships Can be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s 
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years, the world has seen a dramatic decrease in such crime in the Straits of Malacca. 
Hence, the central question of the entire thesis is to determine to what extend the 
present international law, instruments, policies and the Malaysian legal framework is 
adequate to respond to the challenges of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of 
Malacca from the Malaysian perspective. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis undertakes a qualitative study that mainly involves documentary, library 
and internet resource research of previous literature, documents and official 
documents of the United Nations, IMO and annual reports of IMB and the 
Government of Malaysia on piracy and armed robbery at sea. Apart from the legal 
analysis, a historical perspective is also emphasised to fully understand the nature and 
concept of the law in context, to determine its adequacy and relevancy in the current 
situation. Since the thesis focuses on piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of 
Malacca from the Malaysian perspective, several interview sessions with Malaysian 
government officers and representatives of national maritime institutions including 
National Security Council of Prime Minister department, Royal Malaysian Navy 
(RMN), Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) officers and the 
Prosecuting Officers in the Attorney General Office were also undertaken in Malaysia 
to obtain their unofficial view on the government policy in order to support some 
arguments in the thesis and to ascertain their standpoint on this issue. This thesis 
studies the individual and cooperative efforts of states, particularly Malaysia, in 
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships, in an attempt to determine the 
                                                                                                                                       
Maritime Security Framework’ in d Johnson and M Valencia (eds.)  Piracy in Southeast Asia, 
Status, Issues, and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 2005) 53. 
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adequacy of current policies in dealing with piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
the Straits. It also examines and analyses the cooperative measures involving the 
littoral states and the stakeholders which have contributed to the decrease in piracy 
and armed robbery incidents, as measured in the statistical data of the IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre. 
 
1.4 WHY IS THE STRAITS OF MALACCA THE FOCUS OF THIS 
THESIS? 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA 
As the Straits contribute considerably to the maritime and shipping industry of the 
world in general and its coastal states in particular, it is important to highlight the 
fundamental factors that lead to this vital contribution before further examining the 
legal framework that covers this area and the crime of piracy and armed robbery that 
arises due to congestion in the strategic location of the Straits. Thus, this chapter 
points out the significance of the Straits in terms of three contexts: geographical, 
climatic and historical. These two factors have boosted the economic development of 
the littoral States. The historical context of the Straits is accentuated to present an 
overview of the past status of the Straits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
1.4.1 GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
The Straits have long been accepted as one of the most important and busiest shipping 
lanes in the world.
32
 Ptolemy’s geography indicates that the Malay Peninsula 
(including Malacca) was known as the ‘Golden Khersonese’.33 The ‘golden’ 
description appended to the word ‘Khersonese’, which is used in reference to the 
Malay Peninsula, signifies the economic importance of the Malay Peninsula.
34
 
 
Picture 1: Map of the Straits of Malacca
35
 
                                               
32  HM Ibrahim and HA Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective 
(Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 2008) xiii; DB Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: 
Gateway or Gauntlet? (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal 2003) 7.  
33  P Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay 
Peninsula before A.D 1500 (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur 1961) 144-146; R 
Braddell, A Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca and Notes 
on Ancient Times in Malaya (MBRAS, 1980) 460; Thomas Suarez, Early Mapping of Southeast 
Asia (Tuttle Publishing, North Clarendon 1994) 84. 
34  Wheatley (1961) 145. See also Freeman (2003) at 54. Grotius also mentioned the ‘Golden 
Chersonesus’, which he believed referred to Japan: RVD Magoffin (tr), The Freedom of the 
Seas: The right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade. A Dissertation 
by Hugo Grotius (OUP, New York 1916) 41. 
35  The picture of the map of straits of Malacca is taken from:  
    <www.welt- atlas.de/map_of_strait_of_malacca_6-847> accessed 20 May 2011. 
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Geographically, the Straits are defined as a funnel-shaped passage stretching from the 
Asian mainland, between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and connecting the eastern 
and western continents.
36
 The Straits are strategically located between the coastline of 
Malaysia and Singapore to the east and the Indonesian Island of Sumatra to the west. 
The Straits stretch for approximately 600 miles, becoming narrower in the southern 
part. At its narrowest it is less than 3km wide, between the Riau Islands of Southern 
Sumatra and Singapore. At its shallowest, the reported depth is only 25 metres.
37
 It is 
difficult for large vessels to pass through these Straits at normal speed, but the aim of 
minimizing transport costs outweighs the technical difficulties that might be faced in 
passing through this shallow waterway.
38
 
 
Notwithstanding the funnel shape and the shallowness of the Straits, about 600 
commercial vessels laden with a variety of valuable commodities and half of the 
world’s oil are estimated to use the Straits each day.39 This is three times higher than 
                                               
36  Freeman (2003) 7; U Nihan, ‘Current Legal Developments Straits of Malacca: Protecting the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore against Piracy and Terrorism’ (2006) 21 Int’l J.Marine & 
Coastal L. 539; M Leifer, (1978) at 52.  
37  The length of the Straits consists of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, measured together. See 
M George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis Malaysia, 
Petaling Jaya 2008) 6; Leifer (1978) 52; Freeman (2003) 7; A H Ansari and N A Kamal, 
‘Prevention, Abatement and Control of Pollution of Straits: An Appraisal with special reference 
to the Straits of Malacca’ [2005] 3 Malaya Law Journal 37; CS Kuppusamy, ‘Straits of Malacca: 
Security implication’ South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No.1033  
<www.saag.org/papers11/paper1033.html> accessed 20 August 2007. Some writers prefer to 
measure these Straits individually. For example Ong-Webb describes the length of Malacca 
Strait as 805 kilometres at the northern part, added to the 105 kilometres of the Singapore Strait 
at its southern part: GG Ong-Webb, ‘Introduction, Southeast Asian Piracy: Research and 
Developments’ in GG Ong-Webb (ed), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca 
Straits (ISEAS, Singapore 2006) xxxvi;  Ana G.Lopez Martin, International Straits: Concept, 
Classification and Rules of Passage (Springer, Madrid 2010) 104. 
38  Freeman (2003) 6. 
39  JS Burnett, Dangerous Waters Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (Penguin, New 
York 2003) 1-2; HM Ibrahim, HA Husin and D Sivaguru ‘The Straits of Malacca: Setting the 
Scene’ in HM Ibrahim and HA Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s 
Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 2008) 32; IISS ‘Shipping in South-
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the volume of vessels which passed through the Straits each day 32 years ago.
40
 It is 
predicted that the number of vessels transiting the straits annually will rocket from 
70,000 vessels in 2007 to 140,000 by 2020.
41
  The types of vessels using the Straits 
include general cargo ships, bulk carriers, very large crude carriers (VLCC), Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) and Liquefied Natural gas (LNG) carriers and other types of 
vessels including naval and fishing vessels. Around thirty to forty per cent of all the 
transit vessels are oil tankers.
42
 Japan alone contributes to almost eighty per cent of 
the oil shipped.
43
  
 
It may therefore be submitted that the Straits can justifiably claim to be ranked among 
the most valuable and critical trade routes, not only for maritime nations and 
international users but also for the surrounding littoral states. However, the continuing 
increase in the number of vessels using the Straits daily also potentially adds to the 
vulnerability of, and hazards to, the areas surrounding the Straits. The foreseen and 
real peril is not limited merely to the environmental aspect of the Straits but also 
extends to the safety and security of the Straits from maritime crime such as piracy, 
armed robbery and maritime terrorism. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
East Asia: Going for the jugular’ (Singapore, 10 June 2004); --‘Malaysia says joint patrols with 
Indonesia, Singapore in Malacca Straits can be examined’, The Star (Kuala Lumpur, 17 April 
2007); EL Teck, ’Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Past, Present and Future Cooperation’,  
<www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/conferences/som04/papers/lim.pdf>, accessed 30 September 
2007. 
40  Malaysian Digest, Kuala Lumpur, 15 August 1976. 
41  Ibrahim and Husin (2008) xiv;  Ibrahim, Husin and Sivaguru (2008) 35. 
42  Freeman (2003) 114. 
43  ibid. See also: H Ahmad, The Straits of Malacca: International Cooperation in Trade, Funding 
and Navigational Safety (Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya 1997) 87. 
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1.4 .2 CLIMATIC CONTEXT 
Apart from the advantage of their strategic location, the Straits also reaps the 
advantages of the monsoon winds.
44
 The monsoon was among the contributing factors 
in the development of shipping technology and international commerce between the 
east and west trade routes in the fifteenth century. The wind patterns directly facilitate 
the navigation of voyagers and traders.  
 
The north-east monsoon winds normally start in the month of November and last until 
March.
45
 Historically, merchants and traders from Arabia and India would have been 
brought to the Malay Peninsula during this period with the aid of the monsoon winds. 
Long regarded as a strategic location joining the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ports 
adjacent to the Straits were ideal transit points for traders and voyagers. While waiting 
for the south-west monsoon, which normally lasts from June to September and which 
would have blown them towards the South China Sea, the traders took the opportunity 
to do business and trade with other foreign and local traders in the ports.
46
 One of the 
factors which encouraged foreign traders to sail for the Malay Peninsula during one 
monsoonal wind system and then return to their home countries a few months later by 
means of another was that they were able to shelter from the variable winds during 
April and May.
47
 Thus, traders in this era were well-versed as to the patterns of 
monsoonal wind circulation. While traders were sheltering from the monsoon winds, 
this transit period was also an opportunity for foreign merchants to meet their 
                                               
44  Ibrahim and Husin (2008) xiv; George (2008) 7. 
45   Freeman (2003) 21. 
46  Freeman (2003) 21, Wheatley (1980) xviii. 
47  Wheatley (1980) xx; AJ Halimi, Perdagangan dan Perkapalan Melayu di Selat Melaka (Dewan 
Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur 2006) 15. 
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counterparts and exchange goods efficiently at such a strategic entrepôt.
48
 This 
eventually made the Malay Peninsula, especially the port of Malacca, into a famous 
trading centre and entrepôt for long-distance trade in that era. 
 
1.4.3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The strategic location of Malacca and the reliable monsoon wind system have been 
acknowledged as factors that led to economic prosperity and political stability in 
Malacca. Pires states that:  
Men cannot estimate the worth of Malacca, on account of its greatness 
and profit. Malacca is a city that was made for merchandise, fitter than 
any other in the world; the end of monsoons and the beginning of 
others. Malacca is surrounded and lies in the middle, and the trade and 
commerce between the different nations for a thousand leagues on 
every hand must come to Malacca.
49
 
 
The achievement of Malacca during the era of sail was immense, and might be 
associated with its having had a great ruler or a far-sighted founder. Thus, the need to 
have some idea of the origin of Malacca is apparent in order to understand its early 
history.  
 
Although there are not many recorded facts concerning the history of the Kingdom of 
Malacca, the sources of Tome Pires,
50
 the Malay Annals,
51
 Fei Hsin
52
 and the Ma 
                                               
48  The word entrepôt is French and refers to a port or other place which acts as a centre for import 
and export. This word is commonly used during the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth 
century: See The Oxford Dictionary of English (OUP, Oxford, 2000); Freeman (2003) 22; N 
Husin ‘Historical Development of Coastal Ports and Towns in the Straits of Malacca’ in HM 
Ibrahim and HA Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (MIMA, 
Kuala Lumpur 2008) 11. 
49  A Cortesao (ed), The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires: An Account of the East from the Red Sea to 
Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515 and The Book of Francisco Rodrigues: Rutter 
of a voyage in the Red Sea, Nautical Rules, Almanack and Maps, Written and Drawn in the East 
Before 1515 (2nd series Hakluyt Society, London 1944) 286. 
50  Cortesao (1944) 286. 
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Huan
53
 are principal references for the early history of Malacca. However, it should be 
noted that the early history of Malacca in these sources is quite confused. The sources 
are in conflict with one another in some aspects of the story, including the question as 
to who was the founder of Malacca. This is probably due to the differences in 
translations of the primary sources.
54
  
 
According to Halimi, one of the main commentators, Malacca was founded by the 
Prince of Palembang,
55
 Parameswara, during the year 1400.
56
 Parameswara left 
Palembang after being attacked by the King of Java. He fled to Singapore and stayed 
there for about five years. After hearing that the King of Siam wanted to attack 
Singapore, he fled to near the river of Muar before moving to Bretam,
57
 now a part of 
Malacca. This, however, differs from the account of Pires who asserts that the town of 
Malacca was founded by Chaquem Daraxa (Muhammad Iskandar Shah), the son of 
                                                                                                                                       
51  This is the only recorded source available in the Classic Malay language written in the fifteenth 
century. It was believed to have been first compiled and edited by Tun Sri Lanang, the Prime 
Minister of the Royal Court of Johor in 1612 (although some scholars argue that it was written 
before 1536) The Annals are entitled Sulalatus Salatin in Arabic, meaning the genealogy or 
descent of kings: see CB Kheng & AR Ismail (tr), Sejarah Melayu, The Malay Annals (MBRAS, 
Kuala Lumpur 1998). 
52  R Ptak (ed), JVG Mills (tr): Hsing Ch’a Sheng Lan, The Overall Survey of the Star Raft by Fei 
Hsin (revd Harrossowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 1996). 
53  JVG Mills (ed), Ma Huan (1414-1451), Feng, Chengjun (1885-1946), Yingyai Shenglan: ‘The 
Overall Survey of the Oceans Shores [1433] (Thailand White Lotus, Bangkok 1997). 
54  See Ptak (1996) 53: There were differences in the translation of the words Shan Ku which, 
according to Mills, means ‘a single hill’ which suggests that Malacca’s topography was mainly 
dominated by one single hill. cf. Wheatley (1961) 324, who has translated this sentence as ‘the 
coast is rocky and desolate, the population sparse’ which seems to imply ‘the hills are deserted.’ 
However, this discrepancy in the intriguing story of the early history of Malacca will not be 
discussed in detail. 
55  Palembang is located at the South of the Indonesian Island of Sumatra. See also: N Husin 
‘Historical Development of Coastal Ports and Towns in the Straits of Malacca’ in HM Ibrahim 
and HA Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (MIMA, Kuala 
Lumpur 2008) 8-23. 
56  Halimi (2006) 65; Freeman (2003) 83; RO Winstedt, ‘The Malay Founder of Medieval Malacca’ 
(1948) 12 Bulletin of the SOAS 726-729. 
57   Cortesao (1944) 229-232. 
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Parameswara, who later became his successor.
58
 Muhammad Iskandar Shah had 
decided to settle on the hill of Malacca after he saw a mouse deer get the better of a 
dog and believed that this was a good sign for the place.
59
  
 
After Parameswara died, Muhammad Iskandar Shah ordered the people of Bretam to 
come to Malacca and he appointed the Celate mandarins as his guards. It is important 
to note that the people of Celates or Bugis
60
 were among the earliest inhabitants of 
Malacca. They were originally people of Macassar Island who were described by 
Pires as the ‘greatest thieves than any in the world’ and as corsairs.61 These Celate 
mandarins served the Sultanate of Malacca with whole-hearted loyalty. With their 
assistance, Muhammad Iskandar Shah successfully expanded the population of 
Malacca and attracted wealthy merchants from other countries, including India and 
Arabia.
62
 He established a good reputation with neighbouring countries such as Java 
and Pasai at Sumatra. By 1409, the historian Fei Hsin stated that the Empire of 
Malacca had been awarded the title of ‘country’ by the Emperor of China.63 The 
respectful relationship between Muhammad Iskandar Shah and the Emperor of China 
enabled Malacca to flourish and to become among the busiest and the most important 
port in the world, and the title ‘the throat of Venice’ was used by Pires to describe the 
importance of Malacca.
64
  
 
 
                                               
58   ibid. at 236-237; Cf  the founder of Malacca was Parameswara and not his son. See S H Hoyt, 
Old Malacca (OUP, Kuala Lumpur 1993) 1-2. 
59  Cortesao (1944) 236-237. 
60  ‘The Javanese call them Bugis and the Malays call them this and Celates’: Cortesao (1944) 227. 
61  Cortesao (1944) 226. 
62  Cortesao (1944) 240. 
63  Mills (1997) 108-109. 
64  Cortesao (1944) 287; see also Halimi (2006) 65. 
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Although scholars have differed in some points on the early history of Malacca, such 
as the identity of the founder of Malacca, they are agreed that the second ruler of 
Malacca was the one who brought economic prosperity to Malacca and made the 
country a peaceful and convenient place for the establishment of the port. The 
Malacca Sultanate lasted for about one hundred years until defeated in 1511 by the 
Portuguese, led by Afonso de Albuquerque.
65
 The intervention of a colonial power in 
this lucrative area is believed to have occurred for commercial reasons, so that 
Portugal could exercise dominion over the eastern trade routes.
66
 Freeman has argued 
that, although the Malay Peninsula was called the ‘Golden Khersonese’, the main 
reason which induced the Western countries such as Portugal, England and The 
Netherlands to colonize Southeast Asia was not gold.
67
 It was in fact the spice trade 
which had motivated them to travel to the East.
68
 Nonetheless, following the 
intervention of these countries, there were substantial changes in the political, cultural 
and economic structure of Malacca and other states in Southeast Asia, particularly the 
Malay Archipelago. Malacca had become part of the Federation of Malay States 
(Malaya) before it was declared an independent state on 31 August 1957. The 
Federation of Malaya changed its name to Malaysia in 1963.
69
 Singapore had 
previously joined Malaysia in 1963 but two years later quit the Federation to form its 
own sovereign state.
70
 Despite the change of reign and administration of the littoral 
                                               
65  Halimi (2006) 37; Leifer (1978) 8. 
66   Ram Prakash Anand, International and Developing Countries: Confrontation or Cooperation 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Boston 1987) 54; Leifer (1978) 9. 
67  Freeman (2003) 54. 
68  The term ‘spice trade’ usually refers to European motives for navigating to Asia. See EJ 
Hamilton, ‘The Role of Monopoly in the Overseas Expansion and Colonial Trade of Europe 
Before 1800’ (1948) 38 American Economic Review 36-38. 
69  RS Milne, ‘Malaysia’ (1964) Asian Survey 695. 
70  ibid. 
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states, the Straits of Malacca have continued to prosper as an important waterway in 
the world. 
 
1.5  LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Since the thesis mainly focuses on the act of piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
the Straits of Malacca, current controversial issues such as the potential of nexus 
between piracy and terrorism and the UN Security Council resolutions to deal with the 
piracy problem in the Horn of Africa are not discussed in detail. The thesis mainly 
emphasises the perspective of Malaysian, other littoral States’ view or legal 
frameworks will not be highlighted in details unless it renders necessary. The analysis 
of the statistical data of piracy reports is limited to ten years beginning 2001 because 
the cut off date of the data collected is until December 2010. It is noteworthy that, 
despite the few  centres that report incidents of piracy globally or regionally,
71
 the 
thesis mainly extracted piracy reports from the IMB. This is because the quarterly and 
annually piracy and armed robbery report of the IMB is a well-known source available 
online to the shipping industries, media and international community which was 
established in 1992. 
 
1.6  ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The reason for choosing the Straits of Malacca for this study is first highlighted in the 
introductory chapter. The significance and crucial importance of the Straits to the 
world’s shipping industry has continuously attracted the attention of the international 
community to any danger be it real, such as piracy and armed robbery against ships, or 
                                               
71   IMB, IMO and ReCAAP. 
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potential, such as maritime terrorism. The historical and legal analysis of the Straits of 
Malacca as Straits used for international navigation is discussed in chapter two. This 
chapter determines the juridical status of the Straits after examining the evolution of 
the International Law of the Sea and related rights and duties of state that are derived 
from it. This is due to the legal implication of the right of passage in territorial seas 
which are considered as straits used for international navigation is different from those 
which are not. The third chapter focuses on the main topic of this research, namely 
piracy and armed robbery against ships generally in the context of public international 
law. The historical background and the development of international law of the sea 
and piracy are highlighted in order to fully appreciate the nature of this age-old crime 
and its definitional issue which remains unsolved. The reality of contemporary piracy, 
the relevance of universal jurisdiction and the attempt to assimilate it with maritime 
terrorism is also discussed briefly without delving too deeply into the crime of 
terrorism. In analysing these issues, the main references are the 1982 Convention and 
SUA Convention.  
 
While these two chapters form Part One of the thesis which mainly discusses the 
general principles of the international law of the sea regarding the regime of strait and 
piracy, Part Two of the thesis will focus on the development of law and policy in 
safeguarding the Straits of Malacca against such crime, in particular on the Malaysian 
response. The first chapter in Part Two namely chapter four, commences the 
discussion on the issue of safety and security in the Straits of Malacca from the 
historical overview before embarking on the present threat of piracy and armed 
robbery against ship. Since the Straits has long been recognised as an important 
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waterway, the crime of piracy has also been its inherent problem since time 
immemorial. The extent of risk and threat of piracy in the Straits is assessed by 
evaluating the incidences of attack, types and vulnerability of vessels. The extra-legal 
factors underlying piracy and armed robbery and the different types of piracy attacks 
are also examines in order to identify its root problem. Once these issues are 
identified, the response of the stakeholders at regional and national level are examined 
to study how far the cooperative and enforcement mechanism are undertaken to tackle 
the issue of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. Chapter five discusses the 
response of regional and extra-regional bodies and states in securing the Straits such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), The Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
(RMSI) and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).  
 
Since the thesis mainly investigates the perspectives of Malaysia in securing the 
Straits from piracy and armed robbery, chapter six thoroughly examines Malaysian 
legal framework and response on this. The emergence of the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and its challenge as the sole enforcement agency for 
Malaysia is a central discussion in this chapter. Then, the jurisdiction of court to 
punish piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits which is provided under 
the 1964 Court of Judicature Act, the Penal Code and the 1971 Firearms (Increased 
Penalties) Act, is examined with elaboration on few example of incidents which have 
taken place in the Straits. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the current 
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development of the Malaysian first experience in prosecuting high seas piracy. 
Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis.  
 
1.7 CONCLUSION & CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE. 
The thesis attempts to answer the research question on the adequacy of law and 
enforcement mechanism that deal with piracy armed robbery against ships through 
analysis of general principles of international law and instruments, analysis of risks 
and threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits, the trends and types of reported 
attacks and extra-legal factors underlying these acts. Although Malaysia does not have 
a special law on piracy and is not a contracting party to the 1988 SUA Convention and 
ReCAAP, the thesis has found that Malaysia has an enforcement capability and 
adequate law to suppress piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. However, it is 
suggested that as a matter of convenience, Malaysia has to enact specific laws on 
piracy and armed robbery against ship. Due to scarcity of academic research on piracy 
and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca from the Malaysian perspective, it is 
hoped that such a legal analysis which is intended to provide a holistic view on the 
legal framework governing piracy and armed robbery at international, regional and 
state level may enlighten any controversial issues arising out of this.  
 CHAPTER TWO 
A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF STRAITS OF MALACCA AS 
STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse historical and legal developments in the law of 
the sea and straits used for international navigation with special reference to the legal 
status of the Straits. It begins with a discussion of the evolution of the international 
law of the sea and the general principles of public international law on straits used for 
international navigation. It then determines the legal status of the Straits prior to and 
after the adoption of the 1982 Convention and the issue of rights of passage conferred 
on this Straits. Finally, the document concludes by evaluating the Straits as straits 
used for international navigation and the inherent problems which remain unsolved.   
 
2. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES ON 
DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME JURISDICTION ZONE 
The study of the chronological development of the international law of the sea is 
essential before the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits is 
analysed. This study provides the historical background that led to the establishment 
of the present legal framework on the maritime breadth and the regime of passage in 
the strait used for international navigation in general and the Straits of Malacca in 
particular. Although most commentators have suggested that the present 1982 
Convention on the law of the sea is inadequate, the difficulties and the lengthy and 
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painstaking process of reaching a consensus on some provisions of law
1
 have 
demonstrated the unfeasibility of drastically amending this final convention.
2
 
 
2.1  PRE-UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA  
2.1.1  THE CONTROVERSY OVER MARE LIBERUM AND MARE CLAUSUM 
After careful examination of the background history of Malacca, it might be inferred 
that the development of the principles of the freedom of the seas has a connection with 
the Portuguese intervention in the east-west trade route during the sixteenth century. 
This is evident from the dissertation written by Hugo Grotius on the theory of freedom 
of the seas, Mare Liberum.
3
 Grotius, the eminent Dutch jurist, is regarded as the 
‘father of the science of International Law.’4 It is undeniable that his original purpose 
in writing this legal opinion was to challenge Portuguese and Spanish domination
5
 of 
the sea routes to the East Indies.
6
 Indeed, Grotius was a lawyer who was retained by 
the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) to deal with this matter.
7
 According to Scott, in 
                                               
1   Hudson also describes the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as ‘the world’s 
largest and longest conference…’: R Hudson ‘The International struggle for a Law of the Sea’ 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December 1977) 14. 
2
    See discussion on the weakness of the 1982 Convention in Chapter 3.3. 
3  Published in 1608. See RR Churchill & AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn Manchester 
University Press, Manchester 1999) 3-4; RVD Magoffin (tr), The Freedom of the Seas: The right 
which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade. A Dissertation by Hugo 
Grotius (OUP, New York 1916) 7-11. 
4   W Rattigan, ‘The Great Jurists of the World: Hugo Grotius’(1905) 6 J.Soc.Comp.Legis. 1, 78. 
5   At that time Portugal had been united with Spain. See RP Anand, ‘Maritime Practice in South-
East Asia until 1600 AD and the Modern Law of the Sea’ (1981) 30 ICLQ 442. 
6   DP O’Connell (IA Shearer (ed.)) The International Law of the Sea (vol 1, Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1982) 9; E Fletcher, ‘John Selden (Author of Mare Clausum) and His Contribution to 
International Law’ (1933) 19 Transactions of the Grotius Society, Problems of Peace and War 7; 
MB Vieira ‘Mare liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on 
Dominion over the seas’, (2003) 64 Journal of the History of Ideas, 361; PB Potter, The 
Freedom of the Seas in History, Law and Politics (Longmans, Green and Co, London 1924) 57. 
7   O’Connell (1982) 9; Francis W Kelsey (tr), Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis libri tres  (vol 
2,Clarendon Press, Oxford 1925) xi. 
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the commentary of the De Jure Pradae,
8
 it is believed that Grotius was retained by the 
DEIC to justify the capture of a Portuguese galleon by a Dutch vessel, which occurred 
in 1602 near the Straits of Malacca,
9
 during the war between the Dutch and Spanish.
10
 
The Portuguese galleon Santa Catharina was brought to Amsterdam to be sold as a 
prize and this had triggered dissatisfaction among the Portuguese. Following this, 
Grotius propounded his theory of the ‘freedom of the seas’, which he regarded as res 
nullius. The sea, being the property of no-one, can be possessed in common, as res 
communes.
11
 Grotius stated that: 
For do not the oceans, navigable in every direction with which God 
has encompassed all the earth, and the regular and the occasional 
winds which blow now from one quarter and now from another, offer 
sufficient proof that nature has given to all peoples a right of access 
to all other people.
12
 
The basis of Grotius’s theory is derived from the natural law which he claimed was 
equal for all nations. In fact, his theory was based mainly on arguments by Cicero, 
Ovid, Ulpian and Vasquez.
13
 He believed that the right to trade on the sea, which by 
its nature is not capable of appropriation, might be considered a feature of the jus 
gentium.
14
 Nevertheless, Grotius’s theory in Mare Liberum attracted the emergence of 
an opposite view. John Selden, an English jurist who propounded the theory of 
maritime dominion, had commenced writing his remarkable work, Mare Clausum, 
                                               
8   The manuscript of De Jure Pradae which was written by Grotius in the year 1604-1605 was 
discovered in 1868. Mare Liberum was considered to be the twelfth chapter of De jure 
Pradae:Vieira (2003) 361; Rattigan (1905) 76. 
9   JB Scott, introductory note in Kelsey (1925) xi; O’Connell (1982) 9; The capture of the Santa 
Catharina occurred in 1961: Anand, (1987) 7. 
10   Portugal was part of the Spanish empire: Anand (1987) 7 & 54.  
11   Res Communes is understood as ‘things common to all’ and is derived from the Roman Emperor 
Justinian’s classification of res (things): see WW Buckland (rev P Stein), A text-book of Roman 
Law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1966) 182-
183. 
12   Magoffin (1916) 7. 
13   See Magoffin (1916) 23-28; Freitas disagreed with the argument of Grotius based on a passage 
from Ulpian which Freitas believed was truncated by Grotius to favour his conclusion: Vieira 
(203) 374. 
14   O’Connell (1982) 9. 
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around 1617 or 1618, and this was finally published in 1635.
15
 His work had taken 
into account the Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli ac Pacis of Grotius. In fact, Selden 
started writing his thesis on Mare Clausum as a consequence of the capture of Dutch 
fishing vessels in Greenland waters.
16
 This area was claimed to be the property of 
England. However, only seventeen years later, during the reign of King Charles I, 
there was an order for Mare Clausum to be published.
17
 The two key points of Mare 
Clausum as pointed out by Galdorisi and Vienna are, first, that the sea is capable of 
being a private dominion as it is not common property to all men and, second, that the 
King of England is lord of the sea.
18
 This is different from the view of Grotius.
19
  The 
basis for Selden’s view was quite extensive as he had referred to many views from 
ancient times, including those of Antiochus IV,
20
 the people of Tyre,
21
 the people of 
the Levant
22
 and Minos.
23
 In the second part of his treatise, Selden argued that the 
British had secured dominion at sea ever since pre-Roman times. He had adduced all 
relevant evidence from English history to prove the existence of British power, which 
included their fishing areas.
24
 Although the discussion put forward by Selden has 
evidenced the possibility of maritime dominion, as a matter of legal right it was 
                                               
15  DJ Padwa, ‘On the English Translation of John Selden’s Mare Clausum’ (1960) 54 AJIL 157; 
PB Potter, The Freedom of the Seas in History, Law and Politics (Longmans, Green and Co, 
London 1924) 58. 
16
   Fletcher (1933) 8. 
17   ibid. 
18  G Galdorisi and KR Vienna, Beyond the Law of the Sea: New Directions for US Oceans Policy 
(Greenwood Press, London 1997) 16. 
19   Vieira (2003) 362. 
20  Antiochus IV, Epiphanies, was the King of Syria in 176 BC, and is quoted as saying ‘are not 
both the sea and the land mine?’See Potter (1924) 12. 
21  The people of Tyre had practised absolute dominion of the sea which they called ‘a Tyrian sea.’ 
See Potter (1924) 12. 
22  The people of the Levant had recognised the possibility of controlling the sea: Potter (1924) 11. 
23  Minos had been mentioned by Thucydides, Diodorus Siculus and Aristotle as having exercised 
maritime dominion which was believed to have existed in pre-Christian times. See Potter (1924) 
13. 
24  Rattigan (1905) 80; Fletcher (1933) 8-10. Potter takes the view that Selden’s work was superior 
to Grotius in term of historical study of the existence of sea dominion prior to the year 1650: 
Potter (1924) 64. 
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uncertain whether this theory had been recognized by all nations.
25
 Grotius’ theory 
was not as famous as that of Selden during his time. Only in the late eighteenth or 
early nineteenth centuries, in the era of colonization, did the theory of the ‘free sea’ 
become popular.
26
 
To sum up, it can be considered that the arguments put forward by both Grotius and 
Selden were used to justify the interests of the country or the company to which they 
belonged. However, their work has contributed significantly to the development of the 
international law of the sea. Although Grotius clearly mentioned the acceptance of 
freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean since medieval times, his discussion on the 
theory of maritime dominion and maritime liberty is primarily concerned with the 
Western practice. The long traditions of Eastern countries, particularly in the Indian 
Ocean, on the freedom of navigation and liberty of commerce have not been 
thoroughly examined.
27
 Indeed, the rival theories of Selden and Grotius were used by 
the countries they represented to extend their rights over the adjacent sea and to justify 
their right to trade in other parts of the world. 
 
2.1.2 THE CANNON-SHOT RULE AND THE THREE-MILE FIXED LIMIT OF 
THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
Although the debates over the theory of freedom of seas in Mare Liberum versus the 
sovereignty of the seas in Mare Clausum occurred over many centuries, this has since 
led to a more realistic and practical understanding of the notion of a territorial sea. 
                                               
25  Selden was sceptical of the universality of Roman law as proposed by Grotius and Gentili. 
Gentili was the author of the work De Jure Belli ac Pacis. See MA Ziskind, ‘Criticism and 
Affirmation of the Common Law Tradition’ (1975) 19 American Journal of Legal History 1, 37. 
26  See Anand (1981) 450; AL Sanguin, ‘Geopolitical scenarios, from the Mare Liberum to the 
Mare Clausum: The High Sea and the Case of the Mediterranean Basin’ (1997) 2 Geoadria 52. 
27   Anand (1981) 442, 447. 
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Neither the absolute freedom of the seas nor complete maritime dominion has been 
accepted in total. The prevailing view accepts the coherent status of land and water of 
a sovereign state and is evidenced by state practice on the law of the coastal sea.
28
 
When states realized the importance of the natural resources of the sea, the practice of 
expanding the jurisdiction of a state to the surrounding waters became expedient. 
However, the question of the actual breadth of the territorial waters remained 
unsettled until serious debate was undertaken in the twentieth century.    
It is worth mentioning that attempts to limit sovereignty over the sea had been 
mentioned even before Grotius and Selden wrote their treatises. As early as 1400, 
Baldus Ubaldus
29
 had suggested sixty miles as being the limit of sovereign rights over 
the seas.
30
 This suggestion was not widely discussed until the doctrine known as the 
‘cannon-shot rule’ was formulated. The cannon-shot rule was propounded by 
Cornelius van Bynkershoek, a Dutch jurist, in his work De Dominio Maris, published 
in 1702.
31
 This rule suggests that the coastal states’ maritime rights were the distance 
that cannon could fire from shore.
32
 Bynkershoek’s ideas can be considered a blend of 
the two famous theories of the freedom of the seas and the theory of state sovereignty 
over its adjacent waters.
33
 Bynkershoek proposed two maxims. The first was mare 
terra proximum which refers to the capability of states to include certain portions of 
                                               
28  O’Connell (1982) 124; C Phillipson, ‘Cornelius Van Bynkershoek’ (1908) 9 Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Legislation 36. 
29  He was a student of Bartolus, an Italian jurist. See Scott C Truver, The Straits of Gibraltar and 
the Mediterranean. (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn The Netherlands, 1980). Some 
commentators state his name as Baldus de Ubaldis. For the detail backgrounds and contributions 
of Baldus see: JD Wilson, ‘Baldus de Ubaldis’ (1902) 12 Yale Law Journal 8-20. 
30  RS Trigg, ‘National Sovereignty over Maritime Resources’ (1950) 99 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 82-83. 
31  Phillipson (1908) 27; 34. 
32  A hypothetical cannon-shot is defined by Brownlie as ‘a belt over which cannon could range if 
they were placed along the whole seaboard’: Brownlie (2003) 175. 
33  Churchill & Lowe (1999) 72. 
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the seas under their exclusive jurisdiction. The second was that the ‘seas are entirely 
surrounded by the neighbouring territory of any particular state, with an outlet into the 
ocean, of which both shores are exclusively occupied by it.’34 The examples he gave 
included the fact that the Mediterranean belonged to the Roman Empire and, during 
his own time, the Black Sea belonged to Turkey. The marine league based on the 
distance that the cannon could fire from shore, proposed by Bynkershoek, was largely 
accepted and regarded as the first to solve the problem of the limits of the territorial 
sea.
35
 
However, O’Connell has suggested that the fixed criterion of three miles for the 
standard measurement of a state’s jurisdiction over the water adjacent to it evolved as 
early as the cannon-shot rule: 
It is possible that the cannon-shot rule was a southern European device, 
while the idea of fixed limits, representing roughly the range of vision, 
was a northern European one, and that the two existed in uneasy 
conjunction until late in the eighteenth century.
36
 
The jurist commonly associated with the three-mile rule is Fernando Galiani.
37
 It is 
interesting to note that there were several arguments regarding the origin of the three-
mile rule. One argument stated that it has been considered the contemporary range of 
the cannon shot.
38
 Other observers, such as Brittin, believed that the three-mile rule 
was not related to the cannon-shot rule but instead ‘originated from the line of sight 
                                               
34  Phillipson (1908) 36. 
35  ibid. 
36  O’Connell (1982) 130. Baty also considered that three miles or the range of cannon-shot was 
‘not alternative rule, but an alternative description,’ see Thomas Baty, ‘The Three-Mile Limit’ 
(1928) 22 AJIL 504. 
37  Galiani was an Italian jurist. See: KM Ioannou, ‘The Greek Territorial Sea’ in Theodore C 
Kariotis, Greece and the Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law International, London 1997), 120; 
Brownlie (2003) 175; Trigg (1950) 83. 
38  Sanguin (1997) 53; O’Connell (1982) 152. 
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from the shoreline, which, at sea level, is approximately three miles’.39 Somehow or 
other, the three-mile fixed limit subsequently became the rule accepted by many 
states.
40
  
In the United States the three-mile limit had been adhered to in mostly inter-state 
relations. The first evidence indicating the acceptance of the three-mile rule can be 
seen in the United States Diplomatic Note to Britain and France dated 8 November 
1793.
41
 In fact, during and after the Napoleonic wars, British and American prize 
courts had translated the cannon-shot rule as the three-mile rule.
42
 
 
It might be argued that the American and British practice in this matter does not 
necessarily reflect the customary rule of all states in the world. This is obvious 
because practice differs from one state to another.
43
 Nevertheless, the implication of 
the major support of the Anglo-American society on this rule led to it eventually being 
regarded as a rule of customary international law. This will be considered further in 
the following section on the development of the international law of the sea. 
 
                                               
39  Galdorisi & Vienna (1997) 17. 
40
  There were also other views suggested and practised by states such as the Soviet Union (1921) 
which adopted a 12-mile limit for fishing in Arctic water and the White Sea; a Statute of 1927 
also mentioned 12 miles from the State boundary. Legislation in 1960 also fixed 12 miles as the 
breadth of territorial sea unless otherwise stated in the third party agreement: see O’Connell 
(1982) 155. 
41  Brownlie (2003) 175; Lousiana General Statute 1938, International Law - Power of a State to 
Extend its Boundary beyond the Three Mile Limit (1939) 39 Columbia Law Review 321. 
42   In American practice, the cannon-shot rule was translated into the three-mile rule in the United 
States Neutrality Act 1794. In British practice it was acknowledged in the decisions of Lord 
Stowell between 1800 and 1805 for the Prize Jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty: see 
O’Connell (1982) 131-132; Brownlie (2003) 175. Generally on the law of prize and Lord 
Stowell’s recognition of the cannon shot rule etc, see  Vrouw Anna Catharina (Mahts) (1803) 5 
C Rob 15; 165 ER 681 and the analysis in Henry J Bourguignon, Sir William Scott, Lord 
Stowell: Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798-1828 (CUP, 1987) 175 et seq - KB 52.S7 
in the Library. 
43  O’Connell (1982), 161. 
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2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
It could be concluded from the historical context that the evolution of law, particularly 
the law of the sea, has been influenced or shaped by changes in politics, societies, 
economics and even the geography of the world. The need for pragmatic legal rules of 
the sea is thus apparent in meeting the varying interests of different countries. Before 
the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919,
44
 an attempt to codify the rules of 
customary international law was undertaken by non-governmental learned societies
45
 
during the nineteenth century. Important issues regarding territorial waters, the sea 
bed, piracy and international straits were already highlighted at this stage. However, it 
was not until the twentieth century that an attempt to codify the international law of 
the sea was seriously undertaken. The complexity inherent in regulating the oceans is 
portrayed in the series of discussions instigated by the League of Nations.
46
  
 
2.2.1 THE HAGUE CODIFICATION CONFERENCE 1930 
In 1924, the League of Nations sought to codify the peacetime rules of the 
International Law of the Sea with reference to the topics of nationality, state 
responsibility and territorial waters.
47
 Preparation was made for consideration at The 
Hague Conference 1930 which included a report based on the replies of the states on 
                                               
44  The League of Nations was established after the First World War under the Treaty of Versailles 
‘to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security’. See 
<www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm> accessed 10 May 2008. See also MD Dubin, 
‘Transgovernmental Processes in the League of Nations’ (1983) 37 International Organisation 
469-493. 
45  The International Law Association (1873), Institute of International Law (1873), Harvard Law 
School and the American Law Institute were regarded as the important bodies contributing to the 
international law of the sea preceding the establishment of the United Nations: Churchill and 
Lowe (1999) 13-14. 
46  In 1945, the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations: see Leland M Goodrich, 
‘From League of Nations to United Nations’ (1947) 1 International Organisation 3; The work of 
the International Law Commission 1 (6th edn  2004) <untreaty.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm> accessed 
2 December 2007; Churchill and Lowe (1999) 15. 
47  O’Connell (1982) 157-158. 
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their policy and practice. Thus, the delegates at the Conference would have had before 
them the report provided by the League of Nations’ Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law.
48
  The maritime matter which may be 
considered as the central issue for resolution at that time was the issue of the breadth 
of territorial sea. It has been argued that the 1930 Conference ‘had taken no decision 
as to whether existing international law recognized any fixed breadth of the territorial 
sea.’49  
The Conference, although not fully successful, was influential in founding the body 
which was then known as the International Law Commission (ILC).
50
 One of its 
functions was to prepare draft articles related to the law of the sea, particularly on 
territorial waters and the high seas.
51
 The work of the ILC became the basis of 
discussion at the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1958. 
 
2.2.2 GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE 
CONTIGUOUS ZONE 1958 (1958 GENEVA CONVENTION) 
The ILC Report was extensively used at the first Conference on the Law of the Sea 
which was held in 1958.
52
 As noted earlier, the central issue to be dealt with 
concerned the breadth of territorial sea. Following the 1930 Hague Codification 
                                               
48  PC Jessup, ‘The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1959) 59 Columbia Law 
Review 235. 
49  Statement made by Mr Hudson in the Summary Record of the 169th meeting, A/CN.4/SR.169, 
(1952) 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 170. 
50  The ILC was established in 1948 pursuant to Art 13 of the Charter of the United Nations which 
obliged the General Assembly to encourage ‘the progressive development of international law 
and its codification’: see <www.un.org/law/ilc/> accessed 10 May 2008; H Lauterpacht 
‘Codification and Development of International Law’ (1955) 49 American Journal of 
International Law 16; Jessup (1959) 235-236. 
51  Churchill and Lowe (1999) 15. See the Report of International Law Commission in the eight 
session in (1957) 51 AJIL 154. 
52  Jessup (1959) 234. 
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Conference, almost all governments were inclined to regard the distinction between 
the regimes of the territorial sea and the high sea as that prescribed in mare clausum 
and mare liberum.
53
 The question of the extent of the territorial sea remained 
unanswered, while the high seas were recognized as free for all nations.
54
 In the eight 
sessions of the 1958 Convention, none of the proposals
55
 pertaining to the question of 
the breadth of the territorial sea was successfully reached by a majority vote. It was 
then decided by the United Nations General Assembly to postpone the question to a 
further Conference in 1960. Although the issue of the breadth of territorial sea 
remained unresolved, the 1958 Convention might nevertheless adequately be 
considered a successful conference for the development of the law of the sea as it was 
able to adopt four conventions.
56
  
 
2.2.3 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1960 
(1960 CONFERENCE) 
Although there was a clear divergence of views and practice, the vigorous arguments 
concerning the limits of the territorial sea actually became a drawback throughout the 
conference. As time went by, more and more states sought to expand the breadth of 
territorial sea from the customary state practice of three nautical miles to twelve 
nautical miles and up to 200 nautical miles.
57
 It was not clear, however, whether the 
                                               
53  Commentary to the Arts concerning the law of the sea, report to the General Assembly (1956) 2 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 265 (hereinafter referred to as the 1956 
Commentary). 
54  ibid. 
55  ibid. 266 paras 5 and 6. 
56  The four conventions are: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the 
Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on the Continental Shelf; and the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 
57  HB Robertson ‘Passage through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1980) 20 Va.J.Int’l L 804; Table of claims to 
Maritime Jurisdiction (as at 29 December 2006) : 
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claims made by many states were limited to fishery limits or were general sovereign 
limits. In order to prevent the unilateral extension of jurisdiction by states and at the 
same time proceed with the existing issue on the breadth of territorial sea, the second 
Law of the Sea Conference was convened in 1960 at Geneva. Unfortunately, no 
definite conclusion was reached concerning the breadth of the territorial sea.
58
 
 
2.2.4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982 
(1982 CONVENTION) 
Although the second Geneva Convention in 1960 failed to arrive at an agreed limit on 
the territorial sea, the endeavour and commitment shown by the ILC was unrelenting. 
In 1973, the first session of a meeting was held with the objective of improving the 
1958 formulation of the law of the sea, and to meet the concerns of the majority of the 
members of the states attending the meeting.
59
 In consequence of the various 
backgrounds of the states, estimated to be about 156, negotiations became lengthy, 
causing difficulties in adopting voting measures. The best approach was suggested to 
be negotiation by consensus.
60
 This method was believed to be necessary in order to 
satisfy certain criteria, especially with regard to the controversial questions of the 
breadth of territorial sea and the right of passage in the international straits.
61
 As a 
result of the non-uniformity of international practice on this matter, the ILC agreed in 
                                                                                                                                       
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/claims.htm> accessed 24 April 2007. 
See O’Connell (1982) 161: ‘Lauterpacht was the principal defender of the three-mile limit. 
Kozhevnikov thought the limit might differ from country to country, the Latin-American 
members were opposed to any fixed limit.’ 
58  LT Lee, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the third States’ (1983) 77 AJIL 551. 
59  The substantial number of newly independent states which had not been involved in the 1958 
Convention had insisted that the Conference review the previous law of the sea: Churchill and 
Lowe (1999) 18-19. 
60  B Buzan, ‘Negotiating by consensus: Development in technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1981) 75 AJIL 324-348. 
61  The resolution for the question of the extent of territorial sea, although considered ‘the most 
difficult for codification’, was very important and urgent: see O’Connell (1982) 158. 
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the draft text that international law recognized an extension of territorial waters from 
three to twelve miles.
62
 The idea of fixing the limit at twelve miles was proposed in 
the drafts of the United Kingdom and the Eastern European bloc
63
 and was later 
incorporated into Article 3 of the Caracas Draft Convention 1980 before being 
adopted in the 1982 Convention. 
 
Despite many challenges, tensions and difficulties faced in securing international 
agreement on the law of the sea, which took almost a decade, the adoption of the 
Third Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 can be considered a remarkable 
achievement in the history of the international law of the sea. The Convention was 
adopted by 130 affirmative votes, with 4 votes against
64
 and 17 abstentions,
65
 on 30 
April 1982. Eight months later, on 10 December 1982, the Convention was opened for 
signature at Montego Bay in Jamaica.
66
 Within two years, about 159 states and 
organizations signed the Convention. As required by Article 308, the 1982 
Convention might only enter into force after twelve months following the date of 
deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification. Accordingly, the accession of Guyana 
on 16 November 1993 brought the Convention into force on 16 November 1994.
67
 To 
date, 165 countries have become parties to the 1982 Convention.
68
 Although some 
                                               
62  ‘In practice the claims to the territorial sea ranged from 3, 4 , 6, 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical 
miles…’ : HZ Zhang, ‘The Adjacent Sea’ in Mohammed Bedjaoui, International Law, 
Achievement and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff, London 1992) 854. 
63  O’Connell (1982) 164; Robertson (1980) 822. 
64    United States, Turkey, Israel and Venezuela. 
65   United Kingdom, USSR, Ukraine, Thailand, Spain, Poland, The Netherlands, Mongolia, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Hungary, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic 
Republic, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, Bulgaria and Belgium. 
66    Arts 305-307 of the 1982 Convention. 
67   Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the United Nations Law of 
the Sea Convention 1982 and the related Agreement as at 23 January 2013 can be found on 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of ratifications. html>, accessed 14 
June 2013; Churchill and Lowe (1999)19. 
68   ibid. The latest country to ratify the Convention was Timor-Leste on 8 January 2013. 
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states, including some major maritime states such as the United States, have not yet 
ratified the 1982 Convention, they have asserted that some principles of the 1982 
Convention, especially on the freedom of transit and overflight through and over 
international straits, have became part of customary international law
69
 and 
consequently have become binding upon them.
70
 As a matter of fact, the special 
regime of transit passage in straits used for international navigation was originally 
proposed by the United States. Thus, the attitude of ‘pick and choose’71 exhibited by 
the United States, which voted against the Convention for not accommodating its 
interest in Part XI,
72
 but declared its right over the regime of transit passage in part III, 
has been widely criticized by numerous states.
73
 The following part will further 
analyze the historical and contemporary issue of the regime of straits in international 
law generally and then will specifically refer to the Straits of Malacca. 
 
2.3 STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION 
A strait may be defined as a ‘narrow stretch of water connecting two seas’74 or ‘a 
narrow stretch of sea connecting two extensive areas of sea’.75 However, this 
definition merely reflects the geographical character of a strait and does not 
necessarily address the legal implications, especially in international law.
76
 This is 
                                               
69   George (2008) 115; See also KY Koo ‘Transit Passage Regime Controversy Revisited: An 
Appraisal and Analysis on the Legal Ambiguities and Recent Trends’ (1992) 37 Korean J. Int’l 
L, 79-95, 79. 
70   George (2008) 115; United Nations Law of the Sea 20th Anniversary (1982-2002) ‘Constitution 
of the Sea, Bring Order to the Ocean’ <www.un.org/issues/docs/documents/losenbk.pdf> 
accessed 2 December 2007. 
71   Koo (1992), 79. 
72  T B Koh, ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was 
accomplished?’ (1983)    46 Law and Contemporary Problems 5, 9. 
73  JA de Yturriaga, Straits Used for International Navigation: A Spanish Perspective (Martinus 
Nijhoff, London,1991) 3; Koo (1992), 79. 
74  The Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
75  WG Moore, A Dictionary of Geography (2nd edn, Black, London, 1975). 
76  BB Jia, The Regime of Straits in International law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998) 3. 
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because different straits have different roles and importance. Some straits become 
very important as a conduit of strategic lanes of communications while others possess 
no such criteria. Thus, the fact that not all straits are of major concern for the 
international community led to the transformation of customary international law right 
of innocent passage in the straits used for international navigation to the right of 
transit passage in the 1982 Convention.
77
 Its legal implication is twofold. First, it 
accords more freedom of navigation to foreign ships transiting the straits, making such 
freedom almost the same as passing the high seas.
78
 Second, it has deteriorated the 
sovereign rights of the coastal states, as compared to previous rights of innocent 
passage in the customary international law. 
79
  As a matter of fact, the right of transit 
passage conferred in Part III of the 1982 Convention remains the rule for foreign 
vessels transiting straits used for international navigation. It is, however, pertinent to 
discuss the sequential development of the regime of straits prior to and after the 1982 
Convention in order to identify the juridical status of the Straits of Malacca as straits 
used for international navigation before further discussion on the issue of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in these Straits is undertaken. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
77  George (2008) 3. 
78  Art 37 of the 1982 Convention confers the transit passage right ‘not to be impeded’ as long as 
the passage through the strait is ‘solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit.’   
79  Although Art 34 preserves the legal status of waters forming straits used for international 
navigation, the straits state cannot impeded the passage of foreign vessels unless they breach 
local regulations made under the provisions of Art 42 of the 1982 Convention, namely maritime 
traffic, pollution, fishing and custom and immigration rules; George (2008) 26.  
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2.3.1 THE CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL STRAITS  
Historically, the idea of setting up a legal framework to govern the regime of straits 
was proposed by the Institut de Droit International in 1894.
80
 Later, when the sub-
commission of the Hague Codification Conference 1930 was considering some 
technical aspects of measuring the breadth of territorial sea, the issue of straits was 
again highlighted.
81
 The key issue which remained unresolved was the question of 
what constituted an international strait and the right of passage derived from it. 
Although various tests were suggested to answer to this question,
82
 the legal position 
of a strait was ambiguous until the first judgement of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case 1949.
83
  
 
2.3.1.1   DEFINITION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CORFU 
CHANNEL CASE 
The case arose from the incident in which damage was caused to the British warships 
HMS Saumarez and HMS Volage by the minefield in the Corfu Strait. The question 
                                               
80  Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, The Law of The Sea: Straits 
Used for International Navigation, Legislative History of Part III of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, vol. I (United Nations, New York 1992) 1 [hereafter referred 
to as ‘Legislative History of the Regime of Straits’]. 
81  In the 1930 Conference it was suggested that the coastal state should not prevent the passage of 
foreign vessels in straits used for international navigation: ibid. at 1-2. 
82  See for example; the definition of straits as being those which did not exceed double the 
territorial sea in width, while an international strait was distinguished by the formula ‘habitual 
passage for a route which is indispensable for maritime communications’, The Institut de Droit 
International 1894-1912: O’Connell (1982) 301; There was no need for definition of a strait as 
the Shucking Report to the Committee of Experts suggested that the right of passage be based on 
the difference between the territorial waters and internal waters which rely upon the singularity 
or plurality of states. Only in the latter category has the right of innocent passage existed. Sub-
Commission II of The Hague Codification Conference 1930: see Legislative History of the 
Regime of Straits (vol 1) 2-4. 
83  (Great Britain v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4; see also [1949] ICJ Rep 99 (Judge 
Azevedo). 
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before the ICJ was to decide on the status of straits used for international navigation 
and the right of passage over such straits.
84
 The ICJ in this case ruled that: 
It is in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in 
accordance with international custom that states in time of peace have 
a right to send their warships through straits used for international 
navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous 
authorization of a coastal state, provided that the passage is innocent. 
Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no 
right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in time 
of peace.
 85
 (Underline added) 
The underlined words are intended to show three important principles that may be 
derived and argued from this case. The first is that the judgment is believed to be the 
decisive step that confirmed the customary international law rules of innocent passage 
relating to straits used for international navigation that connect two parts of the high 
seas. Wolfke pointed out that the words ‘generally recognized and in accordance with 
international custom’ indicate the existence of established rules of international 
custom universally accepted.
86
 Also, the view expressed by Munro that straits which 
connect two portions of the high seas have ‘the force of international common or 
customary law’ whereby ships should not be prohibited or suspended from passing 
through territorial waters, is inclined to generalize the law for all straits.
87
 In a 
practical sense, international practice or custom is variable and subjective, in 
accordance with the historical background and customary practice of a state or a 
                                               
84   The issues involved were: ‘(1) Whether the Corfu Channel constituted an international strait or 
not; (2) whether the UK was entitled to send their warships through the channel and claim the 
right of innocent passage for the same; and (3) whether there was a violation of Albanian 
Sovereignty as Albania claimed to require notification and authorization for passage by foreign 
warships and merchant vessels’: see George (2008) 28. 
85  ibid.  
86  K Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (2nd edn Martinus Nijhoff, London 1993), 27-
29; see also Art 38 (1)(b) of the Statute of International Justice: the Court shall apply inter alia 
‘international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’ 
87  HA Munro, ‘The Case of the Corfu Minefield’ (1947), 10 MLR 372. It is to be noted that this 
article was published before the 1949 judgement on the Corfu Channel. 
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region.
88
 Therefore, the court, in simply giving its opinion on the binding force of the 
international custom without stating the grounds on which it was based, was 
unjustified.
89
  
 
The second and third principles derived from the case were on the definition of 
international strait and the nature of passage through such a strait. Albania had 
contended that there were at least two types of straits, one being a natural route of 
passage connecting two parts of the high seas and the other being crucial and 
necessary for international commerce. Albania argued that only those straits which 
were important to commerce and linked two parts of the high seas, making passage 
through them indispensable, were international straits.
90
 Although Britain did not 
dispute Albania’s contention, it argued that so long as a strait provided a ‘necessary or 
natural route for international maritime traffic’, that particular strait could be 
considered an international strait.
91
 Britain further argued that the Corfu Channel met 
this criterion because it was of ‘not inconsiderable importance to the Mediterranean 
navigation’.92 Both parties tried to support their arguments by pointing out the 
functional aspects
93
 of the Corfu Channel as well as the weight of interests in the 
                                               
88  It has been emphasized that there was no uniform regime for straits in international law: see 
Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 7 para. 36. 
89  As compared to the Corfu Channel Case, the North Sea Continental Shelf case is probably the 
best example on how the court determines a particular practice to become a customary 
international law. See discussion in B Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a 
Divided World in R St J Macdonald and DM Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of 
International Law (Brill 1986) 513-554. 
90  ICJ Pleadings, iv 383. 
91  ICJ Pleadings, iv 550. 
92  ibid. 
93  Jia suggested that there existed agreement on both sides that one of the criteria of international 
straits was that such straits must demonstrate appreciable use: Jia (1998) 38. 
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international community. In discussing this issue, George also lists seven criteria that 
were relevant in order to determine whether a strait is an international strait:
94
 
1. it was of great navigational importance; 
2. the volume of traffic was high; 
3. the traffic was international, national or mixed; 
4. the strait was the only route; 
5. the strait was a necessary route; 
6. the strait was the alternative route; and 
7. the strait was a useful route. 
 
Despite all other possible criteria for establishing the status of a strait, only two 
criteria were considered important by the ICJ, namely that it connected two parts of 
the high seas coupled with the fact that it was used for international navigation.
95
 The 
fact that the Channel was only used by a few flag states had sufficiently qualified such 
a Channel to be an international strait in which the right of innocent passage for all 
ships, including warships, was applied.
96
 The simplification of the case, as Kaye 
asserts, ‘led many publicists to the conclusion that any waters used periodically by 
international shipping were subject to a right of innocent passage…’.97 Thus, although 
a strait was merely providing an alternative route for ships’ navigation, as in the case 
of the Corfu Channel, it would still be regarded as an international strait. It is 
suggested that, although it may be agreed that the judgement in the Corfu Channel 
Case nearly solved the issue on determining the legal status of international strait, this 
may not have been applicable to all international straits in the world at that time.
 98
 
                                               
94   George (2008) 28. 
95  ICJ Rep 1949 28-29.  
96  S Kaye, ‘Regulation of Navigation in the Torres Strait: The Law of the Sea Issues’ in D 
Rothwell & S Bateman (eds.) Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2000), 121.  
97  ibid. See also: George (2008) 27. 
98  The debate on this case is discussed in paragraph 3.1.2 below. For example, Mr Zourek argued 
that, ‘it was wrong to base a general rule’ on a decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case 
and ‘especially to apply the rule formulated by the Court to all straits…’ See Summary Record 
of the 273rd meeting UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.273.  
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Therefore, a legal regime for straits was still needed to clear up the ambiguity of the 
law relating to straits used for international navigation.  
 
2.3.1.2   THE REGIME OF STRAITS IN THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: INNOCENT PASSAGE AND TRANSIT PASSAGE 
It is unsurprising that, during the progress meeting of the Geneva Convention 1958, 
the geographical test applied by the ICJ as the decisive criterion in determining the 
status of international straits led to disagreement among those delegations present.
99
 It 
has been argued that it is wrong to rely totally on the decision of the ICJ in the Corfu 
Channel Case on the definition of straits and to apply the principle in this case to all 
straits equally.
100
 This is particularly important when it is realized that there are more 
than 260 straits in the world.
101
 Thus, it is clear that some straits will be significant 
because of geographical factors such as strategic location. Others will be insignificant 
for international trade, for instance those straits which lead to the internal waters of a 
state. During the 308
th
 meeting of the 1958 Convention, it was noted that there were 
three types of straits. The first of these was subject to international conventions. The 
second was not subject to international conventions, but was important to international 
navigation. The third was not used for international navigation.
102
 Although there was 
some suggestion that the most appropriate and flexible question for determining the 
                                               
99  Yearbook of ILC 1955, vol.1, 151; S Rosenne, League of Nations Conference for the 
Codification of International Law, The Hague, 1930 (Oceana Publications, New York, 1975), ii, 
58. Jia (1998) 24, 34; for discussion prior to the Corfu Channel case see P Cobbett, Cases on 
International Law (6th edn W Walker, Stevens, London 1947) I 165. 
100  Yearbook of the ILC (vol.1 United Nations publication 1954) 272nd meeting paras 47-48 and 
273rd meeting, paras 33-34,38; Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 6-7. 
101  P Boisson, Safety at Sea Policies, Regulations and International Law (Bureau Veritas, Paris 
1999) 5. 
102   Yearbook of the ILC, 1955 vol.1 (United Nations publication) 308th meeting, paras 14 and 15; 
Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 7; O’Connell (1982) 314. 
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criteria for international straits was the ‘degree of importance’103 as a functional aspect 
of the straits for international commerce,
104
 a proposal to reject the notion of 
international strait as defined in the Corfu Channel Case was defeated during the 1958 
Convention. The rule in favour of innocent passage for foreign vessels, including 
warships, in straits used for international navigation which was laid down in the Corfu 
Channel Case was adopted in Article 16 (4) of the 1958 Convention.
105
 The provision 
of Article 16(4) reads as follows: 
There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships 
through straits which are used for international navigation between 
one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial seas of a foreign State.
106
 
 
Similar to the ICJ decision, the above provision derives two principles. The first is the 
geographical aspect of the straits in that they are connecting one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the territorial seas of foreign states.
107
 The second 
is the right of passage for foreign ships through such a strait. It does not give any 
specific and direct definition of a strait. Moore pointed out that this type of provision 
had not reached certainty over the definition of straits used for international 
navigation.
108
 It merely restated the existing customary international law which deals 
with the right of innocent passage through the strait. The meaning of innocent passage 
is described in Article 14 (4) of the 1958 Convention as a passage that is ‘not 
                                               
103  Jia (1998) 34. 
104  ibid. The Netherlands acknowledged that there was in customary international law the ‘right of 
free passage for all ships only in straits which may be regarded as main routes of 
communication.’ This statement was made in reply to the Hague Questionnaire before the 1930 
Codification Conference: see S Rosenne (1975) 58.  
105  JN Moore, ‘The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea’ (1980) 74 AJIL 112. 
106  Emphasis added. 
107  Art 16(4) is different from the ICJ decision in the Corfu Channel case in the sense that it 
extended the right of passage through straits to include not only the straits connecting ‘two parts 
of the high seas’ but also ‘the territorial sea of a foreign state’. 
108  Moore (1980) 112. 
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security of the coastal State. Interestingly, 
this provision has identical wording to Article 19 of the 1982 Convention. It would 
appear that, despite having similar meanings of innocent passage, the applicability of 
this right in the respective Conventions was different. Unlike the right of innocent 
passage in the 1958 Convention, a similar right provided in Article 19 of the 1982 
Convention is not extended to the straits used for international navigation. It only 
provides the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.
109
 It is suggested that the 
right of innocent passage applicable for straits as stated at the 1958 Geneva 
Convention protects the interests of coastal states as it requires foreign ships to 
comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state while in transit.
110
  
 
However, for the maritime states, the wording of the provision in the 1958 Convention 
was very subjective and left room for interpretation by coastal states.
111
 The 
hypothetical issue was that states could justify the suspension of foreign shipping for 
security purposes.
112
 Although this had never happened, it was a real concern of the 
maritime states.
113
 They argued that to assimilate the right of passage through straits 
used for international navigation with the regime of innocent passage in the territorial 
sea is a constraint on the freedom of passage of foreign vessels.
114
 Thus, although the 
                                               
109  Section two, Part II of the 1982 Convention 
110  See Art 17 of 1958, which stipulates that ‘Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage 
shall comply with the law and regulations enacted by the coastal state…’. 
111  Art 23: ‘If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State concerning 
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it, 
the coastal State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea’. See too Leifer (1978) 89. 
112  Moore stated that, ‘To permit strait states discretion to control shipping or aircraft could lead to 
expanded conflict’: Moore (1980) 81.  See also Anand (1987) 206. 
113  RJ Dupuy & D Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 972; 
Moore (1980) 79; 81. 
114  The government of Israel had suggested that the passage through straits (even those that lead to 
the harbour of a state) may be assimilated to the high seas because the interest of the 
international community had to have absolute priority over those of the coastal states. See: 
Yearbook of ILC (1956) vol. 2 (doc A/CN.4/99) 52. 
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Geneva Convention of 1958 adopted the right of innocent passage through straits used 
for international navigation, which has it roots in the judgement of the ICJ in the 
Corfu Channel case, this has been widely criticised, especially by maritime states.
115
 
 
The emergence of newly independent countries, and the consequent changes in 
geography, requires a comprehensive and universal law to govern the sea and at the 
same time to improve the shortcomings of the 1958 Convention.
116
 In 1971, the task 
of dealing with the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea and the regime of straits 
was assigned by the General Assembly to Sub-Committee II of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Seabed Committee). The right of innocent passage conferred by the 1958 
Convention was thought to be no longer adequate. This can be seen in a series of 
discussions prior to the 1982 Convention, for example in the statement made by the 
representative of the United States at the beginning of the Conference in 1971.
117
 ‘The 
regime of innocent passage is unsatisfactory when applied to international straits’.118 
For the maritime states, any restriction on the right of navigation, especially in straits 
used for international navigation, was a handicap which might have had a severe 
effects on their economic, political, and military interests.
119
 Thus, a separate regime 
for straits was necessary. O’Connell shares this view as he believes that to recognize 
                                               
115  Leifer (1978) 90. The term ‘Maritime States’ refers to the states whose economic interest largely 
depends on maritime trade.  
116  Official records of the 1982 Convention, vol.1, Summary Records of meeting of the 2nd session, 
Caracas 1973; A Boyle ‘Further development of the 1982 Convention on the law of the sea: 
Mechanisms for change’, in D Freestone, R Barnes and DM Ong, The Law of the Sea; Progress 
and Prospects (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 43. 
117  It is to be noted that the United States is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone which establishes a general regime of ‘innocent passage’ for transit 
through the territorial water. However it is not a party to the 1982 Convention.  
118  De Yturriaga (1991) 241. 
119  KM Burke and DA DeLeo ‘Innocent Passage and Transit Passage in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 9 Yale J. World Pub.Ord. 389, 400. 
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the regime of innocent passage in international straits, as envisaged in the 1958 
Convention, had ‘potentially degraded’ the standard of passage in customary law.120 
This opinion seems to contradict the proposition that the 1958 Convention is a product 
of customary law laid down in the Corfu Channel Case.
121
 In his evaluation, 
O’Connell explained that the 1958 Convention failed to differentiate between an 
autonomous institution of straits in customary law and the rule of innocent passage in 
territorial seas.
122
 Indeed, passage through the strait is neither high sea passage nor 
innocent passage through territorial seas. On the other hand, Churchill and Lowe 
regarded the provisions on the right of innocent passage in the 1958 Convention as 
being a corollary to the customary practice of many states.
123
 They further argued that: 
In relation to this core of disagreement over the precise legal status of 
international straits and rights of passage through them, the balance of 
juristic opinion seemed to favour the conclusion that customary law prior 
to UNCLOS III accorded only a non-suspendable right of innocent 
passage through them. (Underline Added) 
 
It appears that the views of O’Connell and of Churchill and Lowe are reflections of 
the arguments put forward, respectively, by the maritime states and the states 
bordering the straits. Despite the competing interests on this issue, by the end of the 
1982 Convention, consensus over the right of passage in those straits used for 
international navigation was finally reached. Article 37 employs two key criteria for 
the regime of straits - a strait must be used for international navigation and must 
connect two parts of the high seas or EEZ. De Yturriaga points out three constructed 
elements of the words ‘straits as used for international navigation’ established under 
                                               
120  O’Connell (1982) 299. 
121  See discussion at page 25-27 above; Churchill & Lowe (1999) 84. 
122  O’Connell (1982) 314. 
123  Churchill & Lowe (1999) 84. 
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the provisions in Part III of the 1982 Convention.
124
 There are a geographical element, 
a legal element and a functional element. The geographical element, for him, is not as 
crucial as the functional element. He further argued that, although the 1982 
Convention enshrines the fact that a strait in which the regime of transit passage 
applies must be one that is ‘used for international navigation’, the degree of use is not 
clarified. While he successfully analyzed the scholarly view on this issue, he clearly 
did not suggest any solution pertaining to this.   It is therefore submitted that the lack 
of definition given to the words ‘straits used for international navigation’ may be the 
best approach to avoid future conflicts inherent in different types of straits. Koh 
expressed a similar view when he commented upon the proposition made by Arvid 
Pardo – to list all straits that have been considered as straits used for international 
navigation in an annex to the Convention – by saying that such a suggestion might 
‘freeze what is essentially a dynamic situation’.125 By this, he refers to the plausible 
situation in which a strait that is not being used for international navigation at present 
might be so used in the future. Thus, the general meaning of straits in the 1982 
Convention is sufficient to determine the legal status of straits used for international 
navigation.  
 
Unlike the 1958 Convention, which prescribed equal rights of innocent passage 
through straits as well as territorial seas, the 1982 Convention distinguished between 
these two rights by highlighting the geographical importance and legal nature of a 
strait as an international highway. The right of passage adopted in the 1982 
Convention gives all ships and aircraft of user states the ‘freedom of navigation and 
                                               
124  Yturriaga (1991) 8. 
125  T B Koh, ‘The Territorial Sea Contiguous Zone, Straits and Archipelagoes under the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ 29 (1987) MLR 163, 180.  
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overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone’ under the regime of transit passage.126 
Such right shall not be impeded.
127
 Koh commented that the exception to the 
‘continues and expeditious’ requirement may be illustrated in the case of ships coming 
from the Indian Ocean and then transiting through the port of Singapore before 
proceeding into the South China Sea.
128
 In such a case, the non-continuance of the 
navigation of the ships is not against the transit passage regime.  Burke and DeLeo 
point out that ‘this provision apparently supplies the basic guarantee of freedom of 
navigation sought by maritime nations’ which is applicable without discrimination to 
all ships and aircraft.
129
 The words ‘all ships and aircraft’ in the 1982 Convention are 
inserted with the intention of clarifying the freedom of navigation and overflight in 
straits used for international navigation, which includes warships and military vessels 
and aircraft. Although, at a glance, such rights are akin to the right of passage over the 
high seas in Article 87 of the Convention and Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas, the duties imposed on foreign vessels and aircraft to ‘proceed without 
delay’130 and to ‘refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of states bordering the strait, or in any 
                                               
126  Art 38 of the 1982 Convention: 1. In straits referred to in Art 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the 
right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait is formed by an 
island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there 
exists seaward of the island a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone 
of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics. Art 37 
describes the scope of the transit passage. 
127  ibid. 
128  Koh (1987), 182. 
129  KM Burke and DA DeLeo ‘Innocent Passage and Transit Passage in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 9 Yale J. World Pub.Ord. 389, 402; See also 
Robertson ‘Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1980) 20 Va.J. Int’l L. 801,837. 
130  Art 39 (1) (a). 
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other manner in violation of the principles of international law’131 are sufficient to 
differentiate between the passage through the straits and that over the high seas.  
 
Notwithstanding the recognition of the right of transit passage of foreign vessels and 
the rule that coastal states should not hamper and suspend transit passage,
132
 the 1982 
Convention confirms that this will not affect the sovereignty or jurisdiction of states 
bordering the straits.
133
 Moreover, the ships exercising this right are bound to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against States bordering the straits or in any other 
manner which violates the principles of international law embodied in the UN 
Charter.
134
 The transit passage right is also required to be exercised in normal modes 
of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or 
distress.
135
  In the absence of the breach of these duties, there is no right prescribed for 
the coastal states to hamper the passage of foreign vessels.
136
   
 
However, the duties of ships which need to be observed by the user states during 
transit passage as set forth in Article 39 has been criticized by some commentators as 
fruitless.
137
 It is construed by Reisman as having similar weight to the regime of 
                                               
131  Art 39, para. 1 (b). 
132  Art 44. 
133  Art 34. 
134  Art 39,(1)(b) of the  1982 Convention. 
135  Art 39(1)(c) of the 1982 Convention. Some commentators argue on the question of whether a 
submerged submarine has similar transit passage right to traverse the strait since there is lack of 
provision concerning this in the 1982 Convention. Some propose that what is normal to the 
mode of passage for a particular vehicle is presumably permitted. But for others, such right of 
passage of a submarine may be inferred to derogate the sovereignty and security of the coastal 
state: Burke and DeLeo (1983) 403; Reisman (1980) 71; SN Nandan and DH Anderson ‘Straits 
used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in H Caminos (ed.) Law of the Sea (Dartmouth Publishing, Hants 
2001) 92. 
136  ibid. 
137  Burke and DeLeo (1983) 403. 
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innocent passage.
138
 Reisman considers that the provision of Article 44, for example, 
conferred on a state a right to refuse passage to a foreign ship if the passage of such a 
ship clearly departs from those duties.
139
 His attempt to distinguish the duty not to 
hamper ‘transit passage’ in Article 44 of the Convention from the ‘passage’ in general 
is criticized by Moore as illogical conferment of power on strait states.
140
 Shaw also 
agrees with Moore that, in a transit passage regime, foreign vessels cannot be 
suspended for security or indeed any other reasons.
141
  Shaw also added that, despite 
the absence of provision for ‘innocent’ in a transit passage regime, some provisions 
appear to subject such a regime to the same constraints as with innocent passage.
142
 
As for Churchill and Lowe, the failure to observe the ‘criterion of innocence’143 may 
become factors that incorporate the right of transit passage into the general provision 
of innocent passage.
144
 
 
Despite the above arguments which are clearly made in favour of maritime nations or 
user states, the sovereignty of the strait states in regulating the rule for transit passage 
is not absolute. The argument put forward by Moore and Shaw may seem unfair to the 
states bordering the straits. If the passage of a foreign vessel in the Straits of Malacca 
threatens the security of the coastal state or that of other vessels, the denial of the right 
to exercise the power of state sovereignty is detrimental to such states. A hypothetical 
                                               
138  ibid; W Michael Reisman, ‘The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of 
International  Lawmaking (1980) 74 AJIL 48, 70. 
139  Reisman (1980) 70. 
140  JN Moore, ‘The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea’ (1980) 74 AJIL112:‘It does not follow as a matter of logic that the existence of flag state 
duties in Art 39 gives strait states a right to determine violations of such duties unilaterally and 
to seek to enforce them by denial of passage.’  
141  MN Shaw, International Law (5th edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 514. 
142  ibid.  
143  They refer to Art 44 of the 1982 Convention. 
144  RR Churchill and AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, Manchester 
1999) 91. 
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case may be drawn in the case of armed robbery at sea. A vessel from the Indian 
Ocean passing through the Malaysian territorial sea may pretend to be in transit 
passage towards the South China Sea; however in the course of transiting, it may 
suddenly start attacking other vessels. In such a situation the need to suspend such a 
vessel seems crucial. Thus it is submitted that the right of coastal states to exercise 
enforcement power in a case like that illustrated above is rather problematic if it has to 
be dealt with under the regime of transit passage.
145
 Although Article 38, paragraph 3, 
expressly states that ‘any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit 
passage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this 
Convention’,146 the issue at stake remains the difficulty of differentiating whether 
passages of ships or aircraft represent transit passage or innocent passage. This is 
particularly relevant to the Straits of Malacca, since they are wholly situated in the 
territorial sea of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. 
 
In addition to this, the strait states may find themselves under pressure to ensure that 
the ships transiting the straits have a safe navigation. For example, Article 42 provides 
that the States may adopt the laws and regulations relating to transit passage in respect 
of safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, prevention and control 
                                               
145  It is noteworthy that, under the regime of transit passage, the coastal states may only adopt law 
and regulations in four situations. The first is to establish a traffic separation scheme that is 
approved by IMO for navigational safety; the second is to adopt a law for the purpose of 
prevention of pollution in the strait; the third is on fishing vessels and final one is on the loading 
and unloading of commodities, currency and persons: see Art 42; Beckman argued that the right 
of a coastal state to enforce its law over the vessel in transit passage is very limited. If the 
foreign ship violates its duties in Art 39 outside the port of a coastal state and the violation 
causes only minor damage to the surrounding environment of the Straits, the State still cannot 
arrest the ships. Nevertheless the State may make ‘formal complaint to the flag state’ or use the 
‘compulsory binding dispute settlement under part XV of the 1982 Convention’. See R 
Beckman, ‘Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for consideration’ MIMA 
Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 11-15 October 2004, 5. 
146  Illegal acts such as armed robbery or piratical activity occurring in the Straits may be dealt with 
by the relevant state under the regime of innocent passage, as in Part II of the 1982 Convention 
in which the state may enforce its law on the criminal. 
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of pollution, fishing and security in regard to smuggling, illegal immigration, and 
fiscal or sanitary laws.
147
 In fact, the States are expected to give due publicity to that 
law
148
 and any possible danger to navigation and overflight because any act of 
hampering the passage of foreign vessels transiting the straits which the States believe 
have breached their law is unjustified if no publicity on such laws is provided.
 149
 
 
It may be submitted that, under the 1982 Convention, passage through straits used for 
international navigation is not a codification of customary law but merely a treaty or 
contractual relationship as a result of a successful compromise between the interests of 
most of the participating states.
150
  The right guarantees the freedom of navigation of 
foreign ships through the straits used for international navigation while at the same 
time taking into account the interests of coastal states.
151
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
147  Art 42(1)(a)-(d) of the 1982 Convention. 
148  Art 42(3) of the 1982 Convention. 
149  Art 44 of the 1982 Convention. 
150  For example: the littoral states in the Straits of Malacca and the maritime states e.g. the USA and 
the UK had agreed on matters relating to the safety of navigation and prevention of pollution, 
Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 2) 143. See also Dupuy & Vignes (1991) 972; T 
Treves ‘Notes on Transit Passage through Customary Law’ in A Bos and H Siblezy (eds) 
Realism in Law-Making (Martinus Nijhoff, The hague 1986) 247. 
151  MJ Valencia, Malaysia and The Law of the Sea: The Foreign policy issues, the options and their 
implications (Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia 1991) 126-131. 
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2.3.1.3  THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR NON-PARTY STATES TO THE 1982 
CONVENTION 
Having been largely adopted and ratified by the 165 States,
152
 the issue arises as to 
whether this newly-created regime might become customary international law after its 
adoption by most of the states in the world. Although this issue is irrelevant to the 
parties of the 1982 Convention who are definitely bound by its terms, it is of great 
concern to the non-parties to the Convention. The US, for example, while still not a 
party to the 1982 Convention, expressly declared that the basic rule of transit passage 
through straits used for international navigation in the 1982 Convention had 
undergone a transformation into customary international law due to the ‘practice of 
States, supported by the broad consensus achieved at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea.’153 Jia opposed this view since the consensus to 
establish the transit passage regime for straits used for international navigation in the 
1982 Convention is for the benefit of states that have signed and ratified the 
Convention.
154
 The refusal of other states, non-parties to the 1982 Convention, to sign 
and ratify the Convention reflects their unwillingness to implement the provisions in 
such a Convention. Similar to Jia, George also discusses the US view on this issue by 
highlighting several commentators’ opinions.155 Caminos’s view is in line with the 
US, as he believes that the consistent practice of transit passage is well on the way to 
creating the emergence of a customary international law.
156
 Unlike Caminos, De 
Yturriaga does not give an absolute view but his opinion is that the answer lies in the 
                                               
152  To date, 165 states have already ratified the 1982 Convention. The latest is Timor-Leste which 
ratified the 1982 Convention on 8 January 2013: see 
 <www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm> accessed on 
14 June 2013. 
153  BB Jia The Regime of Straits in International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1998) 207.  
154  ibid. 
155  George (2008) 115. 
156  Caminos (1987) 231-232. See also Jia (1998) 208 and George (2008) 118. 
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trend on this issue in state practice.
157
 A similar view is held by Shaw who states that, 
since state practice on transit passage is uncertain, the view that this regime has 
slipped into customary international law is unconvincing.
158
 Meanwhile, Pastor clearly 
rejected the view that transit passage is now customary, as he considers that the 
principles in the Corfu Channel Case for a conventional rule must be fulfilled.
159
 He 
insists that, although the new regime reflects general customary law, it has no binding 
effect on the non-party states.
160
 Zou shares this view by arguing that the states not 
party to the 1982 Convention are not bound by its terms.
161
 
 
It is submitted that the careful opinion of Churchill and Lowe is most timely. 
Although the general right of transit passage has not yet become an established 
customary international law, in some parts of straits that are important for navigation, 
an equivalent legal regime to transit passage does in fact exist.
162
 However, to affirm 
the view that the transit passage regime in the 1982 Convention has been crystallised 
into customary international law due to the large practice of states is considered inapt. 
As Churchill and Lowe rightly argue, it is difficult to determine ‘whether a State party 
to the Convention permits passage because it considers itself obliged by customary 
                                               
157  JA de Yturriaga, Straits Used for International Navigation: A Spanish Perspective (Martinus 
Nijhoff, London, 1991) 308-330. 
158  MN Shaw, International Law (5th edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 514. See 
also George (2008) 116. 
159  George (2008) 118. See also P Tillman ‘Straits of Malacca and the Law of the Sea’ (1994) 68 
Australian Law Journal 885, 887. 
160  ibid. 
161  Keyuan Zou, ‘Seeking effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at Sea’ (2005) 59 Journal of 
International Affairs, 117 at 123. 
162   For example, at the time when the UK extended its territorial sea from three to twelve miles, the 
UK and France entered an agreement to grant rights equivalent to a right of transit passage in the 
Straits of Dover to other states: Joint Declaration of 2 November 1988, (1989) 14 LOSB 14; see 
also Churchill and Lowe The Law of the Sea (3rd Edn Manchester University Press 
Manchester1999) 112-113. DH Anderson, ‘The Strait of Dover and the Southern North Sea: 
Some Recent Legal Developments’ (1992) 7 IJECL 85-98. 
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law to do so or because it is bound by the Convention to so.’163 Thailand, although 
previously affirming the right of transit passage through straits bordered by Thailand 
to ships of all states
 164 
 has recently, on 15 May 2011, ratified the 1982 Convention.
 
165
  It may be considered that the recent ratification by Thailand may negate the view 
that the regime of transit passage in straits has become customary international law. 
Moreover, the United Nations still calls upon all states that have not become party to 
the 1982 Convention to do so ‘in order to achieve the goal of universal 
participation.’166 It may be summed up that, for the non-party states, the principle 
previously applied to the international straits is the customary international law for 
them, namely the right provided in the Corfu Channel Case, unless and until they 
ratify the 1982 Convention or enter into an agreement with particular coastal or strait 
states. 
 
 
 
                                               
163  Churchill and Lowe (1999) 112. 
164  ibid. 113. 
165 Chronological list of ratifaction of 1982 Convention in 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm> accessed on 
6th June 2011; see also ‘foreign Minister confirms Thailand’s readiness in promoting maritime 
security’ in the website of Ministry of foreign Affairs Kingdom of Thailand 
<www.mfa.go.th/web/2642.php?id=39528>accessed on 6th June 2011. 
166  See Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation (updated 08 January 2010) 
  in <www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/status.htm> accessed on 6th June 
2011. 
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2.4 THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA  
Throughout history, some straits have continuously possessed the criteria of straits 
used for international navigation. The Straits of Malacca, as previously discussed,
167
 is 
one of the most important and strategic straits in the world.  Since the 1982 
Convention does not give any particular definition to the straits used for international 
navigation, the general meaning to be deduced from Article 37 of the 1982 
Convention is that the regime of straits in Part III is applicable to straits which are 
used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and 
another part of the high seas or an EEZ. Apart from the geographical context, the 
regime of straits under Part III requires that the straits are not to be governed by any 
long-standing international convention,
168
 and there must not exist any high seas or 
EEZ routes through such straits.
169
 
 
In general, the fact that the Straits of Malacca provide the shortest and most 
convenient route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, coupled with their 
importance to navigation since time immemorial, has arguably placed the Straits under 
Part III of the 1982 Convention. Indeed, the strategic location of the Straits has made 
them increasingly important to international trade and communication. A considerable 
number of ships traverse the Straits in both directions.
170
 Moreover, the exceptions to 
                                               
167  See the earlier discussion on the significance of the Straits of Malacca in their geographical, 
climatic and historical context in Chapter 1(para 1.4). 
168  Art 35 (c) of the 1982 Convention. See, for example, the Montreux Convention of 1936 which 
deals with the Turkish Straits. 
169  Art 36 of the 1982 Convention. 
170  In 2010, there was a total of 74,136 vessels passing through the Straits of Malacca as compared 
to 55,957 vessels ten years before: ‘Type and Total of Vessels Movement Report to Klang VTS’ 
(From January 1999 to December 2010), released by Marine Department, Peninsula Malaysia; 
See also Leifer (1978) 32, 51; N Unlu, ‘Current Legal Developments- Straits of Malacca’ (2006) 
21 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L, 539. 
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the general rule in Part III are undoubtedly not applicable to the Straits of Malacca. 
George points out that, although the regime of innocent passage previously prevailed 
for foreign vessels transiting the Straits,
171
 the coming into force of the 1982 
Convention and the ratification of this Convention by the littoral States has 
consequently made the regime of transit passage contained in the Convention binding 
upon these States.
 172
  
 
2.4.1 THE EFFECT OF EXTENSION OF THE BREADTH OF THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA TO THE STRAITS OF MALACCA: REVISITED  
The right of passage, whether innocent passage or transit passage, differs according to 
the context, that is, whether there is absolute sovereign control by the coastal states. 
According to Anand, the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Malacca was 
a customary right that had long been practised by Southeast Asian states,
173
 as should 
be evident from the existence of the Maritime Code of Malacca (Undang-Undang 
Laut Melaka), which had regulated the commercial usage and maritime practice 
among the traders in the Malacca Straits. This Code had laid down rules to maintain 
law and order on the high seas and also described the captain of a vessel as being 
sovereign at sea until the vessel entered a State port.
174
 In other words, whereas 
previously there existed the freedom of navigation in the high seas, such freedom 
becomes limited when the vessel enters the territorial waters of coastal states. 
Although the territorial limit of the coastal states during that time was definitely less 
than the present limit, which gave foreign vessels more freedom of navigation, the 
                                               
171  George (2008) 3. 
172  Indonesia, Singapore and Indonesia ratified the 1982 Convention on 3 February 1986, 17 
November 1994 and 14 October 1996 respectively. 
173  Anand (1981) 442. 
174  ibid. at 446. 
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nature and the volume of ships passing through the Straits at that time perhaps did not 
put the Straits at as great a risk as they may face today. Perhaps the terminology 
‘innocent passage’ and ‘transit passage’ do not adequately describe the right of 
passage guaranteed by the states bordering the straits at that time.  
 
The issue of the regime of straits is closely interrelated with the issue of the breadth of 
the territorial sea. The number of states participating in the progress meetings of the 
1982 Convention was nearly double that of the 1958 Convention and this also 
lengthened discussion on this matter. The increase resulted from the emergence of the 
new developing states of the post-colonial period. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia 
had not participated in the formation of the 1958 Convention. However, they were 
actively involved in the deliberations leading to the 1982 Convention, which they later 
ratified. In fact, Tommy Koh, the permanent representative of Singapore to the 
negotiating conference, was appointed as the last president of the 1982 Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. 
 
In dealing with the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea for the states bordering the 
Straits of Malacca, Malaysia confirmed in the 1971 session of the United Nations 
Seabed Committee that the national law of Malaysia had established a twelve-mile 
limit for its territorial sea.
175
 This was pursuant to Regulation 3 of the 1969 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance
176
 which reads as follows: 
                                               
175  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, Summary Records of 58th meeting (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SR.45-60) at 71; 
Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 24. 
176  The need to fix a territorial sea limit for Malaysia was regarded as urgent at that time. Thus, 
because of the suspension of parliament in 1969, the government of Malaysia extended its 
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1. The breadth of the territorial waters of Malaysia shall be 12 
miles and such breadth shall, except in the Straits of Malacca, 
the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea be measured in accordance 
with Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958… 
 
3. In applying the aforesaid articles, the expression ‘Territorial 
Sea’ occurring therein shall be construed as ‘Territorial 
Waters’. 
 
However, Malaysia further declared that the twelve-mile territorial sea would not 
affect the right of innocent passage for foreign ships.
177
 Apart from Malaysia, it was 
estimated that since 1960 about 40 newly independent states had claimed a territorial 
sea of twelve miles.
178
  Indonesia
179
 declared in 1961 that, 
 The Indonesia territorial sea is a maritime belt of a width of 12 nautical 
miles, the outer limit of which is measured perpendicular to the 
baselines or points on the baselines which consist of straight lines 
connecting the outermost islands comprising Indonesian territory with 
the provision that in case of Straits of a width of no more than 24 
nautical miles and Indonesia is not the only coastal state the outer limit 
of the Indonesian territorial sea shall be drawn at the middle of the 
Strait.
180
 
 
The narrowness of this Strait had caused an overlap of the territorial sea between 
Malaysia and Indonesia at the southern part.
181
 Therefore, Indonesia and Malaysia had 
agreed on a territorial sea boundary between the two states in the Straits of Malacca 
                                                                                                                                       
territorial sea limit from three miles to twelve miles by the emergency ordinance. See Leifer 
(1978) 30. 
177  UN Doc. A/AC.138/SR.45-60, 58th meeting at 71; Legislative History of the Regime of Straits 
(vol 1) 24. 
178  Jia (1998) 10; cf. ‘…[S]tate practice showed that by February 1969 as to the breadth of 
territorial sea…25 States claimed between 6 and 12 miles territorial sea..’ SP Jagota, Maritime 
Boundary (1985 Martinus Nijhoff, Lancaster) 25. 
179   Indonesia had not only issued a declaration seeking recognition of the extension of its territorial 
water to 12 miles, but also used the concept of straight baselines on its archipelago principles 
which have later been recognized in the 1982 Convention. See Part IV of the 1982 Convention 
on the Archipelagic States. 
180  By Art 1, subsection 2 of the Act 4 of 18 February. The case in which ‘Indonesia is not only the 
coastal state’ particularly refers to the Straits of Malacca. 
181  CR Woolley, ‘Piracy in the Straits of Malacca without degrading the Sovereign Rights of 
Indonesia and Malaysia’ [2010] Santa Clara J. Int’l L, 447,450; Leifer (1978) 53-54. 
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and south of One Fathom Bank on 17 May 1970 which came into force on 10 March 
1971.
182
 In the case of Singapore, the 1878 United Kingdom Territorial Waters 
Jurisdiction Act is still applicable.
183
 This Act conferred upon Singapore the territorial 
sea of one marine league, which is equivalent to three nautical miles.
184
  
 
The effect of these national enactments was that there was no longer a belt of high 
seas in the Straits of Malacca. The debate centred around the increasing number of 
states claiming a wider limit on the breadth of their territorial seas, and in this context 
the need for a regime of passage through straits used for international navigation 
became obvious. It was noted that the extension of the twelve-mile territorial sea 
breadth would result in the high seas corridor in some important straits ceasing to 
exist.
185
 This was affirmed in a statement
186
 made during the progress of the 1982 
Convention that there were over 100 important international straits which would be 
impinged on by the extension of a twelve-mile territorial sea limit.
187
 The impact of 
this was considered disastrous for maritime states because of their main concerns on 
                                               
182  Leifer (1978) 30. 
183  English Common Law, equity and Statutes in force as at 27 November 1826 were adopted by 
Singapore pursuant to the 1878 Civil Law Ordinance, later developed as the Civil Law Act. 
Section 5 of the Civil Law Act was repealed on 12 November 1993 by the enactment of the 
Application of English Law Act Cap 7A. Section 4 of this Act specifies which English 
enactments continue to apply in Singapore and these include the 1878 United Kingdom 
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act. 
184  Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, ‘The Law of the Sea: National 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, Excepts of Legislations and Table of Claims’ (New York, 
United Nations 1992) 118; Singapore's 3 nautical miles territorial sea claim dates from 1957: 
No.1485-SINGAPORE MARITIME ZONES (Government Gazette of 30 May 2008) (see Law 
of the Sea Bulletin No. 67). 
185  See Robertson (1980) 841-842. 
186  Made by a member of the United Kingdom delegation at the 29th meeting of the 1982 
Convention: Official Records, vol.1 2nd session of meeting in Caracas. 
187  Official Records, vol.1 2nd session of meeting in Caracas; See also: YL Lee,‘Two views of the 
Malacca Strait’, in LY Leng, Southeast Asia: Essays in Political Geography (Singapore 
University Press, Singapore 1982) 73-104; The ambassador for the United States opined that 
there were about 116 important international straits that would be affected by a twelve-mile rule. 
The above statement was made in order to explain the effects of a wider territorial sea claim on 
the straits which had taken place shortly before the 1960 Conference commenced: See Jia (1998) 
9. 
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freedom of passage through straits used for international navigation which they 
claimed to be founded on rules of customary international law.
188
 
 
2.4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIME OF PASSAGE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA  
The denial of the notion of internalization of straits emerged when the United States in 
its draft proposal
189
 insisted that it would agree on the twelve-mile rule only if a non-
discriminatory right of unimpeded passage were guaranteed, particularly in straits 
used for international navigation.
190
 The draft proposal of the United States literally 
required the same freedoms of navigation and overflight for all ships, including 
warships, through straits as they had in respect of the high seas.
191
 This proposal was 
opposed by many states, especially coastal states. Nevertheless, it has been argued that 
although, in the notion of free transit, the draft article posited a similar right as for the 
high seas, the freedom sought was actually less than that.
192
 This was explained by the 
Soviet Union representative, who had similar views to those of the United States, i.e. 
that such passage would also respect the sovereignty and the rules of the coastal 
states.
193
  Somehow, the campaign by maritime states against the regime of innocent 
                                               
188
  The representative of the Soviet Union during the second session in 1973 stated that the freedom 
of navigation in the important straits such as Straits of Malacca, Gibraltar and Bab al Mandeb 
was founded on a rule of customary international law. Cf. the argument of the representative of 
Spain who argued that the statement of the Soviet Union caused confusion: see the Legislative 
History of the Regime of Straits (vol.1) 124. 
189  United States Draft Article on breadth of Territorial Sea, Passage through Straits and Fisheries in 
the 1971 Session of the Seabed Committee.  
190  Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 11. The United Kingdom also asserted a 
similar proposition. Robertson (1980), 808-813. 
191  Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits and Fisheries Submitted to Sub-
Committee II by the United States of America, UN Doc A/8421/Annex IV (1971). 
192  Robertson (1980), 812. 
193  Jia (1998), 133; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction, Summary Records of the twenty-fifth to the twenty-seventh 
meetings (UN Doc A/AC.138/SCII/SR33-47), 1972 (statement by John R Stevenson) at 25-27 
[hereinafter cited as Report of the Seabed Committee 1972]. 
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passage had been regarded by some coastal states as ‘beneficial only to naval 
power’.194 It was stated by the Malaysian representative that to deny the regime of 
innocent passage would mean ‘to sacrifice their national security interests to the 
global interests of merely a few states’.195 Furthermore, Indonesia expressed its view 
that there was no basis for arguing that the regime of innocent passage through straits 
used for international navigation would be detrimental to the navigational freedoms of 
the international community.
196
 The right of innocent passage in the Straits of Malacca 
had never caused any difficulties for international trade. Indeed, the right of innocent 
passage could balance the interests of both coastal and user states.
197
 It is suggested 
that such a statement clearly reflects that the regime of transit passage proposed by 
United States was not a customary right, rather, it was a creation of new law to secure 
right of passage through this vital sea lane. Although it may otherwise be argued that 
the position of Singapore was neutral and sometimes to a degree inclined towards the 
view of maritime states,
198
 such a reaction did not negate the long practice of innocent 
passage in the Straits of Malacca. Moreover, although the representatives of Singapore 
had termed their state a ‘strait state’, the fact that Singapore is one of the major ports 
in the world whose economic growth is largely dependent upon international trade has 
equally put the state in the position of being a user state.
199
 The geographical situation 
of Singapore, which is surrounded by the territorial seas of its neighbouring states, has 
                                               
194  This was the view of Spain and Tanzania in 1972: Jia (1998), 133. 
195  This was referred to the maritime powers during that time, such as the United States and the 
Soviet Union: Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 1) 95. 
196  Legislative History of the Regime of Straits, (vol 1) 93-94. 
197  ibid. 134.   
198  In commenting on the conflict of interest between the states bordering the strait and the maritime 
or user states, Singapore pointed out that generally both parties were agreed that in any situation 
freedom of navigation for foreign commercial vessels should be guaranteed: Legislative History 
of the Regime of Straits (vol. 2). 56. 
199  Legislative History of the Regime of Straits, (vol. 2) 7. 
64 
 
positioned the Straits of Malacca as a vital entrance to its port.
200
 Consequently, this 
argument may justify the position and stand of Singapore over the conflict between 
the coastal states and the maritime states. 
 
The Straits of Malacca increasingly became a matter of international contention when, 
on 16 November, 1971, the Governments of Indonesia and Malaysia jointly declared 
that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were not international straits, although they 
recognized the use of the straits for international navigation under the principle of 
innocent passage.
201
 In this regard Singapore only took note of its neighbour’s 
position,
202
 but shared the view that the Straits of Malacca were the sole responsibility 
of the three coastal states.
203
 The objective of the joint statement was to adopt a 
common position on matters relating to the Straits of Malacca, which is a vital link in 
sea communication. It is interesting to note that the declaration was made almost 
simultaneously with the convening of the third United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. The excellent work of Leifer and Nelson before the end of the 1982 
Convention had examined the legality of the joint statement and suggested that: 
…the right of innocent passage by foreign ships in international straits 
forming part of the territorial sea of coastal states is limited by the 
obligation to observe the relevant laws of the coastal state during 
passage. The legality of the joint declaration by Indonesia and 
Malaysia rests on their claim to a territorial sea of twelve miles. It can 
                                               
200  Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol. 2) 56. 
201  The joint statement was announced simultaneously on Tuesday 16 November 1971 in Jakarta, 
(at 12 noon), Kuala Lumpur and Singapore (at 12.30pm): See Joint Statement of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore on the Straits of Malacca (1972) 5 NYU Journal of International Law 
and Politics 425. 
202  Mr Rajaratnam, the Foreign Minister of Singapore explains his government’s position: 
‘Singapore…could not go any further than take note of the views of our two neighbours. The 
reason is that, in Singapore’s view, the status of the Straits of Malacca…should not be 
considered in isolation but in conjunction with the status of some 114 straits scattered 
throughout the world…’: Parliamentary Debates, Singapore, 17 March,1972.  
203  Joint Statement of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the Straits of Malacca (1972) 5 NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics 425. 
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be argued that such claim does not violate the prevailing customary 
norms of international law because of the substantial number of states 
which have adopted such limit. In its narrows, the Straits of Malacca 
fall within the territorial seas claimed by the coastal states. It can be 
submitted therefore that the joint declaration conforms with the lex lata 
of the seas. In consequence, foreign vessels…can only enjoy innocent 
passage through such waters…204 
 
Logaraj, however, has a different view on the issue of the internalization of straits. He 
believes that to argue that the Straits of Malacca are not international is a 
misconception,
205
 especially if the claim of a wider territorial sea limit had eliminated 
the high seas. Thus, the erosion of coastal states’ sovereignty and absolute power over 
international straits is unavoidable. However, it is submitted that to refuse the 
internalization of the Straits in the joint declaration of 1971 was not a wrong idea. 
Having regard to the nature of the straits, their narrowness and shallowness and the 
volume of vessels that pass through them every day, the anxiety of coastal states in 
relation to the security and safety of navigation as well as to the marine resources in 
the straits is to be expected. Moreover, the claim of a twelve-mile territorial sea limit 
by Malaysia and Indonesia is lawful before the international law, and the right 
customarily conferred within the territorial sea, namely innocent passage, is 
consistently recognized by these States.  
 
It was apparent that a controversial issue regarding this matter concerned the most 
appropriate terminology that should be used to avoid misconceptions. Consequently 
the issue of international straits was considered by the ILC under the notion of ‘straits 
used for international navigation’ rather than giving a definition for ‘international 
                                               
204  M Leifer and D Nelson, ‘Conflict of Interests in the Straits of Malacca’ (1973) 49 International 
Affairs  190-203, 197 (emphasis added). 
205  Logaraj, N, ‘Navigational Safety, Oil Pollution and Passage in the Straits of Malacca’ (1978) 20  
MLR 287, 288. 
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straits’.206 Thus the argument that the term ‘international strait’ should not be 
employed for fear that it might be interpreted as a strait belonging to the international 
community was solved.
207
 The term ‘straits used for international navigation’ 
remained acceptable terminology for describing the role of straits rather than their 
state of ownership.
208
   
 
While the littoral States had successfully persuaded other states to use the term ‘straits 
used for international navigation’ rather than ‘international straits,’ they had failed to 
convince them that the customary right of innocent passage was the most suitable 
regime for straits used for international navigation. Although, during the Convention 
discussions, Indonesia and Malaysia had insisted that the right of passage through the 
straits used for international navigation should be similar to the right applicable in the 
territorial sea, they later abandoned their absolute sovereignty rights over their 
territorial sea in the Straits of Malacca in order to compromise on the regime of transit 
passage to the Straits,
209
 a regime which is believed to have effectively struck a 
balance between two conflicting interests.
210
  
 
                                               
206  There was a suggestion to substitute the words ‘used for international navigation’ with 
‘indispensable to international navigation’. However this idea was rejected in fear of the 
subjective meaning of ‘indispensable’: see Yearbook of ILC 1955 vol.1, paras 45, 48 and 50.  
207  H Djalal, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Navigational Freedoms’ in D Rothwell and S 
Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms, and the New Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2000), 121. 
208  ibid. 
209  The United Kingdom’s proposal had attempted to neutralise the competing interest between the 
coastal states and the maritime states. Consequently, this proposal had been largely adopted by 
the 1982 Convention. 
210  Nandan’s view that looking at the ‘entrenched positions of the two sides (namely coastal states 
and maritime states), it appeared that a resolution of the issue was impossible. See Nandan 
(1982), 394.  
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Apart from their worries over the lack of sovereign power, the basis of the coastal 
states’ reluctance to accept this regime at an early stage lies in their concern over the 
issue of safety of navigation and the environmental protection of the Straits.  Thus, 
before ratifying the 1982 Convention, Malaysia, on behalf of Indonesia and 
Singapore, had addressed this issue in a letter to the President of the 1982 Convention 
on the common understanding of Article 233, taking into account the ‘peculiar 
geographic and traffic conditions in the Straits.’211 This was subsequently 
acknowledged by the maritime states, namely the USA, the UK, Japan, France, 
Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany,
212
 and was termed by Dupuy and 
Vignes a successful ‘bargain’ between the two competing groups of states.213 In fact 
Nandan also holds the view that the 1982 Convention was mainly influenced by those 
issues and problems particularly referring to the Straits of Malacca. He further points 
out several provisions in the 1982 Convention which specifically deal with the 
particular interests of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.
214
 However, Nandan merely 
draws attention to this matter without explaining his view in detail. As a result of their 
ratification of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,
215
  they are bound by its 
                                               
211  Legislative History of the Regime of Straits (vol 2 1992) 143-145. 
212  ibid. See too Dupuy & Vignes (1991) 972. 
213
  ‘Acceptance by the latter of the environmental and navigational concerns of the former in return 
for acceptance by the straits states of the rules of transit passage’: ibid. 
214  For example, ‘Special provision to ensure that vessels coming to and from Singapore across the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of its neighbours are hampered; Malaysia 
succeeded in incorporating in the regime for straits used for international navigation a provision 
which ensures that the regime of passage through such straits does not in any way affect the 
status of the waters within a strait (Art 34)…; The regime of archipelagic water itself is very 
much tailored to meet a number of concerns expressed by Indonesia…(Art 53); In the context of 
archipelagic waters, Singapore’s right to undertake certain activities in waters which were 
previously high seas but which became part of archipelagic waters was preserved (Art. 51).’: 
Nandan (1998) 396. 
215  Indonesia was the first of the littoral states to ratify the 1982 Convention on 3rd February 1986, 
followed by Singapore on 17th November 1994 and Malaysia on 14th October 1996. For detailed 
information on the chronological list see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm accessed 
on 4th June 2011. 
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provisions which have formulated the new regime of transit passage for straits used 
for international navigation.  Most of the straits in the world, including the Straits of 
Malacca, that are affected by the extension of the territorial sea limit to twelve miles 
fall within the ambit of Part III of the 1982 Convention which deals with the right of 
transit passage in straits used for international navigation. Such legal innovation 
clearly departs from the customary international law which was retained in the earlier 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea.
216
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The Straits of Malacca are, without doubt, a vital sea lane of communication with the 
geographical advantage of linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The history of the 
Malacca Sultanate clearly shows that the Straits have been of great significance to 
international shipping and trade since the fifteenth century. Indeed, Hugo Grotius’ 
great treatise, Mare Liberum, was initiated as a legal opinion to justify the capture of a 
Portuguese galleon in the Straits during the seventeenth century. To arrive at their 
present legal status as straits used for international navigation, several attempts were 
made, beginning with The Hague Codification Conference of 1930, and continuing 
through the Geneva Convention of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958, the 
Geneva Convention of 1960 and, finally, the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982. Throughout this period, the limits of the territorial sea and the 
nature of passage in straits used for international navigation had become a most 
contentious and challenging issue. These problems derived from the conflicting 
interests of the coastal and maritime states over the nature of passage in straits and the 
                                               
216  M George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis Malaysia, 
Petaling Jaya 2008) 3. 
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extension of the territorial sea of a state. Although, at the beginning of the 1982 
Conference, Malaysia and Indonesia had clearly expressed their reluctance to accept 
the regime of transit passage and jointly declared in 1971 that the Malacca Straits 
were not international straits, the fact that they eventually ratified the 1982 
Convention would appear to have changed their legal status in regard to the Straits. 
Since the states bordering the Straits are all parties to the 1982 Convention, the 
provisions contained in the 1982 Convention are binding upon them.
217
 It may perhaps 
be argued that, if the littoral States are non-parties to the Convention, the right of 
passage through the Straits remains the regime of innocent passage. However, the 
contention of the United States, as non-parties to the 1982 Convention, that they may 
also enjoy the regime of transit passage as it become customary international law, may 
negate the argument.
218
  As a conclusion, it may be useful to note Beckman’s 
statement that ‘while user states benefit from the safe passage through the Straits, 
littoral states – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – bear the risks associated with 
potential accidents and pollution.’219  The expression of this view is timely 
considering the present situation in the Straits. In fact, the risk is expanded to the 
rampant attacks by pirates or armed robbers who take the opportunity to prey on ships 
in such congested Straits. As an important strait of the world, the safety and security 
of navigation in the Straits is a paramount consideration for the stakeholders and the 
littoral states. Thus, any threat to users, especially piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in the Straits, must immediately be eradicated or at least reduced as much as 
                                               
217  Indonesia, Singapore and Indonesia ratified the 1982 Convention on 3 February 1986, 17 
November 1994 and 14 October 1996 respectively. 
218  Cross refer to Chapter 2 (para 2.3.1.3) 
219  East Asian Seas (EAS) Congress Bulletin (vol 131 International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 13 December 2006) 3. In 
<www.iisd.ca/ymb/easc2006/html/ymbvol131num1e.html> accessed 15 July 2008. 
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possible. At this point, having discussed the significance and legal status of the Straits, 
elaboration on the general principles and legal framework relating to the law of piracy 
in international law and international instruments is now undertaken in chapter three 
in order to build an understanding of the development of its concept and legal 
framework generally.  
  
CHAPTER THREE 
PIRACY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CURRENT DEVELOMENTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Piracy has been a constant problem to sea trade for many centuries, including in the 
Straits of Malacca. It is said to have existed since the beginning of maritime 
commerce and shipping.
1
 It is in fact a continuous concern to stakeholders of the 
maritime industry, territorial states and the maritime nations. The safety and security 
of seafarers is sometimes put at stake when they are attacked by pirates.   Yet the law 
has apparently been developing and changing over time. Consequently it is not 
surprising that the law on piracy has been subject to constant debate even after the 
conclusion of the Law of the Sea 1982.  
 
Chapter three will constitute an introduction to the development of the international 
law of piracy and its intrinsic definitional problem, before a detailed discussion on 
Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Straits of Malacca is undertaken in the following 
chapter.
 
This chapter will first examine the original meaning of piracy in classical 
times. It then describes the evolution of piracy in international law from the early 
twentieth century until the conclusion of United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. The definitions of piracy drawn by the international instruments are also 
covered. Then the thesis highlights the problems embedded in the legal definition of 
                                               
1  JL Jesus, ‘Protection of foreign ships against piracy and terrorism at sea: Legal aspects’ (2003) 
18 Int’l J Marine & Coastal L 364; JL Lenoir ‘Law and Modern Piracy’(1936) 18 Com.L.J 18; 
JM Goodwin, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an old Couple to Part’ (2006) 39 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 977. 
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piracy including universal jurisdiction, legal provision on hot pursuit and the potential 
nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism. Finally, it concludes by suggesting 
alternative approaches to overcome the shortcomings in the definition of piracy. 
 
3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF PIRACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
In the Oxford Dictionary of Law piracy is defined as: 
‘any illegal act of violence, detention or robbery committed on a 
private ship for personal gain or revenge, against another ship, people, 
or property on the high seas…Piracy is an international crime and all 
nations may exercise jurisdiction over pirates, regardless of the 
nationality of the ship or the pirates.’2  
 
The above definition has similar rudiments to the law of piracy in international law 
which is also known as Piracy Jure Gentium.
3
  It has deliberately distinguished 
between an act of piracy that occurs on the high seas and one that occurs within a 
state’s territory. In practice, offences that fall under the definition of piracy under 
international law do not necessarily fall within the definition of municipal law. In the 
Oxford English Dictionary the word ‘pirate’ is defined as  a person who attacks and 
robs ships at sea, while the word ‘piracy’ refers to the practice of attacking and 
robbing ships at sea and is assimilated with the act of hijacking.
4
 Definitely, this 
vernacular meaning of piracy could not be applied to all acts of robbing at sea, since 
piracy in international law bears an exclusive legal implication, namely the universal 
jurisdiction.
5
 This is a jurisdiction that applies to a situation where ‘the nature of (an) 
                                               
2  Elizabeth A Martin (ed), Oxford Dictionary of Law (4th edn OUP, Oxford 1997). 
3  It means, ‘Piracy by the law of nations.’ Jure Gentium is a Latin term which means by 
International Law; see Halsbury Law of England (vol. 18(2)(reissue) (i) The High 
Seas/B.Piracy/732; George R Constantinople ‘Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille 
Lauro incident’ (1986) 26 Va.J.Int’l L. 724; ibid. 
4  D Johnson, E Pladdet & M J Valencia, ‘Introduction: Research on Southeast Asian Piracy’ in 
Piracy in Southeast Asia, Status, Issues and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 2005) x. 
5  Joshua Michael Goodwin, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: time for an Old Couple to part’ 
(2006) 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.973. 
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act entitles a State to exercise its jurisdiction to apply its laws, even if the act has 
occurred outside its territory, has been perpetrated by non-national, and even if (its) 
nationals have not been harmed by the acts.’6 Throughout history, a series of attempts 
to formulate the law on piracy have been made; however, the problem of piracy 
remains unsolved and is likely to persist in the future. This is especially true in 
Southeast Asian and Horn of Africa waters inclusive of the Straits of Malacca and 
Somali waters respectively. The following discussion on the evolution of the concept 
of piracy and its legal framework is intended to provide necessary knowledge on this 
criminal activity, before more specific attention is drawn to the contemporary issues 
of piracy. 
 
3.2.1 PIRACY IN THE ANCIENT AND CLASSICAL PERIOD 
Dubner classifies piracy into two main types.
7
 The first type is ‘classical piracy’ and 
the second type is ‘modern-day piracy’. Piracy jure gentium is the classical type of 
piracy.  This type of piracy is regarded as the crime of an enemy against mankind or 
hostes humani generis.
8
  This means that, if the crime is committed on the high seas, 
or outside the jurisdiction of any state, the offender is assumed to have lost the 
protection of his national state and may be punished by all nations.
9
 This phrase is 
associated with Cicero, the Roman politician and philosopher, and later became a 
                                               
6  The Executive Council, ‘Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction by some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/ Attorney General’ Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 24-28 June 2008, Sharm El-Sheikh, 
Egypt, 1; see also Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use 
It (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994) 57. 
7  Barry H Dubner ‘Piracy in Contemporary National and International Law’ (1991) 21 California 
Western International Law Journal 139-140. 
8  Latin term which translates to English as ‘Common Enemies of All Mankind’: JM Goodwin 
(2006) 993. See also Jacob W.F Sundberg, The Crime of Piracy, in  M Cherif Bassiouni,, 
International Criminal Law (Transnational Publishers Inc, New York 1998)  441.  
9  O’Connell (1984) 966. 
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principle of international law. However, some scholars opined that the evolution of the 
phrase ‘hostes humani generis’ into modern piracy meant that it had departed from its 
original meaning as intended by Cicero.
10
 The phrase used by Cicero was primarily 
deployed for the sake of his political career.  The original maxim mentioned by him is: 
‘pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium’ which 
translates as ‘piracy is not a crime directed against a definite number of persons, but 
rather aggression against the community as whole.’11 This maxim is commonly 
phrased as ‘pirata est hostis generis humani.’12 De Souza noted that Cicero regularly 
used the word ‘pirate’ to describe his political opponents such as Verres.13 He had 
once described Verres in the course of a speech as someone who had ‘plundered the 
inhabitants of all the places’ and also as a ‘worse evil than pirates.’ Thus, although it 
is widely believed that the English word ‘pirate’ is derived from the classical Latin 
term ‘Pirata’14 which derives ultimately from the Greek term ‘peirates’15 or 
‘peirato’,16 it may be submitted that the original meaning used in ancient times has no 
legal consequences in modern times. The meaning has surely changed over time as it 
was intended to apply to different people at different times. That is why Rubin 
declined to attribute the modern meaning of piracy to the ancient or post-ancient usage 
                                               
10  AP Rubin, The Law of Piracy (University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 1988) 83-84;  JM 
Goodwin ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to Part’ (2006) 39 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 989. 
11  DR Burgess, ‘Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New International Law’ (2006) 13 
U.Miami Int’l & Comp. L.Rev 302. 
12  Bassiouni (1998) 441.  
13  Verres was a proconsul of Sicily during his time. Philip De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman 
World  (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 150-152. 
14  The misconception of the citation of Cicero’s classical definition of piracy that claimed to have 
its origin in the Latin term ‘pirata’ is also highlighted by Rubin. See Rubin (1988) 4. 
15  This means attack or attempt, cognate to peril or the adventurer who attacked a ship: Johnson, 
Pladdet and Valencia (2005) x.  
16  Cf. Rubin opposed Coleman Phillipson’s writing on the meaning of piracy which according to 
Phillipson means ‘peirato’ in Greek term. In fact, none of the original Greek cited by him had 
used the term ‘peirato’. See Rubin (1988) 3. 
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just because it had been frequently repeated by learned authors.
17
  According to him, 
the word ‘pirata’ had never appeared in ancient texts but exists only in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, mostly bearing a non-legal translation.
18
 In fact, the intention 
was to label rebels or ‘hostes in bello’19 as ‘pirata’ to show contempt for their act, 
rather than the robbers or ‘praedones/latrones’20 who had clearly not been outlaws 
previously. This view is shared with Goodwin who explains that the Romans’ use of 
the word pirate was to describe ‘communities that did not follow the rules of war 
because they did not go through the formalities of declaring war before attacking.’21 
Thus, for both Goodwin and Rubin, the phrase ‘hostes humani generis’ may be 
suitable for describing piracy in ancient times, although it may be too lacking in a 
legal sense for it to continue to be applied in modern times.
22
  
 
3.2.2   PIRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL  
ANALYSIS 
Despite disagreement among scholars on the original meaning of piracy and its 
essence, the world in the twentieth century had already accepted that piracy in 
international law is traditionally the enemy of humankind and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of any state. In 1927, Moore J of The Lotus Case stated that: 
Piracy by law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis.
23
 Though 
statutes may provide for its punishment, it is an offence against the law of 
nations; and as the scene of the pirate’s operations is the high seas, which it is 
                                               
17  Rubin (1988) 2-3. 
18  Rubin (1988) 2-3. 
19  It means enemies in war: Rubin (1988) 84. 
20  It means robbers by Roman jurists: Rubin (1988) 84. 
21  Goodwin (2006) 978-979. 
22  Rubin (1988) 84; Goodwin (2006) 1011. 
23  It is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as unique, or literally means ‘of its own kind.’ It is Sui 
Generis because it is unique and the law prescribed for piracy is very special compared to other 
laws. See Keyuan Zou Law of the Sea in East Asia Issues and Prospects (Routledge, London 
2005) 141. It is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as unique, or literally means ‘of its own kind.’ 
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not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is denied the protection of the 
flag which he may carry, and is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of mankind 
- hostis humani generis - whom any nation may in the interest of all capture 
and punish.
24
 
 
Generally, the crime of piracy must be allied with acts committed at sea
25
 and must be 
beyond any state territorial jurisdictions. It has also been regarded as sui generis 
before the international law because it is committed on the high seas, thus placing the 
pirates beyond the protection of their national state. This is an important element that 
distinguishes between piracy in international law and piracy in municipal law. A 
similar conclusion was reached by O’Connell when he said that ‘it is the area of 
jurisdiction that establishes the difference between international and municipal law.’26 
Thus, the question of universal jurisdiction will not arise in cases where piracy occurs 
in territorial waters of a sovereign state. 
 
Since there was no authoritative definition of international piracy,
27
 Brierly, an 
international law jurist, had suggested three important elements to constitute an act of 
piracy.
28
 Firstly, it must involve an act of violence. Then, it must be committed at sea. 
Finally, the act must not be backed by any authority.
29
  In other words, an act of piracy 
committed for a political purpose would not fall under the legal meaning of piracy. 
                                               
24  The Case of the S.S Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J, (Ser. A)  No.9 at 70 (The Lotus 
Case). 
25  For detailed discussion on this see Malvina Halberstam ‘Terrorism on the high seas: The Achille 
Lauro, ‘Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety’ (1988) 82 AJIL 269. 
26  O’Connell (1984) 966. 
27  Joseph W Bingham, Harvard Research in International Law, Comment to the Draft Convention 
on Piracy (1932) 26 AJIL Supp.749,750. 
28  JL Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the international law of peace (6th edn 
Oxford Clarendon Press 1963) 31; JL Brierly, The Law of Nations (1928) 154. See also the 
judgment of Story J in the case of United States v Smith (1820)18 US (5 Wheat) 153,154; Dr 
Lushington’s statement in The Magellan Pirates (1853) 1 Sp Ecc & Ad 81 (164 ER 47); the 
Privy Council decision in In re Piracy Jure Gentium (1934) 49 Lloyd’s List L.R 411; George R 
Constantinople ‘Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro incident’ (1986) 26 Va 
J Int’l L 727-731; O’Connell (1984) 966-969. 
29  Brierly (1928) 154. 
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This seems indistinguishable from a case of a recognized act of piracy in the sixteenth 
century.  For example, Sir Francis Drake, who attacked Spanish vessels in peacetime, 
was regarded as a national hero by the Queen of England.
30
 Goodwin attributes the 
royal recognition to the fact that such an act had increased the royal treasury and could 
thus be justified. Nonetheless, this kind of piracy was no longer acceptable in later 
centuries.  
 
However, privateering had then become a famous activity that was authorised in 
England during the eighteenth and nineteen centuries. The acts of a privateer were no 
doubt similar to those of piracy except that they became legal only because the 
privateer carried a letter of marquee from the crown legalising his act. The profit 
gained would also be shared with the state.
31
  Privateering was then no longer 
acceptable and the English authorities began to crack down on it due to the desire of 
states to overcome the problem of piracy. Despite the existence of the Law of Piracy 
in municipal law, the central legal framework at the international level was seen as 
necessary to provide a basis of jurisdiction for the crime of piracy. In consequence, in 
the early twentieth century, the League of Nations began its important role of 
codifying the international law, which includes the law on piracy. 
 
 
 
                                               
30  This case happened in 1579 and Drake was knighted by Queen Elizabeth in 1581. See Goodwin 
(2006) 979-980. 
31        Goodwin (2006) 980-981; Rubin (1988) 17. 
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3.2.2.1  PIRACY IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE HARVARD  
CONVENTION 1932 
Piracy was chosen as one of the most important subjects to be considered for the 
purpose of codification of international law as proposed by Council of the League of 
Nations in 1924. Initially, in 1926, the Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law proposed a ‘Draft Provisions for the suppression of 
Piracy.’  The report of the Rapporteur, M.Matsuda, produced eight key provisions 
relating to the codification of piracy law; among them were the requirements to be on 
the high seas,
32
 for the purpose of private gain
33
 and universal jurisdiction
34
 over a 
pirate. This report, however had made no reference to any cases, state practice and 
juristic opinion in consequence of which the Draft was considered a proposed draft of 
new treaty or de lege ferenda.
35
 Yet, the question of discrepancy between the draft and 
learned juristic and historical analysis was irrelevant since it was permissible in such 
progressive codification.
36
 The response of governments to the Draft report revealed 
the difficulty of concluding a universal agreement on the subject of the international 
law of piracy.
37
 As a result, this Draft report was not invoked in the subsequent 
Codification Conference. 
 
Following the failure to regard the issue of piracy as one of interest to all states in the 
Resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, an attempt to define the 
                                               
32  Art 1 of the Draft Provisions for the Suppression of Piracy proposed by the Committee and 
drafted in form by M Matsuda 0n 26 January 1926. 
33  ibid. 
34  ibid. Art 5, Art 7. 
35  It means ‘a proposal for new law regardless of history and theory’. See Rubin (1988) 307. 
36  Rubin (1988) 307. 
37  These were originally the words of the Polish Representative, M Zaleski, which were approved 
by the League Council on 13 June 1927. See Rubin (1988) 308. 
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international law of piracy was made again in the 1932 Harvard Draft of International 
Convention.
38
 This was said to be an independent research effort by the League.
39
 It 
was unsurprising that the legal formulation of piracy in the Draft Convention was 
considered to be the most difficult one to draft.  Article 3 of the Draft Convention
40
  
read as follows: 
Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state: 
1.  Any act of violence or of depredation committed with 
intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a 
person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for 
private ends without bona fide purpose of asserting a 
claim of right, provided that the act is connected with an 
attack on or from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is 
connected with an attack which starts from on board ship, 
either that ship or another ship which is involved must be 
a pirate ship or a ship without national character. 
2. Any act of voluntarily participation in the operation of a 
ship with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship. 
3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an 
act described in paragraph 1 or 2 of this article. 
 
The key element of this article seems to reiterate the earlier requirement of ‘private 
end’ in M.Matsuda’s report. No requirement of ‘high seas’ is stated but it requires 
piracy to be committed ‘in a place situated outside the jurisdiction of any state.’41 
Rubin points out some weaknesses of the Harvard Research Draft.
42
 For him, some of 
the Draft articles were historically and legally wrong due to lack of evidence and 
                                               
38  Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with comments (1932) 26 
AJIL Supp 768. 
39  Rubin (1988) 308. 
40  Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with comments (1932) 26 
AJIL Supp 739,743; See too Ethan C Stile, ‘Reforming Current International Law to Combat 
Modern Sea Piracy’ (2004) 27 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 305-307; PA Buhler, ‘New 
Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a Revised Definition of Maritime Piracy’ (1999) 8 
Current Int’l Trade L.J 61-65. 
41  ibid. See Art 3(1) and Art 4(1). 
42  For further discussion refer Rubin (1988) 313-317. 
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support and had ignored the idea of general international law.
43
 Despite this criticism, 
the Harvard Convention might be regarded as an important and useful starting point in 
the development of the international law on piracy because it provides the basis for a 
discussion of piracy, the central issue of which is common to the law of most 
individual states.
44
 
 
3.2.2.2     PIRACY IN THE REGIME OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The subject of piracy has continuously been discussed concurrently with 
developments in the Law of the Sea on the subject of territorial seas and the high seas. 
While it is recognized that piracy is a crime against a nation, the definition of piracy is 
complicated, in reality making it difficult if not impossible to enforce laws to deal 
with it. The definition of piracy in the current 1982 Convention is mainly taken from 
Article 15 of the 1958 Convention.
45
 Article 101 of the 1982 Convention gives the 
definition of piracy.  It is important for certain fundamental requirements to be 
fulfilled before the act can be regarded as piracy in international law. This Article 
reads as follows: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
                                               
43  Rubin (1988) 316. 
44  George R Constantinople ‘Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro incident’ 
(1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 732. 
45  Art 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention is in pari materia (similar exactly) with Art 101 
of the 1982 Convention. 
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(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b). (Underline Added) 
 
The above definition underlines some important features of piracy under international 
law, the basis of which are long-established principles dating back hundreds of years. 
This is not startling in view of the fact that most of the provisions in the 1982 
Convention were replicated from the regime of piracy in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, with only minor changes.
46
 The most important features are that the 
intention must be for private ends, the act must be carried out on the high seas and it 
must be against other ships. The issues arising from these requirements will be 
discussed in detail below. 
 
3.2.3 PIRACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANISATION (IMO) AND INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME BUREAU (IMB) 
The IMO is an intergovernmental organization and a specialized agency established 
under Article 57 of the United Nations Charter with the motto “Safer ships and cleaner 
oceans”.47 The subject of piracy and armed robbery at sea is assigned to the Maritime 
Safety Committee of the IMO. The definition of piracy in the IMO is the duplication 
                                               
46  Compare the provisions in the 1958 Geneva Convention and 1982 Convention. See also Jesus 
(2003) 373, 375. 
47  See IMO website at <http://www.imo.org>; Philippe Boisson, Safety at Sea: Policies, 
Regulations and International Law, Paris: (Bureau Veritas, Paris 1999) 59-61. 
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of the United Nations’ definition in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Thus, any 
crime or illegal act resembling piracy which occurs within the territorial sea of a state 
is known rather as ‘armed robbery against ships.’ This is defined in the Code of 
Practice for Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
48
 
as follows; 
Armed Robbery against Ships means any unlawful act of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an 
act of ‘piracy’, directed against a ship or against persons or property 
on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences. 
 
In IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) ‘Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ armed robbery means any of the following 
acts:
49
 
1. any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, 
or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private 
ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on 
board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic 
waters and territorial sea; 
2. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described 
above 
 
Both definitions given by IMO above reflect the legal implications of similar acts but 
in different locations. Such an act that occurs in the territorial waters of a state would 
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of that particular state. However, this greatly 
depends on the availability of municipal law and regulation of the local states.  
 
                                               
48  See IMO, MSC.4/Circ.95 (19 December 2006), quoting Resolution A.922 (22), annex paragraph 
2.2. 
49  IMO Resolution A.1025(26); IMB Annual Piracy Report, 3. 
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On the other hand, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which was established in 
1981 as a division under the International Chamber of Commence (ICC)
50
, gives a 
broad definition of piracy. This read as follows: 
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent 
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent 
or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act. 
 
Obviously, the above definition deviates from the legal definition of piracy provided 
under the 1982 Convention. While piracy is consensually accepted by most of the 
participating states in the said Convention as a universal crime that may only occur on 
the high seas and in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state, piracy as defined by 
the IMB disregards the state’s local jurisdiction. This definition has become a 
controversial issue among the local authorities, especially for those states that are 
alleged to be piracy hotspots.
51
  However, the IMB has commented that the definition 
given by them is only for statistical purposes. They are looking at the current situation 
in which the majority of attacks against ships occur within the territorial waters and 
jurisdiction of a sovereign state.
52
 It further urges that the meaning of ‘armed robbery 
against ships’, which was stated by the IMO at its 74th meeting of MSC, in article 2.2 
of the Draft Code of Practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships
53
, has more legal implications in international law. In fact, the 
objective of setting up the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 
                                               
50  See  www.icc-ccs.org/ accessed on 20 February 2009. 
51  Malaysia and Indonesia have denied the accuracy of IMB reports on piracy attacks in their 
respective territorial waters including the Straits of Malacca. They argue that the attacks are only 
sea robberies and not piracy according to international law. Such piracy reports, if not 
distinguished, might affect the states’ credibility and sovereignty in the eyes of the international 
community: Interview with Captain Maritime Mamu Said Alee, Director of Maritime Policy and 
International Relation, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (Kuala Lumpur 23rd February 
2009). 
52  Boisson (1999) 72. 
53  The IMO Code of Practice: MSC/Circ.984. 
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in October 1992 was to assist the shipping industry and to report to local authorities, 
helping them to deal with piracy and armed robbery problems.
54
 In this context, the 
pirates’ attack against MV Alondra Rainbow in 1999 was a clear example of the 
efficiency of the IMB-PRC in playing its role.
55
 Its prompt action in issuing alerts to 
ships at sea to respond to the missing ship, Alondra Rainbow, and its later reporting of 
that missing ship’s possible location to the local authority was commendable and 
expected  for the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
56
 
 
As far as the statistics of piracy are concerned, it is important to differentiate between 
the reports produced by the IMO, IMB and the local authority of a coastal state. One 
might be confused by the discrepancies in these reports but this is to be expected due 
to the incongruity of individual definitions of piracy and the number of reports 
received from the victims. Moreover, some incidents go unreported. In conclusion, it 
should be highlighted again that, while the IMO definition of piracy is similar to the 
1982 Convention and only covers acts of piracy on the high seas, the IMB definition 
covers both piracy and armed robbery regardless of where the event occurs.  On the 
other hand, the definition given by the littoral or coastal states comes under the ambit 
of municipal law and varies enormously between states.  
 
 
                                               
54  This is done by issuing daily status reports on piracy and armed robbery to ships via broadcasts 
on the Immarsat-C SafetyNET service. See ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
ships’, Report for the period 1 January-30 September 2006, 2.  
55  RS Vasan ‘Alondra Rainbow revisited, A Study of related issues in the light of the recent 
judgment of Mumbai High Court’ paper no.1379 issue 13.05.2005 by South Asia Analysis 
Group <http://www.southeastasiaanalysis.org/\papers14\paper1379.html.> 
56  ibid.  
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3.3 ANALYSIS OF ADEQUACY OF THE LAW OF PIRACY IN THE 1982 
CONVENTION  
Although the international law has undergone gradual changes, with the 1982 
Convention generally presumed to have solved the significant issues in the law of 
International Sea Piracy, some incidents that have occurred since the adoption of the 
Convention demonstrate that some sensitive issues have been overlooked.
57
 It was 
expected that the 1982 Convention would bring some changes to piracy law; however, 
it still has some loopholes and a narrow definition which might not be sufficient to 
tackle the piracy problem in certain situations.
58
 
 
3.3.1 DEFINITION OF PIRACY: REVISITED 
Generally, pirates commit robbery, plunder and sometimes even murder and rape. The 
main argument for not challenging the existing piracy law which has evolved from the 
traditional piracy norms is that the law of piracy has universal consensus and thus 
should not be altered.
59
 Rubin, in his book ‘The Law of Piracy’, criticized the existing 
international law on piracy for its lack of juristic and scholarly interpretation.
60
 His 
study on the historical and legal background of piracy in international law indicates 
that no codification was made on the law of piracy. Instead, the regime of piracy in the 
1982 Convention is a product of the earlier disputed work by the Committee of 
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law in 1924, whose proposal 
on Draft Provisions for the Suppression of Piracy was not invoked due to lack of 
                                               
57  Dubner (1979) 471. Constantinople (1986) 745-748 suggested that the Achille Lauro incident 
could be a lesson on the need for a more comprehensive definition of piracy. In other words, the 
present definition of piracy is outdated and needs to be revised to suit contemporary society. 
58  The definition of piracy given in Art 101 would exclude piracy that occurs in the territorial sea 
and acts of mutiny by ships’ crews.  
59  Ibid. 475. 
60  AP Rubin, The Law of Piracy (University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 1988). 
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universal agreement, and also the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention. In fact, the 1982 
Convention derives its model from the 1958 Geneva Convention which follows major 
aspects of the Harvard Convention. It would appear that criticisms of the definition of 
piracy in the present 1982 Convention are aimed primarily at the issues of private 
ends, high seas and two-ship requirements.
61
 In fact the conflicting opinions of 
scholars in this matter have existed since the very beginning of discussions on the law 
of piracy.
62
 
 
Significantly, the first essential feature in paragraph (a) of Article 101 of the 1982 
Convention requires such criminal act, detention or depredation to be committed ‘for 
private ends’. This definition would definitely exclude governmental or political acts 
as well as insurgency and belligerence in support of political ends from being treated 
as piracy under international law.
63
 Crockett considers that, were common jurisdiction 
to be imposed on state-sponsored piracy, its consequences would probably be more 
detrimental to international peace and stability in the sense that ‘maybe a state whose 
interests [had] not been directly infringed [would seek] to punish a state which 
authorised an act of piracy.’64 Thus, the decision to exclude state acts from the 
definition of piracy is sound and reasonable after weighing the potential impact 
associated with such inclusion. Dubner also agrees with Crockett on limiting the 
                                               
61  EC Stiles ‘Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy’ (2004) 27 
Suffolk Transnat’l L.Rev 299, 322; PA Buhler, ‘New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a 
Revised Definition of Maritime Piracy’ (1999) 8 Current Int’l Trade L.J 61-65,67; CH Crockett 
‘Towards A Revision of the International Law of Piracy’(1977) 26 DePaul L Rev. 78,84; (GG 
Ong ‘Ships Can be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s 
Maritime Security Framework’ in d Johson and M Valencia (eds.)  Piracy in Southeast Asia, 
Status, Issues, and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 2005) 53. 
62  Jesus (2003) 38; Crockett (1977) 92-93. 
63  WP Willig, Comment, The Santa Maria Incident: A grey zone between unrecognised insurgency 
on the high seas and Piracy Jure Gentium (1961) 25 Alb. L.Rev. 299-312. 
64  Crockett (1977) 88. 
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definition merely to ‘private ends’ in order to avoid political difficulties and to 
preserve the theory of sovereign equality and the presumption that interfering with 
government ships on the basis of suspicion of piracy might have greater 
consequences.
65
 It may be noted that this kind of politically motivated act could be 
considered one of the popular bases for rejecting the definition of piracy by some 
states for lack of coverage.  
 
As a result of the private end requirement, the crime of maritime terrorism which has 
become infamous lately is also automatically excluded from the legal meaning of 
piracy.
66
 But, for Halberstam, a terrorist act such as the hijacking of the Italian Cruise 
Liner Achille Lauro in 1985 is not exempt from the definition of piracy until and 
unless it is directed against a particular state.
67
  To this day, the debate about 
incorporating acts of terrorism within the ambit of the definition of piracy still 
endures. Burgess argues that, were terrorism to be proved to have similarities with 
piracy, the universal jurisdiction created for piracy might be applicable to terrorism 
too.
68
 In fact he believes that, when tracing the history of piracy, both piracy and the 
act of terrorism are profound.
69
 While Burgess is devoted to applying the universal 
jurisdiction of piracy over maritime terrorism,
70
  Rubin and Goodwin would prefer to 
discourage or abolish this established principle of jurisdiction as it no longer makes 
sense.
71
 The reasons put forward by the latter are quite convincing. The reality, in this 
                                               
65  ibid 262; Dubner (1979) 476. 
66  Dubner (1979) 473. 
67  Malvina Halberstam. Terrorism on the High Sea: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO 
Convention on Maritime Safety, [1988] 82 AJIL 276. 
68  Douglas R Burgess ‘Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a new international law’ 
(2005-2006) 13 U. Miami Int’l &Comp.L.Rev 299. 
69  Burgess (2006) 308. 
70  Burgess (2006) 340-341. 
71  Rubin (1988) 343, Goodwin (2006) 973-1011. 
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twenty-first century, is that the rights of people always have priority. Hence, to allow 
universal jurisdiction to be applied may indirectly abuse the due process of law.
72
  It is 
agreed that the universal jurisdiction may have been the best rule a hundred years ago, 
but it no longer suits contemporary society.
73
 Furthermore, to avoid applying the 
universal principle to the crime of piracy does not mean that pirates might escape 
punishment. There are still other types of jurisdiction available in international law 
such as the flag-state principle, nationality principle and the passive personality 
principle that are more relevant and practical nowadays as a means of establishing 
jurisdiction.
74
 
 
The second feature of piracy in Article 101 of the 1982 Convention requires that the 
act must be committed on the high seas or at a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
state. It is not mentioned clearly in the definition of piracy in Part VII of the 1982 
Convention whether the international law of piracy may be applied in Exclusive 
Economic Zones. This issue appears to be divided into two sections. Those who 
would restrict the application of the law of piracy only to the high seas and a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state justify this with the plain meaning of Article 101 
of the 1982 Convention. The intention to limit the coverage area for piracy in 
international law to that extent is a result of the assumption that piracy, if it occurs 
within the territorial sea of a state or the EEZ where the state has sovereign rights to 
the economic exploitation of the sea, should be dealt with exclusively by the affected 
                                               
72  Goodwin (2006) 973-1011. 
73  ibid; Cross refer to Chapter 3(para 3.3.2). 
74  Cross-refer to the discussion on the Incident of MT Bunga Laurel in Chapter 6 (para 6.4.4). The 
most recent case of an attack by Somali Pirates on the Malaysian Charter Ship Bunga Laurel in 
the Gulf of Aden has raised the issue of jurisdiction on piracy. 
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states. They argue that Article 58(3) conferred ‘regulatory power to the coastal states 
over the enforcement rights of all states’, to suppress piracy in the EEZ.75 This article 
reads as follows: 
‘In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention 
in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations 
adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.’ 
 
It is assumed that, if a state has exclusive power in an EEZ, including the right to 
combat piracy, this might reduce the conflict of jurisdictions among states because the 
coastal state would have exclusive rights to prosecute piracy occurring within its area. 
Moreover, the coastal state’s duty to police its maritime zone would be undertaken 
efficiently without disputes arising with other foreign states. Otherwise, state may 
argues that the foreign state has encroached in its EEZ area with the reason to police 
and repress piracy. Djalal supports this view.
76
 Despite agreeing that freedom of 
navigation must be guaranteed in the EEZ as required by Article 58 (1) and Article 87, 
he considers that an act of piracy occurring within an EEZ would fall under the 
national jurisdiction of the coastal state since the high seas requirement in Article 101 
is generally understood to refer to an area beyond the EEZ.
77
 This would definitely 
encourage cooperation among states. Zou also suggests that ‘since piracy is closely 
related to the safety of navigation, states could assume corresponding duty or right to 
                                               
75   J Ashley Roach ‘Agora:Piracy Prosecutions, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International law 
and International Institutions’ (2010) 104 AJIL 3, 397-416,398. 
76  Hashim Djalal ‘Combating Piracy:Co-operation Needs, efforts, and Challenges’ in DJohnson 
and M Valencia, Piracy in Southeast Asia, Status, Issues and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 
2005)144. 
77  ibid. 
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suppress piracy in the EEZ of other states provided that anti-piracy measures taken by 
such states are inadequate.’78 In other words, it means that if a state is capable to 
repress piracy in its EEZ it is not appropriate for other states to encroach into that area 
of EEZ.  
 
Those who oppose this demonstrate their ambivalent views by referring to other 
related provisions contained in the 1982 Convention itself. Many commentators 
suggest that the international law of piracy extends not only to the high seas and areas 
beyond the territory of any state, but also includes the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ) by virtue of Article 58(1) and (2).
79
 These Articles read as follows: 
Article 58(1): 
‘In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, 
the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation….;  
 
Article 58(2):  
‘Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law 
apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part;’   
 
Article 87:  
‘The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid 
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It 
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States  
a) freedom of navigation;  
(b) freedom of overflight…;  
 
All states have been given the freedom of navigation in the EEZ to a similar level as 
on the high seas. Article 58(2) has directly embraced the application of the definition 
                                               
78  Keyuan Zou, ‘Seeking Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at sea’ (2005) 59 Journal of 
International Affairs, 117,122-123. 
79  Vladimir Golitsyn, ‘Maritime Security (Case of Piracy)’in HP Hestermeyer, et al (eds.) 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) at page 1162;         
Keyuan Zou ‘Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea’ (2000) 31 Journal of 
Maritime Law and Commerce 107, 111. 
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of piracy in Article 101 to include the EEZ. This appears to indisputably confirm the 
extension of the obligation of a state to cooperate in the repression of piracy as 
requested in Article 100 to the EEZ area.
80
  Even though the coastal states are given 
certain sovereign rights in the EEZ, this right is limited to economic exploitation of 
the sea as provided in Article 56 of the 1982 Convention:  
‘for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, 
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds.’81  
 
Kontorovich regards any attempt to exclude EEZ from the jurisdiction for repressing 
piracy, as required by the 1982 Convention, without proper justification as 
misleading.
82
 Roach agrees with this and regards it strictly as an unquestionable 
issue.
83
 Although, previously, the international customary law required the act of 
piracy to have occurred on the high seas, the expansion in the 1982 Convention of the 
maximum breadth of territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and the additional right to 
exploit the EEZ within 200 nautical miles of the baseline could not possibly refute the 
application of the 1982 Convention to piracy in the EEZ.
84
  Beckman also supports 
                                               
80
  Art 100 of the 1982 Convention: ‘All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State’. 
81  Art 56(1)(a). As for the limitation of jurisdiction of coastal states in EEZ refer to Art 56(1)(b) 
and (c):  
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: 
i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;  
ii) marine scientific research;  
iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;  
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
82  Eugene Kontorovich, ‘A Guantanamo on the sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and 
Terrorists, (2010) 98  CAL. L.EV. 243,253.  
83  J Ashley Roach ‘Agora: Piracy Prosecutions, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International law 
and International Institutions’ (2010) 104 AJIL 3, 397-416,398. 
84  Roach (2010) 398; Martin Murphy, ‘Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help 
Regional States Combat Piracy?’ in Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of 
Global Terrorism, (Oxon,Taylor & Francis, inc, 2007)161-63, 155. 
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this view when he argues that the international law of piracy has established 
‘extraordinary exceptions’ to the general principles governing jurisdiction of a state.85 
Thus, so long that the act of piracy is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
any states, the right to arrest and prosecute the pirates extends to all states. 
 
It is submitted that the application of the piracy provisions in the EEZ areas would 
definitely allow the exercising of universal jurisdiction by foreign states in order to 
catch and prosecute piracy, but it would limit the power of the coastal states over such 
areas. In the event of piracy attacks in these areas, foreign states will assume equal 
powers for the purpose of suppressing the crime of piracy in the EEZs of other states. 
This might have little significance for unstable states such as Somalia but, for other 
sovereign states such as those bordering the Straits of Malacca, apart from having the 
right to exploit the EEZ area, the exclusive right to pursue pirates within this area is 
crucial.  Furthermore, the vast maritime area left for common jurisdiction over piracy 
would still not resolve the problem deriving from it. This is especially true considering 
the pattern of piracy attacks in the Southeast Asian region. It would appear that the 
majority of attacks occurred within a 12-mile radius of a state’s territorial sea on ships 
anchored, berthed or steaming.
86
 This is an area where the implications of the 
definition of piracy and armed robbery given by the 1982 Convention and IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre are distinguished. Legally speaking, an act of piracy that occurs 
within the territorial waters of a state is called armed robbery against a ship rather than 
                                               
85  RC Beckman ‘The Piracy Regime under UNCLOS: Problems and Prospects for Cooperation’ in 
RC Beckman, JA Roach (eds.) Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN: Prospects 
for Cooperation (Edward Elgar Publishing, Oxon 2012) 20-21. 
86  See 2010 Annual Report of the ICC-IMB-PRC;  Taylor G. Stout, ‘Piracy and the Law of the 
Seas,’ Spring (2011) International Judicial monitor: see 
(www.judicialmonitor.org/current/generalprinciples.html ) accessed on 23 June 2011. 
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piracy.
87
 Although the elements and tactics of the crime and even the offenders are the 
same, the significant legal factor that differentiates between these two under 
international law is the location of the attacks.  In other words, the elements or act of 
the crime of piracy will be determined by referring to the extent of various maritime 
zones.  
 
Another requirement in the 1982 Convention which stipulates that the attack must be 
mounted against another private ship
88
 automatically excludes mutiny by the crew and 
privateering from being considered as piracy.
89
 Jesus takes the view that the two-ship 
requirement is clearly stated in the 1982 Convention. This prevents foreign warships 
from interfering in the ship’s affairs, even if the crew’s seizure or a takeover of the 
ship has been reported by the crew. He further argued that, in order for states to deal 
with piracy and maritime crime including terrorism efficiently, this requirement 
should be amended.
90
  
 
Therefore, it can be submitted that the 1982 Convention may need to be reviewed, 
especially in this contemporary world where the advances in technology utilized by 
the pirates run parallel with the technology of the coastal states and shipping industry. 
Nonetheless, the lack of definition should not be treated as an obstacle to a state’s 
attempts to curb the piracy and armed robbery issue to its fullest extent. Young’s 
opinion on this issue is very much welcomed. For him, the general definition of piracy 
                                               
87  Art 101 of the 1982 Convention; IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) in its 26th Assembly session. 
88  Art 101 (a) of the 1982 Convention. 
89  United Nations, ‘Article concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries’, text adopted by 
ILC at its 8th session (1956) 2 Year Book of the International Law Commission 265. 
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has ‘subjective values’ which may suit different times, places and cultures. Such 
values would ‘provide a way to avoid some of the biases in the use of the term.’ 91 
Thus, even though there are so many criticisms and comments on the suitability of the 
said jurisdiction in current society, many other compromises may be reached to 
finally fulfil the need to punish the offender.  For example, the mutiny of a crew on 
board a ship or an act of terrorism may be dealt with similarly to other types of 
crimes, such as robbery, causing harm or murder, which can be punished using 
relevant domestic laws or through extradition under the 1988 SUA Convention, 
provided that the states involved are party to that Convention.
92
  
 
3.3.2 PIRACY AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND THE RELEVANCE OF 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
The long-established principle has not given other states the right to police or enforce 
jurisdiction in other states’ territorial water including over foreign-flagged ships on 
the high seas. This is because the foreign-flagged ships that navigate the high seas are 
bound exclusively by the jurisdiction of their flag states. However, because of the 
globally accepted view on the importance of combating piracy, the perpetrators of 
which has been regarded as an enemy of mankind or hostes humani generic,
93
this 
principle has had to accommodate exceptions which allow the involvement of all 
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states in prosecuting the perpetrators.
94
 In fact, piracy was the first crime to be 
criminalised under international law and is considered the oldest international 
offence.
95
 Bantekas and Nash point out that international criminal law is a 
combination of international law and domestic criminal law.
96
 These two legal 
disciplines are complementary to each other since international rules would exist 
merely in a theoretical vacuum without the help of national legislation and 
enforcement authorities.
97
 On the other hand, Cryer and others, while recognizing a 
plethora of definitions of international criminal law, explain that an international 
crime ‘may also be defined as an offence which is created by international law itself, 
without requiring the intervention of domestic law.’98 In such cases, the international 
criminal responsibility will be directly imposed on an individual personality.
99
 
However, Cryer and others also believe that, in terms of enforcement, domestic 
legislation becomes part and parcel of international criminal law,
100
 particularly, in 
the implementation of international treaties. For example, the international law may 
simply provide the drafting of the commonly accepted rules on a criminal act, but it 
relies on states that are parties to the treaties to further execute its provisions. As 
Bantekas and Nash further comment, this execution or enforcement of international 
law by the domestic courts will ‘not necessarily be in identical manner, but with a 
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certain degree of consistency and uniformity based on the object and purpose of each 
particular treaty.’101 Thus, it is unsurprising that, in practice, the law and penalties for 
such crime vary from state to state, so long as the objective of the criminalization of 
crime is achieved.  
 
Bantekas and Nash illustrate this relationship by pointing to the crime of piracy, which 
is generally accepted in international customary law and international treaties as a 
crime against humankind.
102
 As discussed above, piracy, as it is defined in Article 101 
of the 1982 Convention, is limited to acts that occur on the high seas, EEZ or in places 
beyond the jurisdiction of any state. Apparently, these are the only maritime zones 
where piracy under international law might take place. The legal implication of the 
piracy provisions would empower every state to catch and punish pirates since they 
are dangerous to all ships regardless of their nationality.
103
 The principle of universal 
jurisdiction is classically defined as ‘a legal principle allowing or requiring a state to 
bring criminal proceedings in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the location of 
the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.’104 Churchill and Lowe 
comment that the piracy provisions are one of the exceptions to the jurisdiction on the 
high seas
105
in which the general rule is that the exclusive right to exercise power and 
                                               
101  Bantekas and Nash (2009) 1. 
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103  Because they are enemies of all mankind thus they no longer enjoy the privileges of law: 
Goodwin (2006) 992; Per Moore J, The Case of the S.S Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ, 
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enforce jurisdiction lies with a flag state.
106
 For Crockett, who gave his view in 1977 
before the adoption of the 1982 Convention, this common jurisdiction for piracy is the 
best means of enforcing international law against crime that occurs beyond any state 
jurisdiction.
107
 In fact, after the adoption of that Convention, hardly any changes were 
made to the provisions for piracy. As Bantekas and Nash correctly point out, the 
reason why piracy is regarded as a universal crime is because it has long been 
associated with acts that occur on the high seas or in places that are not owned by any 
sovereign state
108
 and it has been widely acknowledged as an international offence by 
all nations. 
 
Goodwin suggests seven reasons for the relevance of application of universal 
jurisdiction to classical piracy.
109
 However, these reasons are no longer relevant for 
contemporary piracy, and he further advocates the need to remove such jurisdiction. 
He opines that this universal jurisdiction if widely applied may create tension among 
states and may deprive the accused pirates of human rights and due process of law.
110
 
The Princeton Principles put forth by Goodwin sufficiently illustrate this.
111
 
                                               
106  The flag State is a State which has granted to a ship the right to sail under its flag. This rule is 
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99. 
108  An exception was made recently beginning in 2008 by Resolutions 1816, 1838 and 1846 of the 
United Nations which dealt exclusively with piracy on the high seas or similar acts in the 
territorial seas of Somalia: See UN DOC/S/RES/1816 (2008);  UN DOC/S/RES 1838 (2008); 
UN DOC S/RES/1838 (2008), UN/DOC/S/RES/1897 (2009) :  see in < 
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm > accessed on 20 June 2011. 
109  See Goodwin (2006) 987-1002: 1. Statelessness 2. Pirates are Hostis Humani Generis 3. 
Heinousness 4. Uniform Punishment  5.Narrowly-defined Offence 6. Piracy directly threatens or 
harms many nations 7.Summation. 
110  Goodwin (2006) 1003. 
111  Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
45 (2001); MC Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, (2001) 42 Va. J. Int’L, 81, 108; to allow continuous 
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Improper exercises of criminal jurisdiction, including universal 
jurisdiction, may be used merely to harass political opponents, or for 
aims extraneous to criminal justice. 
 
Similar to this view, Rubin also discourages the use of universal jurisdiction over 
contemporary piracy as, although suitable in the past, it is no longer suitable for 
today’s society.112 This is particularly true in this twenty-first century, especially when 
most of the attacks reported worldwide occur either in territorial seas, internal waters 
or ports of a state rather than on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
Thus, the onus of ensuring safety and security of navigation will fall on the sovereign 
coastal states. Philippe, in commenting on this issue, considers that, although 
international law empowered and mandated states to punish such crime, the 
implementation of this international law is complicated as it would involve national 
legislation, political will, sufficient resources and assets, and efficient enforcement 
power from that particular state. He suggests three essential ways to achieve proficient 
operation of the universal jurisdiction:  
1. ‘The existence of a specific ground for universal jurisdiction; 
2. a sufficiently clear definition of the offence and its constitutive 
elements, and; 
3. national means of enforcement allowing the national judiciary to 
exercise their jurisdiction over these crimes.’ 113 
 
In the absence of any one of these, there will be a lack of practical sense for the 
application of universal jurisdiction. Despite concerns expressed by some 
commentators on the difficulties of implementing this jurisdiction, it has until now 
                                                                                                                                       
Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute,’ (2004) 80 Notre Dame L.Rev.111, 
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112  AP Rubin, ‘The Law of Piracy’ (1988) 63 US Naval War C.Int’l L Stud. 343; Cross-refer to 
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been associated with the crime of piracy. The 1982 Convention requested all states to 
cooperate ‘to the fullest possible extent’ in the suppression of piracy.114 However, 
states have normally accepted the universal jurisdiction as a voluntary commitment.
115
 
Due to the lack of a precise definition of piracy and incomplete enumeration of the 
duty, most often, only states whose national or territorial interests are affected by the 
crime will take action against the criminal.
116
  
 
The commendable empirical research by Kontorovich and Art found that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction over piracy throughout the world during the ten-year period 
from 1998 to 2008 accounts for no more than 1.47 per cent of the total number of 
prosecutions.
117
 Only four states, namely China, India, Kenya and Yemen have used 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute piracy.
118
 Indeed, the slight rise of 0.94 per cent in 
the exercising of universal jurisdiction over piracy since 2008 has been mainly caused 
by the recent sharp increase in Somali piracy.
119
 Despite the legitimacy of universal 
jurisdiction for combating piracy, states are reluctant, hesitant or perhaps unwilling to 
invoke universal jurisdiction for many reasons, one of which is the potential for abuse 
of universal jurisdiction. Bassiouni opined that: 
                                               
114  Art 100 of 1982 Convention: ‘All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.’  
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Unbridled universal jurisdiction can cause disruptions in world order 
and deprivation of individual human rights when used in a 
politically motivated manner or for vexatious purposes. Even with 
the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction can be used 
imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions between States, potential 
abuses of legal processes, and undue harassment of individuals 
prosecuted or pursued for prosecution under this theory. Universal 
jurisdiction must therefore be utilized in a cautious manner that 
minimizes possible negative consequences, while at the same time 
enabling it to achieve its useful purposes.
120
 
 
It is suggested that, although universal jurisdiction is a recognised jurisdictional basis 
for dealing with piracy,
121
 states normally use diplomacy or invoke other means of 
establishing their jurisdiction in order to avoid controversial prosecution, especially 
since the 1982 Convention is silent on the method of prosecution and imposition of 
punishment and has not specified any penalties for the pirates. It leaves the matters of 
enforcement action, which relate to substantive and procedural process, to the 
individual state, meaning that such a universal crime would be subject to the 
municipal law of an individual state.
122
 However, enforcement might be difficult or 
impossible to implement if a state does not have any local law regulating piracy or 
crimes resembling it. Thus, states need to further incorporate relevant law pertaining 
to the crime of piracy into their domestic legislation and to establish jurisdiction of the 
local courts to try such crimes. Having said that, it is not expected that each state will 
have similar, precise and identical rules of enforcement. Rather, it will be sufficient 
for states to have consistent practical laws that meet the ultimate goal of the 
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Convention, which is to prosecute and punish the pirates or armed robbers who prey 
on ships. 
 
3.3.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT 
Despite the mandate of the 1982 Convention to all states to combat piracy on the high 
seas, there is a problem when the pursued pirates enter the territorial waters of their 
own nationality or the territorial waters of other states. State territorial sovereignty is a 
very recognized principle in international law. Foreign ships will be said to infringe 
this principle if they breach the limit set out. For that reason, the 1982 Convention 
provides the right of hot pursuit with some limitations.
123
 Paragraph three of Article 
111 provides that:  ‘the right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters 
the territorial sea of its own state or a third state.’ This is actually the concept of fresh 
pursuit that was practised by Anglo-Americans during the 19
th
 century.
124
 Poulantzas 
considers that, although the concept of hot pursuit has extended the rights of states 
into the high seas, it has not impaired the freedom of the high seas when carried out 
properly and accordingly.
125
 The idea and recognition of this, which was evidenced by 
the state practice, had later been incorporated into Articles 23 and 24 of the1958 
Convention. This then became Article 111 of the 1982 Convention. 
 
The right of hot pursuit is limited to the infringements of municipal law that 
commence while a foreign ship is in the state jurisdictional area of internal and 
territorial sea. It also applies to continental shelf and EEZ in cases of violation of the 
                                               
123  Art 111 was taken from Art 23 of the 1958 High Seas Convention. 
124  Brownlie (2003) 235; Poulantzas (2002) 4-6. 
125  NM Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (2nd edn Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague 2002) 127. 
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right of a coastal state within this area.
126
  In order to enforce its law a state has been 
given power to continue pursuing the foreign vessel without interruption with a 
condition that ‘a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which 
enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship’.127 In fact, only warships, military 
aircraft or government-authorized ships have the right to conduct hot pursuit
128
, which 
might include customs and police vessels.
129
  
 
Although paragraph one of Article 111 of the 1982 Convention recognised the coastal 
state’s right to extend its power beyond the territorial sea by maintaining an 
uninterrupted chase of a fleeing foreign ship due to having ‘good reason to believe 
that the (foreign) ship has violated the laws and regulations of that state’130 while that 
ship was within a state’s sovereignty, the case of piracy under international law is 
somewhat different. Merely having ‘good reason to believe’ or suspecting that a 
particular ship is a pirate ship does not give the coastal state the right of hot pursuit of 
the suspected ship. This is due to the constraint provided in Article 101 of the 1982 
Convention which requires the existence of an act of violence or depredation that is
131
 
committed by one ship against another ship. Moreover, piracy, as defined 
                                               
126
  Art 111 (2) of 1982 Convention reads as follows: ‘The right of hot pursuit shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental 
shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations...’ 
127  Art 111 (4) of 1982 Convention reads as follows: Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun 
unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that 
the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued 
as a mother ship is within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be, within the 
contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may 
only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which 
enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship: Brownlie (2003) 236.  
128  Art 111 (5) of 1982 Convention reads as follows: The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only 
by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as 
being on government service and authorized to that effect. 
129  Brownlie (2003) 236. 
130  Art 111 (1) of the 1982 Convention. 
131  Art 100 of the 1982 Convention. 
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internationally, is limited to the area of the high seas,
132
 which gives equal right to all 
nations to repress such an enemy of mankind. Consequently, in spite of being located 
on the high seas where no-one can claim sovereignty, any warship has the right to 
pursue a pirate ship that has committed or attempted to commit piracy. However, such 
a right would still cease immediately when the pirate ship enters its own territorial 
state or any other third-party state. Article 111 also protects the rights of innocent 
foreign ships, which merit compensation if they are mistakenly suspected by the 
coastal state’s authority or if there is a lack of evidence to justify such a pursuit.133  
 
Dubner long ago suggested the need to extend and allow hot pursuit provisions into 
the territorial waters of foreign coastal states for more effective enforcement action 
against piracy.
134
 Although this might be a good way of capturing the pirates, 
intrusion into a state’s sovereign territory may create tension between states. Such 
consequences will threaten international peace and worsen international relations 
between states. It has been suggested that more diplomatic means, such as cooperation 
and bilateral or trilateral agreements between surrounding states might create good 
relations and produce an efficient solution to capture pirates. The bilateral and 
trilateral agreement to coordinate law enforcement between Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, which includes an agreement to extend the right of hot pursuit up to five 
miles within one another’s territorial waters, has proved to be a good mechanism to 
                                               
132  Cross-refer to Chapter 3 for a comprehensive discussion on the definition of piracy. 
133  Art 111(8) of 1982 Convention reads as follows: Where a ship has been stopped or arrested 
outside the territorial sea in circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot 
pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained. 
134  BH Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1980)  8. 
104 
 
combat piracy.
135
 Apart from cooperative measures, the right of hot pursuit has 
recently been extended to the territorial sea of Somalia, following the sharp increase in 
piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.
136
 This is actually a 
new approach and an unprecedented right.
137
 The purpose of this is very 
straightforward, namely to catch and prosecute pirates and suppress piracy.  On 16 
December 2008, the UN Security Council decided that: 
 ‘...States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast - for which prior notification had 
been provided by Somalia’s Transitional Federal government to the Secretary 
General - could undertake all necessary measures ‘appropriate in Somalia’...’ 
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this exceptional right is solely applicable to Somali 
territory and does not create any international customary right.
138
 The rationale behind 
this resolution is the political instability, weak governance and ineffective 
enforcement power of Somalia to suppress such crime alone. This resolution has 
proved to be a challenge to the International Law of the Sea which may be seen as a 
weak tool for combating maritime crime, especially piracy. 
  
 
                                               
135  Cross-refer to Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussion on cooperation mechanism of the three 
states in combating piracy in the Straits of Malacca; See also: UK House of Commons Transport 
Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, Piracy, at page 16 and Annex D, Ev29 at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmtran/1026/1026.pdf accessed 
on July, 12 2011. 
136  IMO Assembly in November 2007 adopted Resolution A.1002 (25) which, among other things, 
requested the UN Security Council to seek the consent of Somalia’s Transnational Federal 
Government (TFG) for warships or military aircraft to enter its territorial sea, to engage in 
operations against pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers.   
137  The UN Security Council SC/9541 ‘Security Council authorizes states to use land-based 
operations in Somalia as part of the fight against piracy off the coast, unanimously adopting  
Resolution 851 (2008). 
138  See UN Resolution. See http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm  
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3.3.4 THE CONFLATION OF PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM AND 
THE 1988 SUA CONVENTION  
The fact that piracy is becoming increasingly violent with the use of more 
sophisticated weapons, to the extent of callously inflicting injury and death on the 
crew members of the attacked ship, has widened the scope of maritime security.
139
 
Indeed, some commentators have equated piracy attacks with terrorism at sea, 
especially as there has been an increase in the number of hijackings in piracy 
incidents.
140
 Ong lists four main grounds for possible overlapping or interconnecting 
areas between piracy and maritime terrorism based on the implication of both threats 
for global security; tactics and approaches or modus operandi employed; similarity of 
armoury used to achieve their objectives (hijacking ships); and, finally, the increasing 
use of violence.
141
  However, the main obstacle to these perceived similarities and 
connexions between pirates and terrorists that has been strongly upheld by antagonists 
of this perspective is the different motives of the pirates and terrorists.
142
   
Terrorism is distinct from piracy in a straightforward manner. Piracy 
is a crime motivated by greed, and thus predicated on financial gain. 
Terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act 
of attacking or hijacking a maritime target. The motivating factor for 
                                               
139  See: Table 8 ‘Types of Violence to Crew and Passengers, Jan-Dec 1994-2005’ in IMB Annual 
Piracy Report  2005 and Table 8 ‘Types of Violence to Crew, Jan-Dec 2005-2009’ in IMB 
Annual Piracy Report 2010. 
140  JL Jesus, ‘Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects’ 
(2003) 18 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 363, 387; Leticia Diaz & Barry Hart 
Dubner ‘On the problem of utilizing unilateral action to prevent acts of sea piracy and terrorism: 
A proactive approach to the evolution of International law,[2004-2005] 32 Syracuse J Int’l L & 
Com 1; GG Ong ‘Ships can be Dangerous, too: Coupling Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia’s Maritime Security Framework’ in D Johnson and M Valencia Piracy in Southeast Asia: 
Status, Issues and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore2005) 45, 49; Helmut Tuerk, [2007-2008] 15 
Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 337-368, 343. 
141  GG Ong ‘Ships Can be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s 
Maritime Security Framework’ in D Johson and M Valencia (eds.)  Piracy in Southeast Asia, 
Status, Issues, and Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 2005) 58. 
142  Ong (2005) 59. 
106 
 
terrorists is generally political ideology stemming from perceived 
injustices, both historical and contemporary.
143
 
 
It is a well-established principle that the goal of piracy and armed robbery at sea is to 
achieve financial or private gain, whereas terrorism is carried out for political or 
ideological purposes and is always coupled with the threat of mass devastation.
144
 
Apart from perpetrating the act for private gain, pirates always try to avoid attention 
and will only use harm if necessary to accomplish their mission while terrorists 
always call attention to themselves and will inflict as much harm as they can.
145
  
When commenting on maritime terrorism, Young and Valencia prefer to use political 
piracy as its working definition. Just as the definition of piracy has been problematic, 
maritime terrorism also has no internationally accepted definition.
146
 Indeed some 
scholars prefer to use Articles 3 of the SUA Convention as an operational definition 
for maritime terrorism.
147
  
 
Jesus believes that the absence of specific rules on maritime terrorism probably stems 
from the fact that ‘terrorism at sea has never been a serious international problem, in 
contrast to piracy and armed robbery.’148 The Achille Lauro incident of October 1985 
may be considered the first case to trigger the alertness of the international community 
                                               
143  AJ Young and Mark J Valencia, ‘Piracy and Terrorism Threats Overlap,’ The Washington Times 
(Honolulu, 6 July 2003) www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/jul/6/20030706-104801-
9949r/print/ accessed on 27 June 2011. 
144  Tammy M Sittnick ‘State responsibility and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: 
Persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to take additional steps to secure the straits’ [2005] 14 Pac 
Rim L & Pol J 743,751; Leticia Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner ‘On the problem of utilizing 
unilateral action to prevent acts of sea piracy and terrorism A proactive approach to the 
evolution of International law [2004-2005] 32 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com 1. 
145  ibid. 
146  Ong (2005) 61.  
147  ibid. See Art 3 in Chapter 3 (para 3.3.4.1). 
148  Jesus (2003) 387. 
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on the lacuna of law dealing with maritime terrorism.
149
 This Italian-flagged cruise 
ship was hijacked on the high seas by four Palestinians who held the crew and 
passengers hostage, threatening to blow up the ship should any rescue operation be 
undertaken.
150
 One passenger was killed when their demand for the release of fifty 
Palestinian prisoners by Israel was not fulfilled.
151
 Certainly, the involvement of 
various nationals and conflicts of jurisdiction in such a high-risk or fatal incident 
requires a more comprehensive international legal framework. The absence of 
international law to deal with the increasing and potential risk of modern maritime 
terrorism and the inadequacy of existing international law on sea piracy met with a 
rapid response by the International Maritime Organisation one and a half months after 
the Achille Lauro incident. It started by providing a resolution on measures to prevent 
unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and 
crews.'
152
 Tuerk comments that the adoption of practical measures, no matter how 
stringent, is insufficient to deter such crime, especially when several national 
jurisdictions are involved. Thus, a practical legal deterrent to make the criminal duly 
accountable is vital and urgent.
153
  
 
                                               
149
  RC Beckman, ‘The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol: Tools to Combat Piracy, 
Armed Robbery and Maritime Terrorism’ in R Herbert-Burns, S Bateman and P Lehr Lloyd’s 
MIU Handbook of Maritime Security  (CRC Press, New York  2008) 192. JD Simon, ‘The 
Implications of the Achille Lauro Hijacking for the Maritime Community’ The Rand Paper 
Series (1986): 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P7250.pdf accessed on 30 June 2011. 
150  Malvina Halberstam. Terrorism on the High Sea: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO 
Convention on Maritime Safety, [1988] 82 AJIL 269. 
151  Brad J Kierserman, ‘Preventing and Defeating Terrorism at Sea: Practical Considerations for the 
Implementation of the Draft Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), in Myron H Nordquist, John Norton Moore & 
Kuen Chen Fu, eds. Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China (2005) 425, 425 ; 
Glen Plant, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, [1990] 39 Int’l & Comp L.Q.27. 
152  Resolution A584 (14); Tuerk (2008) 340. 
153  Tuerk (2008) 340.  
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In reviewing the Achille Lauro incident, it is apparent that several conditions required 
by Article 100 of the 1982 Convention to establish the accountability of piracy under 
international law were not fulfilled. First and foremost is the condition pertaining to 
the intention of the attacker or hijacker, which has already been highlighted. The 
ultimate purpose of the criminals was to serve their ideological and political needs 
rather than any financial end.
154
 Secondly, Article 101(a) (i) states that the seizure 
must be made by one ship against another ship. However, in this case there was no 
other ship involved as the cruise ship was hijacked by passengers pretending to be 
tourists on the ship.
155
 Despite the fact that the thorough evaluation of Article 101 of 
the 1982 LOSC on the incidence of maritime terrorism, particularly the case of the 
Achille Lauro, would suggest that there is no possible nexus between these crimes 
primarily because of the different motives of pirate and terrorist, the lack of 
comprehensive rules of law on maritime terrorism has resulted in this theory. It is 
noteworthy that, at that time, there were already laws to suppress unlawful acts with 
respect to civil aviation such as the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and the 1971 Montreal Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
156
 It might be 
suggested that the absence of law on maritime terrorism was due to the fact that it had 
not previously been seen as crucial and vital to the international community until the 
real occurrence of the Achille Lauro tragedy sparked its urgency.      
 
                                               
154  Art 101(a) of the 1982 Convention. 
155  Art 101 (a)(i) of the 1982 Convention. 
156  Tuerk (2008) 343. 
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Thus, as a result of the strenuous efforts of states including Italy, Austria and Egypt 
together with the full cooperation and support of the IMO, the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) was finally adopted 
consensually in Rome on 10 March 1988. It was remarkable that such a Convention 
was successfully adopted less than three years after the Achille Lauro incident. In fact, 
the 1988 SUA Convention came into force on 1 March 1992, which was two years 
earlier than the 1982 Convention.
157
 Later on, in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2011 terrorist attack on New York’s Twin Towers, the international community was 
once again shocked by the realization that a mode of transportation had been used as a 
weapon of mass destruction.
158
The IMO called for a review of the 1988 SUA 
Convention in order to strengthen maritime security.
159
 This review was necessary in 
highlighting concern over the possibility of a ship being used as a means of destroying 
an important waterway or port in the same manner as the planes were used by 
terrorists in the September 11 tragedy.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
157  IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Mar 10, 1988.  
158  In the September 11, 2001 attack, planes were used as weapons to attack the Twin Towers in 
New York. 
159  Apart from the review of the SUA Convention, a Conference on Maritime Security was also 
held in December 2002 which discussed, among other things, the amendment of Chapter XI of 
the SOLAS Convention for the adoption of ISPS Code, strict requirements on shipping 
companies and a requirement to install automatic communication through an alert system on 
board a ship: Jesus (2003) 389-390. 
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3.3.4.1 THE 1988 SUA CONVENTION & 2005 PROTOCOL AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO ADDRESS INADEQUACY OF 1982 CONVENTION 
ON  PIRACY 
It is recognized that one of the reasons for adopting the SUA Convention in 1988 was 
to rectify the shortcomings of the regime of piracy in the 1982 Convention, leading to 
the private and financial motives of the criminals and the two-ship rule being 
relinquished.
160
 Unlike the 1982 Convention which stipulated that piracy is a crime of 
the high seas, the SUA Convention disregards the whereabouts of the occurrence of 
the unlawful and illegal acts. In other words, this Convention broadens the scope of 
crime that is not covered by the 1982 Convention including the seizing of a ship, 
violence against individuals on ships and causing destruction on ships that might 
endanger the safety of navigation.
161
  Article 3 of the SUA Convention provides as 
follows: 
1. any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and 
intentionally: 
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat 
thereof or any other form of intimidation; or 
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if 
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo 
which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
                                               
160  Tuerk (2008) 345-346; ND Korolyova, ‘International Legal Issues of Cooperation between 
States in Suppressing Piracy and Terrorism: Some Aspects, in Moscow Symposium on the Law 
of the Sea’ in Thomas A Clingan, Anatoly L Kolodkin (eds.) (Law of the Sea Institute, 
University of Hawaii 1988) 174, 177. 
161  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. 
Concluded at Rome on 10 March 1988 <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv8.pdf.>;  
Stuart Kaye ‘Interdiction and Boarding of Vessels at Sea: New Developments and Old 
Problems’ in R Herbert-Burns, S Bateman and P Lehr  (eds.) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook Maritime 
Security (CRC Press, New York  2008) 207. 
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(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy 
that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which 
endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that 
ship; or 
(e) destroys or seriously damage maritime navigational facilities 
or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or 
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, 
thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or 
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission 
or the attempt commission of any of the offences set forth in 
subparagraphs (a) to (f). 
 
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
(a) Attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 
1; or 
(b) Abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in 
paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is otherwise an 
accomplice of a person who commits such an offence; or 
(c) Threatens, with or without a condition as is provided for under 
national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical 
person to do or refrain from doing so any act, to commit any 
of the offence set forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) 
and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of the ship in question. 
 
In order to remedy the inadequacy of the 1982 Convention, the SUA Convention 
merely describes what would become ‘unlawful acts’ as listed above, rather than 
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defining maritime terrorism or political piracy.
162
 The wider scope of this provision 
will definitely place many kinds of unlawful acts under the ambit of the SUA 
Convention including acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships that occur in the 
territorial sea of a sovereign state but excluding internal or inland waters.
163
 With two 
sets of international rules in place, namely the 1982 Convention and the SUA 
Convention, pirates will not escape prosecution even in cases in which a coastal state 
is unable or unwilling to assert its jurisdiction and prosecute the offenders.
164
 This is 
due to the fact that, under the SUA Convention, the state party has a duty to extradite 
the offender to one of the states that has jurisdiction under such circumstances.
165
 
Moreover, the main aim of the SUA Convention is to ensure the offenders are 
punished and pay the price for their deeds.  Jesus points out that, in the regime of 
piracy, there is no obligation on states to prosecute and extradite the offenders. 
However, he suggests that the rule of ‘extradite and prosecute’ has been a ‘solid root 
in international terrorism law.’166 Thus, it may have a binding effect on the non-state 
parties of the SUA.
167
 State jurisdiction to prosecute the non-state parties may be 
based on four internationally recognised jurisdictional bases. The first is the 
territoriality-based jurisdiction in which the unlawful act was committed. This is a 
common basis accepted by states. Second is the nationality-based jurisdiction which 
takes into account the citizenship of the offender or the flag state of the ships.
168
 Third 
is the passive nationality jurisdiction or extraterritorial jurisdiction, in which the 
                                               
162  Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation. The preamble reads: ‘Acknowledging the terrorist acts threaten 
international peace and security…’;  RC Beckman (2008) 192. 
163  Tuerk (2008) 345; ND Korolyova [1988] 174, 177. 
164  Jesus (203) 392. 
165  Art 6 of the SUA Convention. 
166  Jesus (2003) 392. 
167   Jesus (2003) 392. 
168  Art 6(1) (a) of the SUA Convention. 
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victim’s citizenship is considered. Fourth is the universal jurisdiction, which has been 
used in very limited internationally recognised crime, such as piracy.
169
 In addition to 
these bases of jurisdiction, the SUA Convention also established two more 
jurisdictions, namely the habitual residence jurisdiction for those who have no 
nationality or are stateless persons 
170
and the target state jurisdiction in cases where 
the offence ‘is committed in an attempt to compel that state to do or abstain from 
doing any act.’171 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea in this twenty-first century are 
relatively challenging. The image of a flag with skull and crossbones along with a 
heroic character of a pirate captain is just a fiction that is no longer appropriate in this 
century or maybe centuries ago. Piracy is clearly a real menace to shipping industries, 
local authorities and stakeholders. Looking at the recent dramatic increase in 
contemporary piracy all over the world, it is certain that the provisions available to 
suppress piracy in the Convention are still inadequate. The adoption of the 1982 
Convention has not totally solved the problems of piracy. It merely describes piracy 
under international law, without further explaining its procedural law such as the 
method of arrest, prosecution and punishment. It also lacks legal coverage as almost 
all modern piracy, especially in Southeast Asian waters, occurs within the territorial 
seas of coastal states, and in ports, harbours and anchorages. Subsequently, when it 
comes to dealing with the real problem in contemporary society, the existing 
                                               
169  Art 6(4) of the SUA Convention; Cross-refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.3.2) for a detailed discussion 
on universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. 
170  Art 6(2) (a) of the SUA Convention.  
171  Art 6 (2) (c) of the SUA Convention. 
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international law of piracy might provide a good theoretical framework, but it is 
almost impossible to enforce it efficiently. 
 
Nonetheless, on closer examination of the definition of piracy, which has its roots in 
the previous literature, discussion and practice teach us that such a definition of a 
universal crime on which it is relatively difficult to reach a universal consensus among 
nations, should preferably be retained. The discrepancy of opinions from ancient times 
to the present day is unavoidable.  Obviously, the lack of a legal definition of piracy 
does not mean that it is the sole reason why piracy cannot be curtailed. It is not bizarre 
that piracy still exists today, as the crimes of robbery on land, murder and so forth 
have not been eliminated totally either. While the law and regulations such as the 
1982 Convention and 1988 SUA Convention are considered tools for combating  
piracy and armed robbery against ships, other methods of preventing and controlling 
this crime, such as cooperation among states and regions, the active role of coastal 
guards, navy, marine police, and enforceable sets of municipal laws are much needed.   
Hence, this is not the time to be overly concerned with the technical problem of the 
definition; rather, it is timely to find the best solution to rectify and improve the 
weaknesses in the existing international laws. The following chapters will discuss the 
issues of piracy that affect maritime safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. The 
regional response will be highlighted first before national legal frameworks and 
littoral states’ cooperative measures are addressed.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
PART II 
 
REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES ON THE 
THREAT OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBEY IN THE STRAITS OF 
MALACCA: THE MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: 
 A THREAT TO MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY  
IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA     
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century has seen a constant and rapid growth in seaborne trade 
supplying various goods and energy products including petroleum and gas. This has 
led to a need for sophisticated ships equipped with high-security facilities and modern 
technology.
1
 The growth of the shipping industry also gives rise to increasing risks of 
maritime crime and violence, ship collisions and marine environmental degradation, 
especially on the busiest trade navigation routes. 
 
 The rapid expansion of trade globally and shifts in trade flows into the Asia-Pacific 
region in the 21
st
 century indicate the significance of regional maritime trade routes 
for the world’s economy. In fact, the rapid economic growth of the East Asian region 
has doubled world trade.
2
 As commented by Ho and Raymond, a parallel movement 
of ‘the economic centre of gravity’ and shift of maritime power to the Asia Pacific 
region is unavoidable due to the importance of sea-borne trade and access to marine 
resources to this region.
3
 Consequently, straits that have been used for international 
navigation, in particular the Straits of Malacca, are becoming ever more important 
                                               
1  Craig H Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The evolving role of the IMO and its member 
states in implementing the 1982 LOS, (2009) 10 San Diego International Law Journal 265-334. 
2  J Boutilier, ‘The Global Maritime Outlook 2004’ in J Ho and CZ Raymond (eds.) The Best of 
Times , The Worst of Times : Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (IDSS, Singapore 2005) 15. 
3  J Ho and CZ Raymond (eds.) The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the 
Asia-Pacific (IDSS Singapore 2005) 1. 
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strategic sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) for the maritime community; however, 
more sinister challenges await.
4
  
 
Undoubtedly the Straits of Malacca, a vital maritime gateway connecting the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans, is one of the world’s vital straits. This is clearly evidenced by the 
volume of commercial vessels passing through the Straits annually. Yohei Sasakawa, 
the Chair of the Nippon Foundation
 5
, has estimated that: 
The traffic volume in the Malacca-Singapore Straits is four times that 
of the Suez Canal and more than ten times that of the Panama Canal. 
By 2020, we can expect a sixty percent increase in traffic, from the 
current 4 billion deadweight tons to 6.4 billion deadweight tons. The 
number of vessels will rise by fifty percent, from the current number of 
94,000, to 141,000…6 
 
Furthermore, a statistic given by the Marine Department of Malaysia has shown a 
remarkable increase in traffic density in the Straits during the twelve-year period of 
1999 to 2010 based on the types and total of vessels report to Klang VTS.
7
 Container 
and tanker vessels are contributing most to this dramatic increase. In fact, the number 
of container vessels passing through the Straits was seventeen times higher in 2010 
                                               
4
  MT Yasin, ‘Security of Sea lanes of Communication (SLOCS) through the Straits of Malacca: 
The need to secure the Northern approaches’ in D Rumley, S Chaturvedi and MT Yasin The 
Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean region (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 
2007) 225. 
5  ‘Development towards a  New World Maritime Community, a Cooperative Framework for the 
Future of the Malacca and Singapore Straits’ addressed note in the Symposium of the 
enhancement of safety of navigation and the environmental protection of the Malacca and 
Singapore, 13-14 March 2007, 2. For other views compare with:  About 93,000 merchant vessels 
traversing the Straits annually: See J Boutilier (2005) 15. Traffic transiting the region is 
considerably heavy, reported to be approximately 60,000 vessels a year:  J Ashley Roach 
‘Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2005) Journal of 
International Affairs 59, 97; 50,000 ships per year, nearly a quarter of the world shipping: David 
W Munn ‘Old Danger Becomes New Threat on the Open Seas’ US Navy Sea Power Magazine 
Oct 2004. 
6  ibid. (emphasis added). 
7  See Appendix. 
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than twelve years ago.
8
 While the escalating volume of commercial vessels passing 
through the Straits could be regarded as a notable sign of the growth of the global 
economy in this region, the threat and risks it poses to the coastal states are equally 
significant.  
 
The increasing dependence on the Straits by the seaborne trade has meant that the 
challenges of ensuring safety and security are more critical than ever. While the 1982 
Convention is concerned with environmental degradation and pollution mainly caused 
by oil spills, ships colliding and traffic density in the prominent waterway, the 
maritime security threats such as piracy, armed robbery, ship hijacking and potential 
maritime terrorism are arguably the most vital security concerns that must be dealt 
with immediately. This chapter analyses the threat of piracy and armed robbery ships 
in the Straits based on the statistics of the IMB. The analysis of the risk or the risk 
assessments will explicate the magnitude of the risk and threat of piracy and armed 
robbery in the Straits. The types of piracy and the extra-legal factors that contribute to 
this crime are also examined to provide a holistic view on the implications of these 
crimes on navigational safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. The 
comprehensive nature of the terms ‘safety’ and ‘security’ in the maritime context are 
firstly discussed in brief before relating them to piracy and armed robbery.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
8  In 1999, there were 14521 container vessels passing through the Straits, as compared to 253405 
in 2010: See Appendix. 
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4.2 MARITIME SAFETY OR SECURITY? TWO SIDES OF THE SAME 
COIN 
The growing role of the sea as an avenue for trade and energy transportation will 
never be free of the increasing risk and threat of maritime perils to humans and 
ecological concerns.
9
 The inherent and persistent risk to maritime security and the 
safety of the shipping-related industry has been widely discussed. According to a 
commentator, the maritime security issue in Southeast Asia covers broad issues 
including port security, freedom of navigation, safety of the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), piracy and armed robbery against ships, as well as maritime 
terrorism.
10
 A clear understanding of the term is thus important to provide a 
foundation for cooperation among states.
11
 
 
As far as the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is concerned, its adoption more 
than two decades ago has been criticized for its lack of coverage of the above issues, 
and this has not been dealt with satisfactorily, particularly the issue of what constitutes 
maritime safety and security.
12
 Although both terms are used several times in the 
provisions of the Convention, there is no definition in the 1982 Convention of the 
meaning of security and safety at sea.
13
 Perhaps this definition is intentionally omitted 
to cater for general usage and common interpretation. Moreover, the constitutive 
                                               
9  Craig H Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The evolving role of the IMO and its member 
states in implementing the 1982 LOS, (2009) 10 San Diego International Law Journal 265(-
334). 
10  RC Banlaoi ‘Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia’ in J Ho and CZ Raymond The Best 
of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (IDSS, Singapore 2005) 59-
79, 59. 
11   ibid. 
12  Cross refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.3). 
13  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 <http://www.imo.org> accessed on 
12 November 2009. 
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character of the 1982 Convention which provides a legal regime that is expected to be 
complemented by other rules of international law.
14
 Desker observes that maritime 
safety and maritime security should not be differentiated.
15
 He argues that the past 
practice of making a distinction between maritime safety under the aegis of the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on the one hand, and maritime security 
under the authorities of States on the other hand, is no longer relevant.
16
 In fact, 
‘maritime safety is now an integral part of maritime security’.17 However, the IMO’s 
Current Awareness Bulletin May 2009 is another example of the distinction drawn by 
this organisation between ‘maritime safety’ and ‘maritime security.’18 It divides 
maritime news into several categories such as casualties, IMO, law and policy, marine 
technology, maritime safety, maritime security, navigation and communications, 
pollution, ports and harbours, seafarers, shipbuilding and recycling of ships, shipping, 
special reports and sources. The only matter relating to ships’ compliance with safety 
rules and the like comes under the section of maritime safety, whereas the maritime 
security section covers the topic of sea crime such as piracy and armed robbery. In the 
recent IMO strategic plan, the Organisation proclaims that: 
The mission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a 
United Nations specialized agency is to promote safe, secure, 
environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through 
cooperation. This will be accomplished by adopting the highest 
practicable standards of maritime safety and security, efficiency of 
                                               
14  Craig H Allen, (2009) 274: William T Burke, State Practice, New Ocean Uses and Ocean 
Governance under UNCLOS in Thomas S Mensah ed. (1996)  Ocean Governance: Strategies 
and Approaches for 21st Century, 219-222; See also Art 311 of 1982 Convention and its 
preambles. 
15  Barry Desker - foreword note in S Bateman, CZ Raymond and J Ho ‘Safety and Security in the 
Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action’ IDSS Policy Paper, May 2006. 
16  cf. ‘Maritime security is an integral part of IMO’s responsibilities.’ However, maritime security 
here is referring to security measures on ships, such as the 2002 amendment to the 1974 Safety 
of life at sea Convention (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS Code). See <http://www.imo.org/Safety/ >accessed on 12 November 2009. 
17  ibid. 
18   IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre, Current Awareness Bulletin vol.XXI no.5 May 2009. 7 & 8. 
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navigation and prevention and control of pollution from ships, as well 
as through consideration of the related legal matters and effective 
implementation of IMO’s instruments with a view to their universal 
and uniform application.
19
  
 
This Strategic Plan promotes the importance of maintaining and sustaining safety and 
security in the maritime context through cooperation which may help to improve both 
safety and security at the same time. Although the IMO is arguably attempting to 
distinguish these two terms, the objectives of the IMO’s regulations or plans are 
ultimately to promote and ensure that both ‘maritime safety’ and ‘maritime security’ 
are well-maintained.
 20
 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of security21 and safety22, 
there is a similarity between these two terms in that both use the words ‘protection of 
something or from something’. Thus, in usual and plain meaning, it might be assumed 
that, whenever the issue of maritime safety is discussed, it might also encompass 
maritime security and vice versa. In the view of Desker, the terms ‘safety’ and 
‘security’ are complementary and normally have a common objective. If an important 
sea route lacks security measures, the safety of navigation is probably in a state of 
jeopardy. It is therefore submitted that, despite some views that attempt to distinguish 
between the meanings of maritime safety and security, the plain meaning that both 
                                               
19  IMO Strategic Plan (2008-2013) (emphasis added). 
20  IMO 2004: ‘Focus on Maritime Security’, 7; Craig H Allen ‘Revisiting the Thames Formula: 
The evolving role of the IMO and its member states in implementing the 1982 LOS’  [2008-
2009]  10 San Diego International Law Journal, 265-334. 
21  ‘The activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger…’ C 
Soanes and A Stevenson (eds.) Oxford Dictionary of English (OUP Oxford 2005). 
22  ‘The state of being safe and protected from danger or harm; the state of not being dangerous; a 
place where you are safe’ C Soanes and A Stevenson (eds.) Oxford Dictionary of English (OUP 
Oxford 2005). 
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terms are interrelated is rather preferred for the purpose of this thesis in which piracy 
is the central issue.
23
 
 
4.3   PIRACY AS A THREAT TO MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY IN 
THE STRAITS OF MALACCA: A GROWING OR DECLINING RISK? 
The preliminary and historical aspects of piracy and armed robbery against ships are 
first discussed in order to appreciate the reasons for the enduring nature of piracy 
incidents in the Straits in this modern and contemporary world in spite of the rapid 
development of laws, regulations and conventions dealing with this crime.   
 
4.3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE ORIGIN OF PIRACY IN THE STRAITS 
Piracy and armed robbery against ships is one of the most prominent threats to 
maritime security in the Southeast Asia region. Piracy has existed in this region even 
before the European countries conquered the Indian Ocean.
24
 Pirates were also 
famously known as ‘orang laut’ or ‘pengembara laut’ (sea adventurers) during the late 
eighteenth century and they used to conduct operations in the South China Sea, Sulu 
Sea and the Straits of Malacca.
25
 Among Malays, piracy is called ‘lanun’ which 
means ‘perompak laut’ or ‘bajak laut’ (the person who robs at sea).26 The word 
originated with the native people of Tasik Lanao and Teluk Ilanun of the Pulau 
                                               
23  Maritime security is rather self-explanatory: it means security concerns related to the maritime 
realm. See AJ Young (2005) 1 & 25. 
24  RC Beckman, CG War and VL Forbes ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’ in 
IBRU Maritime Briefing ( IBRU, 1994) 1. Cf to Andrin Raj, ‘Japan Initiatives in security 
cooperation in the Straits of Malacca on Maritime Security and in Southeast Asia: Piracy and 
Maritime Terrorism’ The Japan Initiative for International Affairs (JIIA) Tokyo Japan 2009, 8. 
25  Ahmad Jelani Halimi, Perdagangan dan Perkapalan Melayu di Selat Melaka (Dewan Bahasa 
dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur 2006) 188-189; Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay 
World: A Study of British Imperialism in nineteenth-century South-east Asia (FW Cheshire, 
Sydney 1963) 21 and 9. 
26  Teuku Iskandar, Kamus Dewan (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur 1970). 
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Mindanao, Southern Philippines. Due to the rampant acts of sea robbery perpetrated 
by people from Tasik Lanao and Teluk Ilanun, Malay communities had assimilated 
the act of robbery at sea with their name of origin, namely ‘iranun’ or ‘illanun.’27 The 
term ‘lanun’ is believed to have entered common usage only after the nineteenth 
century.
28
 The vernacular meaning of the word suggests that the piratical act, which 
usually refers to the crime of sea robbery, may take place anywhere at sea. In other 
words, it does not differentiate the act of piracy and armed robbery against ships and 
thus does not reflect the legal meaning as in Article 101 of the 1982 Convention.
29
 As 
long as the robbery occurs at sea, Malay society will usually call it ‘lanun.’  
 
4.3.1.1  PIRACY IN THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD 
During the era of the Malacca Sultanate, between the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca had already been recognised 
as a pirate choke point.
30
 Despite the word ‘lanun’ only being widely used after the 
nineteenth century, the piratical activities that are synonymous with this word are 
known to have existed ever since the beginning of sea trading and voyaging.
31
 As 
early as the fifth century, there is the account of the journey of Shih Fa-Hsien who 
passed through the Straits of Malacca and claimed that ‘this sea was surrounded with 
pirates who might cause death.’32 Although the original documentation of this account 
was written in Chinese, the English translation used to describe the sea robbers in this 
                                               
27  See also JF Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898 (Singapore University Press, Singapore 
1981)149. 
28  ibid. 
29  The international legal meaning of piracy is normally highlighted to identify the jurisdiction of 
prosecuting states in case of piracy or armed robbery against ships. Cross-refer to chapter 3 too. 
30  Wheatley (1980) 82. 
31  R Braddell, ‘A Study of Ancient times in the Malay peninsula and The Straits of Malacca’ 
(1980) MBRAS, 27.  
32  Wheatley (1980) 37-38; See also AJ Young (2005) 7. 
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case as pirates. Later, in the second half of the fourteenth century, Ibn Battutah, an 
Arab voyager who was believed to be physically present in this sea during that time, 
asserted that the junks passing through this sea were usually ready for ‘piratical raids.’ 
According to Young, this kind of ‘piratical raid’ was referring to the extraction of 
taxes rather than attacks by robbers or pirates. As Tome Pires wrote, that such an act 
was a normal source of income for Parameswara (a Malay ruler) when he first found 
Muar and Malacca.
33
 However, when the Straits became a famous entrepôt during the 
fifteenth century, the local government had tried to suppress piracy in order to protect 
the foreign traders. Interestingly, the local authorities sometimes appointed the pirates 
as their naval force to restrain other unauthorised pirates from interfering with the 
foreign traders.
34
  
 
4.3.1.2  PIRACY IN THE STRAITS IN THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD 
It is noteworthy that the fall of the Malacca Sultanates at the end of 15
th
 century due to 
political disruption and instability, commercial decay and the interference of the 
colonial power increased the level of piracy and sea robbery attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca. Jelani, Halimi
35
 and Tarling
36
 argued that piracy swiftly increased during the 
era of Western colonisation.
37
 In fact, the raids by the Malay ruler on the commercial 
ships doing business with the colonial power in Malacca were condemned by the 
colony as acts of piracy.
38
 Young highlights that it was normal for the leaders of the 
                                               
33  Armando Cortesao (1944) 232. 
34  Halimi (2006) 192. 
35  ibid. 
36  Tarling (1963) 2: Marsden, in the ‘History of Sumatra’, stated that “the whole of the inhabitants 
on that Coast are addicted to piracy…” see also Tarling (1963) 13. 
37  Rubin (1988) 17; Tarling (1963) 10-13. 
38  William Damper believed that the Malays are a bold people and are not addicted to robbery. 
They had actually been provoked by the Dutch. The robbery was done deliberately as revenge 
on the Dutch who had been restraining their trade. See Tarling (1963) 11. 
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traditional societies to be ‘engaged in a competitive prestige system that participated 
in maritime raiding’ or piracy.39 Rubin also agreed by pointing out some of the views 
of the British Colonial Officials regarding this issue.
40
 These included Colonel Anson, 
Commander Robinson and Commander Blomfield who insisted that they preferred the 
use of the word ‘piracy’ in this context for purely political purposes.  This might 
include ‘rebels or others who interfered with British actions in the peninsula.’ 41 On 
the other hand, Maxwell suggested that the rulers or Rajahs who had been fighting for 
local power should not be treated as pirates notwithstanding their abetment the 
pirates.
42
  This is clearly because, for the local Ruler whose land had been occupied by 
others, such acts might be considered legitimate. In comparing these views, Rubin 
opines that the colonial powers had tried to use ‘piracy’ as a ‘word of art in public 
international law’ to justify their involvement in the political and administrative area 
of the Malay Peninsula.
43
 This opinion is shared by Tarling who argues that, although 
sea robbery was rampant at that time, to some extent piracy was used as a means of 
resisting the involvement of foreigners in local jurisdiction.
44
 Nevertheless, to equate 
the crime of piracy with the act of insurgency against foreign traders by the Malacca 
Ruler, who was understandably resistant to Western interference, is quite intricate.  
 
 It has therefore been submitted that the word piracy, which commonly used to refer to 
the acts of the Ruler at that time, was politically manipulated. Hence, it departed from 
                                               
39  AJ Young ‘Roots of Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’ in  D Johnson and M Valencia (eds.) 
Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Response (ISEAS, Singapore 2005) 8; G Teitler 
‘Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison’ 1 (2002) MAST, 67-83, available at 
<http://www.marecentre.nl/mast/documents/GerTeitler.pdf> accessed on 20 January 2012 69. 
40  See Rubin (1988) 250-258. 
41  Rubin (1988) 250-258. 
42  ibid. 
43  ibid. 
44  Tarling (1963) 2. 
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the meaning of piracy as intended by international law. However, it is acknowledged 
that armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca still exists to this day, but not piracy. 
Undoubtedly, this stand is insisted upon by the littoral states, namely Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  In other words, when applying a customary international law to the 
definition of piracy that has its root in the evolution of a Western concept, one should 
take into account the local context. This is what Young believes regarding the need for 
caution to avoid inexact application of the legal term.
 45
 Different places, times and 
cultures might bring different understandings and implications of the term altogether.  
 
In this present day, most incidents of attacks on ships, particularly in the Straits, 
cannot truly be classified as piracy in the legal sense. The main reason is not the 
existence of a political motive but the location of the Straits of Malacca which are 
situated within the territorial waters and EEZ of Malaysia and Indonesia. The 
expansion of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles by both states meant that the high 
seas corridors in these Straits ceased to exist.
46
 In fact, it appears that most of the 
attacks in the Straits occurred within a 12-mile radius of a state’s territorial sea, on 
ships that were anchored, berthed or streaming.
47
 Although the governments of 
Malaysia and Indonesia continue to admonish the media not to label the attacks in the 
Straits as piracy, as they are actually armed robbery against ships, these governments 
together with other neighbouring states such as Singapore and Thailand continuously 
cooperate in increasing patrols in the Straits to ensure the safety and security for 
navigation. The positive and proactive response of these states is reasonable since the 
differences between piracy and armed robbery are merely definitional distinctions. A 
                                               
45  Young (2005) 10 and 11. 
46  Cross-refer to Chapter 2( Para 2.4.1); See also Woolley [2010] 450 and Leifer (1978) 53-54. 
47  Cross-refer to Chapter 3.3.1; See 2010 Annual Report of the ICC-IMB, 9-10. 
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more important issue that needs to be tackled, in the view of Mukundan, is the effect 
of the crime on the victims.
48
 For them, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a 
pirate or a sea robber as defined in law, the implication of the attacks on them in most 
cases is more or less the same. 
 
4.3.2 THE THREAT OF CONTEMPORARY PIRACY:  ASSESSMENT OF 
RISKS 
It has been alleged that most parts of the world continue to face serious threats of 
piracy and armed robbery. Globally, attacks have risen sharply every year since 2006; 
the figures rose from 239 incidences in 2006 to 445 in 2010.
49
  Looking at the upsurge 
in incidents reported worldwide, many commentators have raised the issue of the 
adequacy and sufficiency of laws on maritime piracy at both international and 
domestic levels. Irrefutably, Southeast Asia has been a globally notorious hotspot for 
piracy ever since reported incidents were first organised and recorded.
50
 Due to the 
rampant increase piracy incidents reported in the region, particularly in the Straits, 
there have been many allegations and arguments on the level of safety and security of 
ships navigating the Straits. In fact, the credibility of the littoral States in tackling the 
issue has also been questioned.
51
 The anxiety raised by the international community is 
                                               
48  P Mukundan ‘An Analysis of Current Reporting Systems for Piracy’ (paper presented in ‘Global 
Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common approach to Maritime Piracy on April 18-
19,2011 at Dubai,UAE) 71. 
<http://www.dsg.ae/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=b3yNp2iSPZk%3D&tabid=988&mid=1532> 
accessed on 29 October 2011. 
49  ‘Reports on ‘Act of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’  2010 Annual Report of the ICC-
IMB, 5-6. 
50  Only after 2006 does the report show the sharp increase of piracy attacks in the waters off 
Somalia annually as compared to the Southeast Asian sea as discussed below:  The alarming 
reports of piracy and armed robbery attacks against ships in this region are mainly taken from 
the ICC-IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC). 
51  TM Sittnick ‘State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Persuading 
Indonesia and Malaysia to take additional Steps to Secure the Strait’ (2005) 14 Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal 743, 761-767. 
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reflected in the media reports and general studies conducted by several international 
organisations and maritime institutes. The intense scrutiny applied by maritime 
nations such as United States of America and Japan is due to their critical reliance on 
the Straits as the important waterway connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans for 
their maritime trade. The lack of research on the assessment of risk of the piracy and 
armed robbery attacks specifically focusing on the regional problems is believed to be 
an actual problem that over-emphasises the reality of the incidents. 
 
In the mid-twenty-first century, the issue was over-dramatised.  However, the title of 
the world’s most dangerous pirate-infested area has now shifted to the African region, 
particularly off Somali waters. The trend in the number of incidents of armed robbery 
in the Straits and in the territorial waters of the littorals has been declining over the 
last few years. In 2010 alone, 1181 seafarers were taken hostage in piracy incidents 
worldwide, with nearly ninety per cent of such acts attributed to Somali pirates.
52
 
Although the attacks occurred rampantly in a few piracy-infested areas, they are 
believed to have affected and endangered the maritime safety and security of the 
international community at large.  
 
In order to understand the threat and risk of piracy in the Straits, the following 
paragraph explains the reports on piracy and armed robbery at sea during the ten-year 
period of 2000 to 2010; the details are taken mainly from the IMB Piracy Reporting 
Centre’s Annual Report. Although the data show the escalating number of piracy and 
armed robbery incidents worldwide, special reference is given to the reported piracy 
                                               
52  ‘Reports on Act of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ 2010 Annual Report of the ICC-
IMB, 11-12. 
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incidences in the Straits. Apart from the legal analysis of the legal regime in 
international law
53
 and the domestic laws focusing on Malaysia, the statistical data are 
used later in the thesis as a benchmark for determining the efficacy or, at least, the 
adequacy of laws, action and cooperation of the littoral States in preserving and 
maintaining a comprehensive security environment in the management of the Straits.
54
 
This will help to test the supposition that adequate law, action and cooperation among 
states will help to reduce piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. 
 
4.3.2.1  ANALYSIS OF INCIDENCES OF PIRACY IN THE STRAITS  
Before an elaboration of the statistics from IMB Annual Reports on piracy and armed 
robbery against ships is undertaken, it is important to note that the total number of 
actual and attempted attacks reported by the IMB includes the crimes of petty theft in 
ports and on ships anchored off ports.
55
 Therefore, not all attacks were piracy as 
legally defined in Article 101 of the 1982 Convention. Consequently, the attacks or 
incidents that took place in this area have no legal implication in international law.
56
 
Nevertheless, they cannot be left unpunished as such crimes will definitely fall under 
the coastal states’ jurisdiction, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
                                               
53  Discussed in Part 1 of the thesis. 
54  This is parallel with the aspiration of Malaysia: see Keynote Address by Mohd Najib Abd 
Razak, at the launching of the Centre for Straits of Malacca on 21 October 2008, in MIMA 
Bulletin vol 15 (3) 2008, 31. 
55  Cross-refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.2.3). 
56  The objective of setting up the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia in 
October 1992 is to assist the shipping industry and to report and help local authorities to deal 
with piracy and armed robbery problems. See ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
ships’, Report for the period 1 January-30 September 2006, 2. 
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Figure 1: Numbers of actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery attacks from the 
year 2000 until 2010.
57
 This figure shows the shift of the major magnitude 
of the crime from Southeast Asia to the African region. 
 
                                               
57  This calculation of the number of attacks according to region is based on the 2005 and 2010 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report of the IMB. 
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 Figure 2: Numbers of actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery attacks from 
the year 1994 until 2010.
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58  This is based on the 2005 and 2010 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report of 
the IMB. 
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The 1997 Asian economic crisis triggered piracy and armed robbery attacks in the 
Southeast Asia region at an alarming rate.
59
 It became an enormous problem, and 
during that time, the region suffered the highest rate of attacks compared to other 
regions.
60
 The rise in the number of incidents and the increased publicity provided by 
the media and commentators designated this region as the main piracy-prone area and 
most dangerous region in the world during this period.
61
 The IMB-PRC report, the 
main source of reference for the shipping industry on piracy and armed robbery 
incidents, has inevitably agitated the concerns of the international community over the 
safety and security of the area. This is especially true since IMB, in its definition of 
piracy, made no distinction between piracy and armed robbery against ships.
62
 
Apparently, one consequence of this over-emphasised threat was the listing of the 
Straits of Malacca as a war-risk zone by the Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd's 
Market Association (LMA) on June 20, 2005.
63
 This happened because the increasing 
incidence of piracy and armed robbery, including cases of organised crime such as the 
Dewi Madrim which was reported to have been attacked and hijacked by ten pirates in 
2003 using sophisticated weapons, has made such acts indistinguishable from 
terrorism.
64
 In other words, the attacking of the Dewi Madrim by a group of pirates 
                                               
59
  JD Pena ‘Maritime Crime in the Straits of Malacca: Balancing Regional and Extra-Regional 
Concerns’ (Spring 2009) 2 Stanford Journal of International Relations vol.X,, 3. 
60  See Figure 1. Most of the incidents take place in the area of Eastern Sumatra, in the northern and 
southern entrances to the Straits and in the Phillip Channel off Singapore.: S Bateman, CZ 
Raymond and J Ho ‘Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for 
action’ in IDSS Policy Paper, May 2006 at page 20. 
61  Ong (2005) 47; N Khalid ‘Security in the Straits of Malacca’ Japan Focus (June, 1 2006) 
<http://japanfocus.org/Nazery-Khalid/2042 > accessed on 29 October 2011. 
62  Cross-refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.2.3).  
63  Lloyd’s insurance market, the Joint War Committee (JWC) declared the Malacca Straits and 20 
other areas including the adjacent waters in Indonesia,  Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Nigeria as 
War-Risk Zones and related perils based on the advice of the security consultancy group Aegis 
Defence Services (ADS): see IDSS; N Khalid ‘Security in the Straits of Malacca’ Japan Focus 
(June, 1 2006) <http://japanfocus.org/Nazery-Khalid/2042 > accessed on 29 October 2011. 
64  TM Sittnick ‘State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Persuading 
Indonesia and Malaysia to take additional Steps to Secure the Strait’ (2005) 14 Pacific Rim Law 
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had raised the theory of conflation between piracy and terrorism because of the 
similarities in their actions.
65
 Thus, according to the JWC, the Straits were properly 
regarded as a vulnerable and dangerous area. Once declared, these listed areas will be 
associated with ‘war, strikes, terrorism and related perils’, the implications of which 
will burden the transiting ships with extra costs in war risk premiums. Raymond 
believes that the economic impact of the imposition of war insurance premiums on 
ships could be as severe as in Yemen
66
 or maybe more severe because of the area’s 
importance to the world.
67
 
 
This controversial declaration has caused dissatisfaction not only to the shipping 
industry transiting the Straits
68
 but also to the littoral States whose credibility in 
maintaining and guarding the Straits seems to have been disparaged. They believed 
that this declaration was unfounded since they have steadfastly, through unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and cooperation compromised their individual 
state and national interest in order to ensure the security and safety of the Straits 
which have benefited all the users. Mere theoretical linking of piracy and terrorism 
does not necessarily prove the actual fact of the Straits’ vulnerability. The case of the 
                                                                                                                                       
& Policy Journal 743, 744;  Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’ (Nov/Dec 2004) 
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Dewi Madrim mentioned above clearly shows the misconception and misguidance of 
the media reports that relied on the brief reports published by a Private Security 
Company (PSC). This is what is regarded by the littoral states as the over-reporting of 
security in the Straits.
69
 The work by Liss is very helpful in clarifying this situation.
70
  
She believes that the comment made by the PSC personnel has negatively affected the 
public perception of maritime security issues. The true facts about the Dewi Madrim 
chemical tanker incident were narrated by the Singapore-based manager of this 
Indonesian-owned vessel, Captain Chan Kok Leong, who stated that the ship had been 
boarded by ten pirates armed with machine guns and knives on 26 March 2003. The 
master and crew, realizing that the pirates were coming, had tried to hide in the cabin 
and bridge but were later threatened by the pirates. The captain was forced to open the 
safe which contained USD 21,000. Apart from the cash, the pirates also took 
cigarettes, watches and other valuables but showed no interest in the cargo carried by 
the tanker. After that, the pirates left the ship without even trying to steer it. It was 
said that at no point was the ship left unattended and uncontrolled.
71
 Surprisingly, the 
publicity given to this incident by the international media told a totally different story. 
The Dewi Madrim incident had suddenly become the model case to prove the 
conflation between piracy and terrorism in the Straits. This was reported in The 
Economist as follows:  
But according to a new study by Aegis Defence Service, a London 
defence and security consultancy, these attacks represent something 
altogether more sinister. The temporary hijacking of the Dewi Madrim 
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was by terrorists learning to drive a ship, and the kidnapping (without 
any attempt to ransom the officers) was aimed at acquiring expertise to 
help the terrorists mount a maritime attack. In other words, attacks like 
that on the Dewi Madrim are equivalent of the al-Qaeda hijackers who 
perpetrated the September 11
th
 attacks going to flying school in 
Florida.
72
 
 
These words in The Economist were also referred to by Miniter in his attempt to 
suggest a link between the piracy attack on the Dewi Madrim and the acts of al-Qaeda 
terrorists.
73
 Miniter raised Choong’s concern over this issue on the plausibility of a 
terrorist group using a chemical tanker such as this as a weapon.
74
  Also, Singapore’s 
Deputy Prime Minister said that “this may signal the start of serious preparations for a 
maritime terrorist attack as terrorists learn to navigate tankers to use them as floating 
bombs against other vessels, key installations, naval bases or port facilities.”75 In 
addition, Luft and Korin gave a controversial and misconceived account of terrorist 
pirates’ possible involvement in the case of the Dewi Madrim.76 While, one by one, 
numerous commentaries were offered in support of speculation on the theory of the 
nexus between piracy and terrorism, the investigations into the incident of the Dewi 
Madrim by the IMB proved otherwise. It appeared that no one had been kidnapped 
and there was no attempt by the perpetrators to learn to steer the chemical tanker.
77
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This was confirmed by the owners of the vessel to the IMB.
78
 In fact, when the Aegis 
Defence Service was contacted to explain the inconsistencies of the issue, Dominic 
Armstrong
79
 merely acknowledged inaccurate information on the kidnapping issue 
and blamed the journalists, stating that it was their responsibility to ensure the 
accuracy of their sources.
80
 In addition, Bateman, Ho and Mathai noted the misquoted 
accounts of the incident and suggested that the size of the vessel be considered in 
regard to the possibility that it had been used by terrorists to learn how to steer.
81
 They 
said that the chemical tanker was very small with a capacity of only 737 gross tons; it 
would require no specific skills to steer it.
82
  Unfortunately, despite the rectification of 
these factual errors by the owner of the Dewi Madrim, the incident has still been 
referred to by some commentators to support their arguments.
83
 In fact, Aegis Defence 
Services, which was the body responsible for recommending the inclusion of the 
Straits in JWC Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas in June 
2005, made no attempt to retract their maritime terrorist theory of the case. 
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Figure 3: Comparison by year on actual and attempted attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca. Source: IMB Annual Report of 2005-2010. 
 
The Straits had been included on the JWC’s list despite the ‘sharp reduction in 
piratical attacks and zero incidences of terrorist attacks on ships sailing through the 
Straits.’84  According to Khalid, the risk of reported attacks in the Straits was less than 
0.001 per cent of its total traffic volume.
85
 Meanwhile, Raymond agreed when she 
highlighted the finding that, of the total number of alleged terrorists attacks 
worldwide, maritime terrorist attacks have accounted for only 2 per cent and no 
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terrorist acts have ever taken place in the Straits.
86
 This clearly proves that the intense 
efforts to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea have been successful.  
 
Thus, the governments of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia initiated several 
discourses with JWC to review their decision accordingly.
87
 Unsurprisingly, in view 
of the significant improvement in the security environment in the Straits, on 7
th
 
August 2006 the JWC removed the Straits from its war-risk list.
88
 The re-evaluation 
was welcomed since the number of reported attacks had declined remarkably in the 
years following the declaration. In 2005, only twelve attacks were reported compared 
to thirty-eight attacks in 2004. The number of attacks dropped constantly with eleven 
attacks in 2006, seven in 2007 and only two in three consecutive years of 2008, 2009 
and 2010.
89
  
 
Therefore, it is noteworthy that the Straits is no longer a piracy-prone area. Although 
piracy and armed robbery incidents have not been totally eliminated, at least the risk 
has been reduced. Thus, the possibility of maritime terrorism might also be claimed to 
have diminished considering that no actual or even attempted terrorist act has ever 
occurred in this Straits. Furthermore, the level and types of violence used by the 
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perpetrators against the crews of the ships are not as cruel as those used in other 
regions, particularly in the horn of Africa.
90
 It is timely for the media, the maritime 
nations and the shipping industry to pay attention to the importance of this waterway 
to give an accurate assessment of the risks of piracy attacks and maritime terrorism, as 
suggested by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS).
91
 Relying solely 
on media reports may lead to ‘exaggeration and misinterpretation of the problem.92’ 
The lack of evidence on the existence of a link between piracy and maritime terrorism 
coupled with the fact that typical pirates or armed robbers in the Straits are mostly 
unorganised petty criminals suggests that the risk and threat of piracy is tiny in 
relation to the number of vessels passing through the Straits. 
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4.3.2.2  ASSESSMENT OF RISKS: TYPES OF SHIPS AND 
VULNERABILITY OF VESSELS  
An analysis of the shipping patterns in the Straits of Malacca is very important in 
order to assess the vulnerability of the type of vessels passing through the Straits. 
Many commentators who rely on media reports of piracy in the Straits tend to 
generalise the possible risks and threat of piracy to all types of vessels. This 
perception is somewhat inaccurate. It is presumed by Young that the tendency to 
generalise the threat may be due to the lack of important information on the local 
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details.
93
 This may be true since the nature and trend of the attacks differ from one 
region to another. In Southeast Asia most of the attacks are considered armed robbery 
against ships as opposed to piracy. The attacks are mainly mounted against ships 
within states’ territorial seas, in ports or at anchorage.   
 
The vulnerability of the ships will vary according to the types and sizes of the vessels 
when they are under way.
94
 While they are in ports or at anchorage the magnitude of 
the risk of been attacked or robbed is the same regardless of the size of the vessels.
95
   
The IDSS analysis of attacks on vessels revealed that most incidents reported in the 
Straits involved medium-sized or small vessels such as gas carriers, chemical and 
product tankers, tugs and barges as well as fishing boats.
96
 As compared to the larger 
vessels such as container ships, LNG and car carriers, the vulnerability of the smaller 
ships is more obvious in the Straits due to three possible main factors as suggested by 
Bateman, Ho and Mathai.
97
 Firstly, the larger vessels are normally travelling at 
considerable speed which may make it difficult for the attackers to board a ship that is 
under way. However, the large bulk carriers may still face the risk of attacks if they 
are slower or less able to take precautionary measures.
98
 Second, the smaller numbers 
                                               
93  AJ Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies. 
(Singapore, ISAS, 2007) 5. 
94  ibid.  
95   ‘Reports on Act of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships’ 2010 Annual Report of the ICC-
IMB; S Bateman, J Ho and M Mathai ‘Shipping Patterns in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: 
An assessment of the Risks to Different Types of Vessel. (2007) 29 Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 2, 309 at 310-311; PW Birnie ‘Piracy, Past, Present and Future Marine Policy July 1987 
163-183, 173. 
96  S Bateman, CZ Raymond and J Ho, ‘Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: 
An Agenda for Action’ (IDSS Policy Paper, May 2006) 19. 
97  S Bateman, J Ho and M Mathai ‘Shipping Patterns in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An 
assessment of the Risks to Different Types of Vessel. (2007) 29 Contemporary Southeast Asia 2, 
309 at 327. 
98  ibid. 
142 
 
of crew members in smaller ships might attract the pirates.
99
 There are normally more 
crew members in the larger vessels and they are usually competent to defend the ship. 
The third factor is the precautionary guidelines recommended by the IMO which are 
usually adopted and practised on the larger vessels rather than on the smaller vessels. 
These three reasons are without doubt reasonable and practical. In addition, Bateman, 
Ho and Mathai, when analysing the risks of piracy for different types of vessel, also 
argue that local vessels including fishing vessels are more vulnerable compared to the 
international vessels.
100
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Looking at the incidents of piracy in this region, which occur mostly within the 
territorial sea and against smaller ships,
101
 more attention should be paid to improving 
the domestic legal framework and maritime policy. While international law in the 
1982 Convention has established an obligation on all States to suppress piracy on the 
high seas, the capability and competency of the littoral States to patrol their sea area 
needs to be tested and balanced. This is very important because, once their internal 
responsibility has been established and strengthened; these States will definitely be 
able to tackle the security problem beyond their area, whether individually or 
collectively.  
 
In conclusion, it appears that analysing these trends is very important in order to 
accurately assess the risk to a particular region or location. It also aids an 
understanding and identification of regional and national maritime security 
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requirements, especially in developing legal frameworks. The tendency to generalise 
the risks to the Straits by referring solely to general reports of dramatic increases in 
piracy incidents worldwide may lead to a different perception and thus needs to be 
rectified. Apart from assessing the risks of piracy incidents, one also needs to 
understand the types of piracy and the extra legal factors in respect of piracy in 
particular regions.   
 
4.3.2.3  TYPES OF PIRACY IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA 
The phenomenon of piracy which has become endemic and affects almost all parts of 
the world is normally elicited by the opportunities that exist.
102
 However the methods 
of attack differ slightly from one place to another. For states such as Malaysia, it is 
pertinent to identify the nature and types of attack in every incident of piracy in order 
to determine the most appropriate cause of action for charging or prosecuting the 
perpetrator under the domestic law of the relevant state. Although piracy is considered 
a crime against humankind and is subject to universal jurisdiction, in the end the 
perpetrator will be judged and sentenced in accordance with domestic rules of law.  
 
Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes point out four types of piracy that have occurred 
in Southeast Asian waters: ‘traditional piracy against modern shipping’, ‘politically-
motivated piracy’, ‘piratical acts of violence against refugees’, and ‘yacht piracy.’103 
Traditional piracy and piratical acts against refugees
104
 and fishing vessels are the 
most prevalent types of piracy in these waters. However, the IMB classifies the types 
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of pirate attacks into three groups.
105
 The first type of piracy usually occurs in ports 
while at anchorage or berthed. This type of piracy bears a resemblance to the common 
act of theft on land, where the perpetrator usually grabs any opportunity to take cash 
or any portable thing that can easily be taken from the ship. This has also been called 
petty theft. This kind of so-called piracy is defined by IMB as ‘low-level armed 
robbery’ (LLAR) which normally involves small groups or gangs.106 However, it is 
still counted as piracy in the IMB piracy report, and this has caused dissatisfaction 
among coastal states. The lack of port security control and corrupt port officials have 
been identified as escalating factors in such crime.
107
  
 
However, Eklof describes the low-level armed robbery or petty piracy as a ‘quick hit 
and run’ tactic.108 This, according to him, normally takes place whilst the ship is under 
way between midnight and 4 am.
109
 The slow speed of the ship, at about 15 knots 
during those hours, makes it easier for the pirate boat travelling at twice the speed of 
the ship to board the ship, remove the safe and booty, and disembark in less than half 
an hour. This kind of incident involves a small group of seamen usually armed with 
knives or blades and, sometimes, simple firearms. They normally avoid injuring the 
crew members unless they are confronted and will attempt to attack more than one 
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ship in one night.
110
 It should be noted that large vessels such as super tankers are of 
no interest to them since they make it difficult for them to act quickly. Types of 
vessels that have been reported to be their targets include tugs and barges, bulk 
carriers and general cargo vessels.  This form of low-level armed robbery appears to 
be rampant in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Straits of Malacca, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore. Most of the pirates or armed robbers of this kind are believed 
to be Indonesians operating from Indonesian islands such as Batam, Aceh and Riau.
111
 
 
The second type of piracy is defined as ‘Medium-level assault and robbery’ (MLAR). 
Corbett refers to this type of piracy as West African Piracy because of the rampant 
and common attacks of this kind in that area.
112
 The pirates usually have their own 
well-organised gangs and work from a ‘mother’ ship to attack a ship under way. It 
normally involves an armed assault with violence or threats of violence which could 
cause serious injury or even death.
113
 
 
The hijacking of a ship is referred to as a ‘Major Criminal Hijack’ (MCHJ) to 
differentiate this act from the common attack of piracy. Corbett believes that this type 
of piracy is common in the South China Sea.
114
 In addition, the purpose of this crime 
is normally to convert the ship to a ‘phantom ship’ for the purposes of illegal trading 
and maritime fraud.
115
 This type of piracy needs a very careful plan and an established 
link with organised crime syndicates as well as with corrupt officials. Once they have 
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succeeded in hijacking a ship, the pirates will divert it from its destination in order to 
repaint and rename it with false documentation. Zou argued that the loophole in the 
rules of the ‘Flag of Convenience (FOC)’116 has been used by the pirates to re-register 
the stolen ships easily. Although it helps the ship owners to maximise their profits 
while minimizing their operating costs due to the very low charge for registering ships 
for the FOC, the ships’ lack of protection and safety make them more vulnerable to 
piracy attacks. The hijacking of the MV Cheung Son south of Taiwan in the South 
China Sea in November 1998, on its way from Shanghai to Malaysia, might explain 
the modus operandi used in this type of attack.
117
 This case is considered one of the 
most brutal cases of piracy ever reported, as it involved the murder of twenty-three 
Chinese crewmen on board who were then dumped into the sea. The criminals already 
had sufficient information on the ship, sending a well-trained and heavily armed gang 
to attack and seize the ship. The cargo in the ship was transferred to another ship with 
the purpose of disposing of it on the black market. The ship was repainted and re-
registered; it was never recovered. However, the thirteen pirates, twelve of them 
Chinese and one Indonesian, were finally caught and sentenced to death.
118
 Although 
the South China Sea and Southeast Asia used to be classified as the most vulnerable 
area for ship hijacking in the early twenty-first century,
119
 the trend is now downward 
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and has declined sharply in this region. In 2010 alone, out of 53 incidents of hijacking 
reported by IMB worldwide, only three incidents occurred in Southeast Asia and one 
in the South China Sea.
120
 The remaining incidents were all in the African region, 
especially the Gulf of Aden and Somalia, with fifteen and thirty-three incidents 
reported respectively. 
 
4.3.4 EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS UNDERLYING PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY GENERALLY AND IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA  
Although, generally, the nature and purpose of piracy have not changed, namely to 
gain valuables and monetary income, the factors or reasons for the flourishing of 
modern-day piracy in the Straits may not be entirely similar to those during the period 
from the 16
th
 to the 19
th
 centuries.
121
 Unlike pirates in the past, who were assumed to 
have noble and prestigious reputations,
122
 this is no longer the case. The social status 
of piracy nowadays has changed to that of a dangerous maritime criminal whose 
liberty is not protected under international law.
123
 Young points out the necessity of 
appreciating the distinction between piracy in the past and in the present.
124
 He 
believes and highlights that contemporary piracy, particularly in Southeast Asia, has 
been largely shaped by political, economic and social functions of the local people and 
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is thus conceptually different from its historical roots.
125
 Although it is believed that 
the modus operandi of piracy differs from one place to another, more often than not, 
they share certain aspects that enable the act of piracy to flourish.
126
  
 
Murphy, for example, lists seven major reasons for piracy.
127
 They are as follows: 
first, legal and jurisdictional weakness; second, favourable geography; third, conflict 
and disorder; fourth, under-funded law enforcement and inadequate security; fifth, 
permissive political environments; sixth, cultural acceptability; and, last but not least, 
the promise of reward.
128
 Meanwhile, Young proposes four broad reasons for 
contemporary piracy, namely economic crisis, political instability, physical 
geography, and technology and globalisation, all of which fall under Murphy’s 
categorisation.
129
  
 
Banlaoi considers it important to identify the root cause of piracy as it may make the 
task of resolving the risk of piracy easier.
130
 This idea is very sensible and acceptable. 
Banlaoi highlights five factors that have enabled piracy and armed robbery to prosper, 
especially in the waters of Southeast Asia. For him, ‘pervasive poverty’ is the first 
motivator of piracy and the increase in piracy attacks during the 1997 Asian financial 
crises is evidence of this premise. This is followed by ‘weak governance’ or political 
instability as the second factor. The lack of strong political will and unstable 
governance will give the pirates the strength to attack ships. The third factor is the 
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‘huge coastline and weak port security’. Thus, it is unsurprising that two of the largest 
archipelago states in the world, Indonesia and the Philippines, have been recognised as 
piracy hot spots which provide plenty of hideouts for pirates.
131
 The ‘weak maritime 
forces’ are the fourth cause of piracy. This refers to the lack of capacity-building and 
enforcement power to deter such criminal acts as well as the insufficient wages paid to 
members of the maritime security forces. This actually relates to the attitude of 
government officers themselves. While one can argue that corruption might not occur 
were officers to be paid a sufficient amount, this is still a subjective matter which 
depends greatly on one’s integrity. The fifth cause is the weakness of cooperation 
among states. This is again based on the political views or priorities of a state.
132
 
 
While Murphy and other commentators point out several reasons for contemporary 
piracy with special reference to Southeast Asia, Peter Chalk, a policy analyst, 
constructs seven factors accounting for the emergence of contemporary piracy 
generally.
133
 The first is the use of a ship’s carcass134 which means fewer crew 
members, thus enabling pirates to easily board a ship. This view is shared by Teitler
135
 
and is also elucidated in the IMO Module Course on Preventing the Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships.
136
 The second is the high cost of maritime surveillance. 
It is obvious that the cost of maintaining security at sea including sea surveillance 
                                               
131  Eklof Stefan, Pirates in Paradis: A Modern History of Southeast Asia Marauders (Copenhagen: 
NIAS Press 2006) 5. 
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2009 in <www.rand.org> 20 January 2009. 
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systems, capacity building programs and logistic facilities has increased every year.  
This cost, of course, has to be borne by the local coastal states. For the littoral states of 
the Straits, the cost is multiplying, considering the increasing volume and density of 
the traffic in the Straits. The third is the inadequacy of maritime police forces, training 
and equipment in ports and along coasts to deal with low-level piracy or harbour 
thefts. Fourth is the common reason of corruption among officials, especially in regard 
to high-level piracy. Fifth is the unstable political situation exemplified by the waters 
off Somalia where piracy has becomes a hotspot with the highest number of reported 
incidents worldwide since 2008.
137
  Sixth is the prospect of ransom income from the 
ships’ owners who are willing to pay the pirates as long as they can retrieve their ships 
and cargoes. The final factor is the wide availability and proliferation of small arms 
including pistols, rifles and machine guns which pirates normally use to assault and 
frighten their victims.
138
  
 
It may be inferred that, more often than not, these reasons and factors that have led to 
the flourishing of contemporary piracy have been agreed upon by almost all 
commentators although they vary in terms of elaboration, priority and perception.  
Based on the reasons listed by the commentators above, it is suggested that the extra-
legal factors or causes underlying piracy and armed robbery in the Straits can be 
assigned to four major categories, namely political instability or inefficient 
governance, poor economic conditions, geographical attributes, and social and cultural 
circumstances. If the problems that cause these categories can be addressed, the 
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Federal Government (TFG): see  DR Rothwell and T Stephens  The International Law of the Sea 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 432. 
138  Chalk [2009] 1-3. 
151 
 
number of piracy and armed robbery incidents might be controlled and reduced 
consistently as evidenced in the reports of piracy incidents by IMB, IMO and 
ReCAAP in recent years. 
 
4.3.4.1   POLITICAL INSTABILITY OR WEAK GOVERNANCE 
The best evidence of a stable political community is the ‘existence of effective 
government, with centralised administrative and legislative organs.’139  It may be said 
that a steady political state and good governance is the backbone of and key to 
economic growth, effective inter-state cooperation and efficient enforcement of law 
and jurisdiction. An effective political power usually reacts quickly to any possible 
security threat to its people. Thus, almost all commentators regard political instability 
of a state as a good ground for the emergence of piracy.
140
 While, historically, in 
Southeast Asia piracy was either a sign of the vitality of a society or indicated the 
decline and destruction of a regime, nowadays it is normally symptomatic of weak 
political control.
141
 Banlaoi regards Indonesia and Philippines as examples of States 
with such political instabilities as a result of which piracy is rampant.
142
 Indonesia has 
also been regarded as a country lacking an effective navy and coast guard control.
143
 It 
is suggested that the shortcomings of these two States are mainly caused by the 
archipelagic character of their territorial waters which embrace vast and complex 
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coastlines.
144
 Indonesia has been trying to improve the maritime security of its part of 
the Straits by cooperating in the trilateral agreement between the littoral States. The 
strong desire for good governance to police the Straits has also helped to reduce the 
crime of armed robbery against ships within the territorial sea
145
 although some 
episodes of piracy have undeniably occurred within its territorial waters.
146
 The 
current situation in Southeast Asian countries is arguably not as bad as in Somalia.  
That’s why Sittnick’s suggestion to impose responsibility on the littoral States that 
breach their international obligations to exercise due diligence in securing the safety 
and security of other nationals within their territory is unjustifiable.
147
 Of course, 
when Sittnick commented on this issue in 2005,
148
 the cooperative efforts between the 
littoral States had only just begun. Moreover, a fruitful outcome may not emerge for 
quite some time.  
 
However, Banlaoi does not deny that, although a state may have good governance, as 
in Singapore, it is still exposed to the threat of piracy due to the weak governance of 
its neighbours.
149
  This view, however, is still debatable. The most crucial and 
ostensible factor that not only leads to piracy but also may form an obstacle to 
cooperation among states is the concern over the erosion of sovereignty over territorial 
waters. This is apparently not a new issue. It has been raised ever since the 
negotiations to establish the international regime of the law of the sea decades ago.
150
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Nevertheless, again, the sharp decrease in the number of pirate attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca in recent years may provide evidence of the existence of a strong political 
will among the littoral states of the Straits to cooperate in combating piracy.
151
 The 
willingness of the littoral states to cooperate with one another is commendable and 
could be seen as an optimistic initiative to ensure the security of the Straits. They have 
set aside their internal political issues and have shown the capability to responsibly 
manage and maintain safety and security of the Straits, one of the most important 
waterways in the world. 
 
4.3.4.2    ECONOMIC FACTORS AND LACK OF FUNDING 
This category flows directly from the first factors. Although Asian countries are 
currently undergoing economic growth and dynamism,
152
 the unequal distribution of 
wealth is proposed by Young as one factor that leads to the crime of piracy. People 
who live by the sea are usually the victims of this inequality and are left in poverty by 
the States.
153
 Banlaoi agrees, stating that ‘poverty incidences in the region range from 
16 to 55 percent and it is this poverty in Southeast Asia that has prompted people to 
resort to piracy as an alternative means of livelihood’.154 The Minister Mentor of 
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, observes that the problem of poverty, especially in some 
part of Indonesia, needs to be solved in order to fight the threat of piracy in the 
Straits.
155
 The 1997 economic crisis in Asia saw a large number of piracy incidents in 
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Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca.
156
 Daxecker and 
Prins, in their research on ‘institutional and economic opportunities for maritime 
piracy’, found that, in addition to weak governance, the absence of legal forms of 
employment creates economic opportunities for piracy.
157
 Piracy is seen as a 
profitable ‘job’, the benefits from which can be gained within a short time or a few 
hours. Thus, it is not surprising that Burnett,
158
 Frecon
159
 and Murphy
160
 discovered 
that most of the Southeast Asian pirates are fishermen, taxi-boat drivers and sailors. 
They have the skills and experience as well as equipment to attack ships. Their 
knowledge of local sea areas, shipping patterns and climatic conditions are 
advantageous when attempting an attack.  Although not the sole reason, financial or 
economic crisis is believed to be a significant driver of acts of piracy.
161
    
 
Apart from the desperate economic conditions that encourage the flourishing of 
piracy, local governments often have limited funds for capacity-building. This funding 
is very important for providing effective training for the maritime forces and to buy 
assets for the purpose of patrolling the ships.
162
 Whether a state gives high priority to 
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combating piracy and boosting maritime security might be seen from its management 
of funds and budget. As far as the Straits is concerned, the increasing volume of 
vessels passing through this narrow channel and the high cost of maintaining its safety 
and security, a burden falling on the coastal or littoral states alone, may provide their 
justification for the lack of funding. Comprehensive surveillance, although it may 
deter piracy, may be difficult to sustain.
163
  Murphy points out that, during 1992, 
cooperation in patrolling the Straits proceeded wholeheartedly, but it lasted for just six 
months due to the states’ inability to bear the expensive cost.164 The states have to 
provide sufficient resources, and costs include enforcement assets such as boats, 
aircraft and coordination facilities as well as knowledge and intelligence.
165
 Otherwise 
the enforcement force becomes weak, uncontrolled and less efficient. 
 
4.3.4.3   FAVOURABLE GEOGRAPHY 
It has been repeated in many instances that the geographical attributes of a coastal 
state, particularly in Southeast Asia, has become a main factor contributing to the 
rampant increase in piracy.
166
 Archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines, which comprise thousands of islands and a complex topography, may 
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have difficulty in enforcing the law.
167
 Such geographical areas provide strategic 
hideouts for pirates. Moreover, the cost of maintaining security throughout these 
coastlines would also be very expensive, especially for the developing countries. 
Banlaoi addresses this issue perfectly when he compares the high budgets allocated by 
the developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States to the 
protection of their coastlines with the developing states which have huge coastlines 
entailing even higher costs.
168
 The capability of a state to defend the security of its 
coastlines and ensure the safety of navigation in the Straits, particularly in the area 
around Indonesia, is also affected by the vast numbers of small islands which 
normally involve high-cost maintenance and surveillance. As a result, the countless 
islands that provide plenty of hideouts for these opportunistic pirates and armed 
robbers
169
 may at the same time influence the effectiveness of a state’s capacity-
building in suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships.  
 
4.3.4.4    SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CIRCUMSTANCE  
It may be frustrating when the act of piracy and sea robbery is regarded as an 
acceptable cultural activity in some States in Southeast Asia.
170
 But, for some 
commentators such as Murphy and Vagg, there really exists a form of society that 
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makes piracy its main source of family income.
171
 Historically, piracy has been a 
‘part-time calling’ of merchants and rulers.172 However, this is still the case, to the 
extent that it has been related to the corruption of law enforcement officials or other 
patrons of wealthy bodies.
173
 It is suggested that corruption among port authorities is 
the most expensive maritime crime.
174
 According to Dillon, extortion and collusion 
with criminals are the two main forms of corruption indulged in by port officials.
175
 
He describes several instances of reported attacks which received no response from 
the port authority; alternatively, the criminals were caught but then released without 
any action being taken against them.
176
  
 
Gwin’s interview with a pirate177, who was caught together with nine others when 
trying to hijack the Nepline Delima in 2005, provides a good explanation for this.
178
  
Ariffin, or as he called himself, ‘John Palembang’, told Gwin that the attack on the 
Nepline Delima was a plot. It was first planned in a coffee shop in Batam when a 
shipping executive approached his friend Lukman, an Indonesian sailor, to recruit a 
crew to hijack the tanker. As it was hard to find work, he agreed to join Lukman in 
this plot. Although the attack began as planned, one of the tanker’s crewman fled with 
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their speedboat and managed to obtain help from the Malaysian marine police in 
Langkawi. He and nine others were caught and the shipping executive and the 
complicit crew members were arrested.
179
  
 
This interesting story shows the reality of the life of a pirate, who is sometimes a 
normal seaman and sometimes a pirate or, legally speaking, a sea robber. Their own 
desperation coupled with weak enforcement action, crooked patrons of the act, the 
promise of rewards and other factors discussed above may trigger their boldness in 
attacking ships in this lucrative target area.
180
 An archipelagic area will provide 
strategic hideouts for them should their small boats be chased by the authorities. In 
Southeast Asian waters, particularly in the Straits of Malacca, those pirates who have 
been successfully arrested are mostly Indonesian; however, in order to tackle the 
problem, such transnational crimes require the full cooperation of all the littoral states 
and stakeholders, especially in a complex geographical area such as Indonesia.   
 
4.4    CONCLUSION 
Globalisation and the vast increase in international trade have highlighted the 
importance of the sea lanes of communication, especially in the Straits of Malacca. 
This significance has made the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships and 
the challenge to maritime safety and security in this area a matter of great concern to 
the international community, particularly the stakeholders. In the Straits, this threat 
has represented an endless challenge to the littoral states since before the colonial 
period. The vulnerability to the threat became apparent when the IMB attempted to 
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establish a piracy reporting centre in 1992. The quarterly and annual piracy reports 
from IMB and other organisations such as IMO have become the main source of 
reference for the international community to assess the fluctuating risks of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea throughout the world. It is obvious that exaggeration and over-
dramatisation of the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships has severely 
affected the reputation of the littoral states to manage the safety and security of the 
Straits. Although it is undeniable that, according to the annual IMB piracy reports, the 
Straits saw escalating rates of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the years between 
2000 and 2006, subsequent years have seen a sharp decline in such incidents.  
 
Apart from the impressive tripartite cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore recently, which is evidenced by the decline in the number of attacks in the 
Straits,
181
 it is suggested that, were the root causes of piracy to be tackled, this 
problem might be totally eradicated or at least reduced and handled efficiently. 
Appreciating the basic causes and types of piracy in the region that have been 
highlighted in this chapter is very important in order to provide a backdrop to an 
understanding of the issue of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits, before 
examining the adequacy of laws and mechanisms provided in the local context in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COOPERATIVE ACTION IN SECURING THE STRAITS:  
MALAYSIAN RESPONSES IN REGIONAL, EXTRA-REGIONAL AND 
BILATERAL INITIATIVES   
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The persistent threat of piracy and armed robbery has become a central issue that 
directly afflicts the coastal states and indirectly affects regional security. The increase 
in the number of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the twenty-first century has 
required an urgent reaction by the states and regional bodies involved. As discussed in 
an earlier chapter, despite some weaknesses pointed out by various commentators,
182
 
the 1982 Convention has successfully provided a legal foundation for a regional 
cooperative framework, especially for the suppression of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in the Southeast Asian region. The states themselves need to do more in 
order to materialise this cooperative framework. In order to achieve this, states have to 
compromise on their legitimate interests and sovereign rights as well as fulfil their 
moral duties in order to achieve international maritime peace and safety of navigation.  
 
Given that piracy is often a transnational crime, cooperation between states is the best 
method of securing the sea, especially in the congested areas upon which maritime 
trade depends. The Southeast Asian region is home to six of the world’s top twenty-
five container ports.
183
 This is apparently indicative of the intense maritime traffic and 
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the heavy reliance of international trade on the important sea routes of the region. This 
waterway is traversed by thousands of vessels, luring the opportunist pirates and 
robbers whose activities are transnational in nature. As the challenges to maritime 
security grow, the collective collaboration and cooperative action requires a prevailing 
operation and dynamic strategy. The cooperative basis in Article 100 of the 1982 
Convention could be a stepping-stone to encouraging cooperation among states.
184
 
Although collaboration between states is often hampered by concerns over 
sovereignty and individual national security interests, the threat of piracy and armed 
robbery, particularly in the Straits of Malacca, is believed to have so far been tackled 
wisely.
185
 
 
5.1 REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES 
5.1.1 SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)  
Simon points out that the establishment of ASEAN in the immediate post-cold war 
years had the original rationale of protecting each member state’s sovereignty.186 
Their objective is to promote cooperation between newly independent and developing 
countries in Southeast Asia.
187
 It has been seen as a ‘diplomatic association’ that 
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concentrates on regional cooperation and avoidance of intra-regional disputes.
188
  As 
the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abd Rahman, once said:
189
 
‘the initial thrust of ASEAN  should be economic and cultural matters 
and if these initiatives proved successful then efforts could be made 
towards establishing a far-reaching organisation which could extend to 
political as well as security fields.’  
 
Originally, ASEAN, which was founded by Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand 
and the Philippines, made its first cooperative declaration of solidarity on 8 August 
1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. It was then joined by Brunei seventeen years later, 
followed by Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and then Cambodia in 
1999. Simon Tay and Jesus Estanislao, as well as Redha, divide ASEAN development 
into three stages. The first stage starts from the year of its formation in 1967 until 
1976, which they described as the years of ‘highly decentralised structure.’190 This 
                                                                                                                                       
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the 
rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest 
in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in 
the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and 
industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of 
international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and 
communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote Southeast Asian studies; and 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional 
organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer 
cooperation among themselves. 
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was a period of inter-state conflicts that threatened the stability and security of the 
region. This is certainly expected from an embryonic organisation
191
 whose founders 
were also newly-formed self-governing states at that time. Although still 
decentralised, the second stage, covering the years 1976 to 1992, saw a steady 
improvement in this regional organisation, especially in inter-governmental political 
relations, economic mutual understanding and diplomacy. The third stage began in 
1997 and has continued into the new millennium; it has generated more cooperation 
and joint efforts, as well as bilateral and trilateral declarations, especially in dealing 
with regional security issues. These three stages demonstrate ASEAN’s positive 
progress as revealed through its statements, communiqués, plans of action and visions.  
 
On the other hand, Shie classifies the development of ASEAN into three phases, but 
with different time periods, namely early ASEAN (1976 to1992), ASEAN expansion 
(1992 to 2001) and ASEAN new millennium (2001 until the present).
192
 It was in the 
early phase that ASEAN countries showed great concern about any possible 
intimidation or external interference in individual states’ affairs. Consequently, the 
Bangkok Declaration of 8 August 1967 reaffirmed the aims of the United Nations 
charter to protect nations from external interference.
193
 This principle of ‘non-
interference’ has since become the trademark and non-constitutive norm of the 
ASEAN states. Despite this early anxiety, ASEAN’s members explicitly showed their 
commitment to security cooperation in the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
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Security, 1,1 
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(1976 Declaration) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The 1976 
Declaration emphasised ‘the continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis 
between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs 
and interests.’194 However, the attitude of the ASEAN members towards the ideas of 
multilateral security cooperation is reflected in the words of TAC which highlights the 
following:  
Article 2 
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall 
be guided by the following fundamental principles: 
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty,  
b. equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all  
nations;  
c. The right of every State to lead its national existence  
   free from external interference, subversion or coercion;  
d. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;  
e.  Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful        
   means;  
f.  Renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
g.  Effective cooperation among themselves. (Underlined  
added) 
 
The preoccupation with mutual respect for sovereignty and equality as well as non-
interference in the internal affairs of any state that is absorbed in the TAC has been 
repeated consistently.
195
 This signifies that the ASEAN states’ willingness to embrace 
a regional cooperation mechanism would still be subjected to this norm.  As a result, 
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the relevancy and credibility of ASEAN has been criticised because it has been unable 
to constitute an effective vehicle for regional cooperation. It has also been argued that 
ASEAN has never been able to provide a mechanism for resolving conflicting 
territorial claims among its members. Rather, for Jones and Smith, this non-
constitutive fundamental norm has been identified as one of the elements that impair 
ASEAN’s credibility regarding its ability to implement its declaration and planning, 
especially in terms of maritime security which includes transnational crimes such as 
piracy and terrorism.
196
 This is simply because suppressing such crimes requires some 
deterioration of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.
197
 
 
 This is again reiterated by Martin who believes that ASEAN is simply ‘making a 
process and is not making progress.’198 Their bureaucratic process in preserving their 
fundamental norms is very complex. Many commentators are emphasizing that 
ASEAN regionalism, while frequently stating the need for mutual cooperation in 
tackling the security issues, has not really implicated it in actual practice.
199
 This has 
in fact been accentuated in the Report of Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN 
Charter: ‘ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, or action plans. The 
problem is one of ensuring compliance.’200  
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Liss shared this view by pointing out that, apart from unresolved disputes and 
interstate tension between ASEAN States, the ‘ASEAN way’ style of diplomacy has 
become the main obstacle to addressing the security challenges in the region.
201
 These 
factors not only impair cooperation in combating piracy but also affect political and 
security-related cooperation in general.
202
 The central issue remains on the question of 
‘whether ASEAN countries have common security interests and wills sufficient to 
provide a basis for security cooperation beyond the current bilateral arrangement?’203 
According to Shie, some previous studies have shown that the Southeast Asian states 
appreciated and recognised that the anti-piracy efforts of the extra-regional 
stakeholders were more effective than the intra-regional defence and security 
efforts.
204
 The intra-ASEAN defence and security actions were regarded as completely 
inadequate and ineffective. Shie presumed that, as the ASEAN states relied on the 
outside or extra-regional help, ASEAN was considered an unsuccessful means of 
tackling and curbing piracy problems regionally.
205
 Simon, pondering ASEAN’s 
future, insists that ‘ASEAN cannot be a change agent, nor was it ever intended to be a 
collective security regime.’206 Again, he points out that, in such crimes, the 
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cooperation among states is primarily bilateral.
207
 Furthermore, item number 5 of the 
1987 Manila Declaration states that security issues have not become a formal ASEAN 
agenda but a responsibility of each individual state, which needs to resolve them 
separately.
208
 In other words, the idea of regional multilateral security cooperation is 
limited to bilateral agreements between members.  
 
Despite this sceptical view, Severino comments that, for decades, ASEAN attained 
considerable achievements in terms of realising certain regional goals.
209
  For 
example, ASEAN convened the first Conference on Transnational Crime, which 
includes piracy as one instance of a regional problem, in 1997.
210
 This was subsequent 
to the first Informal Summit in November 1996, at which the ASEAN leaders called 
upon the relevant bodies to study the possibility of regional cooperation in tackling 
such crime.
211
 The awareness of ASEAN about the detrimental impact of transnational 
crime on the member states has inspired the need to tackle and fight such crimes by 
enhancing regional cooperation. The specific objectives of the 1999 Plan of Action 
(POA) to Combat Transnational Crime are to urge the ASEAN member countries to:  
1. Develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing, 
controlling and neutralising transnational crime; 
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2. Foster regional cooperation at the investigative, prosecutorial, and 
judicial level as well as the rehabilitation of perpetrators; 
3. Enhance coordination among ASEAN bodies dealing with 
transnational crime; 
4. Strengthen regional capacities and capabilities to deal with the 
sophisticated nature of transnational crime; and 
5. Develop sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in 
criminal justice, including mutual legal assistance and 
extradition.
212
 
 
This POA was very timely, especially at the close of the twentieth century when the 
maritime security threats from piracy and armed robbery attacks had become 
increasingly alarming.  
 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Southeast Asian States were also 
forced to be more serious and diligent in tackling the issues of maritime security. In 
2001, the ASEAN Special Projects was formed in Jakarta with the aim of dealing with 
Transnational Crimes including piracy, terrorism, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
drugs, arms smuggling and money laundering.
213
 In 2002, the Senior Officials 
Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in Kuala Lumpur agreed to deal 
exclusively with the issue of piracy, which was rampant at that time.
214
  It was at this 
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2002 SOMTC meeting that the special plan of actions to combat Transnational Crime 
was adopted. The SOMTC had proposed to implement the following initiatives:
215
 
1. Establish a compilation of national laws and regulations of ASEAN 
member countries pertaining to piracy and armed robbery at sea, 
which is to lead towards establishing a regional repository of such 
national laws and regulations to be made available on the 
ASEANWEB. 
2. Exchange of information and enhanced cooperation with the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as well as with other 
bodies involved in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea such 
as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the Federation of 
ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA) and ASEANAPOL. 
3. Compile national studies to determine trends and the “modus 
operandi” of piracy in Southeast Asian waters. 
4. Consider the feasibility of developing multilateral or bilateral legal 
arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, hot pursuit, 
prosecution and extradition, inquiry, seizure and forfeiture of the 
proceeds of the crime in order to enhance mutual legal and 
administrative assistance among ASEAN Member Countries. 
5. Enhance coordinated anti-piracy patrols. 
6. Enhance coordinated and coordination in law enforcement and 
intelligence sharing of piracy and armed robbery at sea and that of 
other transnational crimes. 
7. Strengthen and enhance existing co-operation among National 
Focal Points of ASEAN Countries involved in combating and 
suppressing piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
8. Enhance and seek training programmes within ASEAN and with the 
ASEAN Dialogue Partners to equip maritime, customs, the police, 
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port authority and other relevant officials for the prevention and 
suppression of sea piracy and other maritime crimes. 
9. Seek technical assistance from users of the waterways and relevant 
specialised agencies of the United Nations and other international 
organisations, particularly with regard to training and acquisition of 
effective communication equipment and assets; this would be in 
accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS Article 43. 
10. Obtain financial assistance for increased patrolling of particularly 
vulnerable sea areas and for training programmes for maritime law 
enforcement officials and the agencies concerned.  
 
It was believed that the plan would facilitate the ASEAN states in developing 
multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements and conducting training programmes and 
joint exercises for law enforcement in more efficient ways.
216
 These include an 
agreement to work together to combat piracy in areas such as information exchange, 
cooperation in legal matters and law enforcement, training, institutional and capacity-
building and extra-regional cooperation. Furthermore, the adoption of the ASEAN 
Charter in 2007
217
 enabled ASEAN to be more effective and expeditious in dealing 
with common regional problems in order to ensure regional peace and stability.
218
 The 
Charter is expected to be a tool for inter-governmental negotiations, especially in 
regional maritime security.
219
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Thus, to disregard ASEAN’s efforts in tackling transnational issues such as piracy 
would be to overlook this organisation’s capability and potential competency. 
Although facing challenges on intra-ASEAN multilateral security cooperation, the 
bilateral defence and security ties have undergone a speedy expansion.
220
 Redha 
believes that, despite ASEAN’s shortcomings as a regional security organisation, it 
has been regarded as an umbrella under which member states may take up bilateral or 
multilateral security initiatives.
221
 More often than not, ASEAN states are able to 
compromise and put aside their self-interests to show their commitment to security 
cooperation, especially when the threat exists in their own areas. For example, the 
Philippines and Malaysia managed to put aside their dispute over the claim on Sabah 
and agreed to enter bilateral military cooperation with Malaysia to conduct naval 
patrols in the agreed area. Shie’s view on the ASEAN states’ over-reliance on the anti-
piracy efforts provided by the extra-regional stakeholders perhaps overshadows the 
intra-ASEAN efforts to fortify the cooperative action among member States to address 
the problems either bilaterally or trilaterally.
222
 
 
5.1.2 ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)  
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established a year after ASEAN formally 
acknowledged ‘the necessity of regional security cooperation’ in the Singapore 
Declaration, namely during the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post 
Ministerial Conference on July 1993. ARF, which is also regarded as ASEAN”s 
offspring, has the dictum of ‘promoting peace and security through dialogue and 
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cooperation in the Asian Pacific.’223 Unlike ASEAN, whose initial members are 
Southeast Asian countries, ARF is not limited to regional states. Although all ASEAN 
states automatically become members of ARF, it is also open for participation by 
other countries as long as certain criteria are met. Currently, about twenty-seven states 
are participating in the ARF, including other regional and maritime powers such as 
China, the United States (US) and European Union States (EU).
224
 The participation 
of these states, despite their geographical location, meets the prescribed criteria and is 
considered relevant since the security of the Asian region indirectly affects these 
countries.
225
 However, ARF would not approve the participation of too many 
countries as members in order to ensure that the effectiveness of the Forum is not 
impaired.  
 
Many of the ARF’s concerns over the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
are the same as those of other regional bodies or parties to multilateral agreements 
whose members are the same countries. The ARF motto demonstrates the objectives 
of the Forum to provide a platform for discussion of common-interest issues, 
particularly the issue of maritime security. The ARF has been defined in the 
Chairman’s Statement as: 
 [A] high-level consultative forum aiming at conducting constructive 
dialogue on political and security issues in Asia-Pacific region, and 
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carrying out cooperation in confidence-building measures, nuclear non-
proliferation, peacekeeping, exchange of non-classified military 
information, maritime security and preventive diplomacy.
226
  
 
In its 10
th
 Post-ministerial Conferences in 2003, ARF adopted a Statement on 
Cooperation against Piracy and other threats to Maritime Security. The Statement 
considered maritime security ‘an indispensable and fundamental condition for the 
welfare and economic security of the ARF region’.227 It does not define maritime 
security, describing it only as the ‘main eventual reason’ for ensuring security in the 
region. It might be inferred that the security issue, which has been given special 
attention in the Statement, seems to be confined to the crime of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships.
228
 Therefore, close cooperation with the international 
instruments such as IMO and IMB-PRC has been fully encouraged. In addition, the 
implementation of the existing international anti-piracy legal frameworks and 
guidelines at the national level is necessary and urgent.  Although it is obvious from 
the Statement that the cooperation of all States in the region is a matter of the utmost 
importance without which welfare and economic security may be at stake,
229
 the duty 
to cooperate is merely on a voluntary basis.
230
 Such a basis might result in a lack of 
willingness on the part of States to further implement the statement especially when it 
involves matters of sovereignty, sovereign power and territorial integrity.
231
 This is 
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similar to the spirit of Article 43 of the 1982 Convention which recommends burden-
sharing between the coastal states and users without any obligation imposed on the 
latter. 
 
Thus, when it comes to cooperation in combating piracy, ARF members may simply 
raise their security concerns over such threats but may not contribute effectively to its 
prevention. Valencia argues that there have been no detailed discussions on the 
mechanism to control and prevent such piracy and maritime terrorism in ARF.
232
 
Therefore, it might be difficult to put such ‘good intentions’ into action.233 In sharing 
this view, Beckman suggests that political will is essential for implementing any 
recommendation or statement of cooperation; without it, nothing will be achieved.
234
 
In many cases maritime issues have not been given high priority in Southeast Asia, as 
Mak commented.
235
 Certainly, resistant states will become a barrier to the 
implementation of effective security measures. In fact, the clash and conflict of 
interests are likely to hinder the transparency of cooperation among states.
236
  
 
Malaysia has responded positively to the ARF dialogue on security. Mohd Najib Tun 
Abd Razak, the current Prime Minister of Malaysia, stated during the 10
th
 ARF Head 
of Defence Universities/Colleges Meeting in Malaysia in 2006 that: 
Despite our [e]ncouraging development and convincing economic 
growth, we have got a long way to go towards becoming an 
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industrialised nation. We place security as an important agenda in our 
national development. We are sharing land and sea borders with the 
majority of the ASEAN members which requires us to have continued 
bilateral and multilateral working relations for our future well-being. We 
will continue to participate in regional forums and be actively involved 
in peace missions such as the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and 
peacekeeping missions under the United Nations Umbrella.
237
 
 
 
National security is a significant issue in the Malaysian policy and legal framework. 
Furthermore, Malaysia also believes that the cooperation and coordination among 
ARF members, either in international or multilateral agreements, is very important in 
ensuring the security of the ocean sectors. Although ARF does not have a specific 
regional enforcement body to suppress piracy and maritime terrorism, the cultivation 
of possible efforts and exchange of ideas as well as the shared development of 
capacity-building among the members has more or less created an awareness among 
states of the importance of intensifying efforts and improving capacity at national 
level before joining forces with other countries. This is a considerable achievement by 
ARF and it should be complimented for it. Thus, Malaysia, as an active member of 
ARF, has shown commitment towards realizing its motto of ‘promoting peace and 
security through dialogue and cooperation in the Asian Pacific’ through the maritime 
security agenda, especially in controlling piracy and armed robbery in the region. 
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5.1.3 TRILATERAL AND BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 
STRAITS 
According to Shie, security measures have been more difficult to address in the 
ASEAN forum than economic and cultural interests.
238
  As the concerns over the 
escalating number of piracy and armed robbery attacks in the Straits, especially during 
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s were attracting increasing worldwide media 
coverage, the efficacy of regional maritime anti-piracy and terrorism initiatives was 
questioned. During the crisis, some ASEAN countries experienced widespread 
poverty and low incomes, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand.
239
  Consequently, 
their ability to combat piracy in the region was hampered by this crisis. Since piracy in 
the Southeast Asia region is perpetrated mainly within the territorial states by cross-
border criminals, which is known legally as armed robbery against ships, the 
contention over the importance of trilateral and bilateral cooperative action among the 
littoral states appears to be the central issue.
240
 In many instances, the littoral states are 
blamed for failing to ensure the safety and security of navigation for those states using 
the Straits.  Fort suggests six important challenges that need to be met by the states to 
cope effectively with cross-border threats such as piracy:
241
 
1. Understanding the true nature of the problem; 
2. Resolving bureaucratic inefficiencies; 
3. Dealing more effectively with root causes; 
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4. Improving intelligence sharing; 
5. Closing the security gap between military and law enforcement authorities 
in situations where their competencies overlap; and  
6. Engaging in a more comprehensive threat assessment. 
  
Like the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action and the 2002 SOMTC initiatives discussed 
earlier,  the process of overcoming the challenges to the suppression of piracy and 
armed robbery suggested above will primarily need a strong maritime force and 
political will by the affected states. It is obvious that the states that possess sufficient 
funds and naval resources, actionable capacity-building and intelligence as well as 
effective law enforcement and judicial strength will have the ability to provide an 
effective deterrent to such threats. Apart from the littoral states’ effort, which has its 
limitations, the assistance of the international community, particularly the Straits’ 
users, is very welcome. As the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Abd Razak, 
said during the conference in Singapore in June 2005: 
‘The littoral states must be in the driver’s seat in maintaining regional 
maritime security and they retain primary responsibility for 
implementation of any measures designed to strengthen safe passage. 
While the need for greater cooperation extends to states using the 
Straits, good intentions are best translated in terms of financial support, 
intelligence sharing, training and provision or loaning equipment such 
as ships and aircraft.’242 
  
Najib’s statement above appears to reassert the 1971 joint statement which 
emphasised that the management of the implementation of measures to strengthen 
security and safe passage in the Straits should be the primary responsibility of the 
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littoral states.
243
 It may be said that this statement derives from the spirit of the 
maritime security agenda of the ASEAN states, which are reluctant to allow any 
external interference, especially when it involves matters of national security and 
sovereignty. 
 
One clear example of successful regional cooperation is that shown by Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore in the bilateral and trilateral security arrangements for 
coordinated patrols against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits. The 
efforts began in 1992 in response to the 1992 Singapore Declaration of ASEAN on the 
importance of strengthening regional cooperation in dealing with security issues.  
Initially, the arrangement for coordinated patrols in the Philip Channel, the southern 
entrance to the Straits, was made between Indonesia and Singapore. Meanwhile, for 
the northern entrance and along the Straits towards the southern part, Malaysia and 
Indonesia have implemented bilateral strategies known as the Maritime Operation 
Planning Team.
 244
  Both bilateral agreements (between Indonesia and Malaysia and 
Indonesia and Singapore) have authorised cross-border ‘hot pursuit’ which to some 
extent solved issue inherent in Article 111 of the 1982 Convention.
245
 But, there is no 
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  Joint statement 16 Nov 1971; Valencia, MJ, ‘The Politics of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Terrorism 
Responses’ in GG Ong-Webb, Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 
(Singapore, ISEAS 2006) 148. 
244  TR Shie, ‘Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-ASEAN 
Cooperation’ in GG Ong Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 
(Singapore, ISEAS 2006) 174. 
245  Art 111 read as follows:  
1.  The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of 
the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and 
regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or 
one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea 
or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the 
territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not 
necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the 
contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise 
be within a contiguous zone, as defined in Art 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken 
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bilateral agreement to allow cross-border hot pursuit between Malaysia and 
Singapore. Thus, the rule of Article 111 that requires a state to ask permission for hot 
pursuit is still applicable between Malaysia and Singapore. It is assumed that, such 
bilateral agreement with Indonesia is very important as compared to between 
Malaysia and Singapore because most of the pirates or armed robbers arrested are 
Indonesian.
246
 Moreover, vast area of ocean space with thousands of islands makes it 
difficult for Indonesian enforcement agency to police its maritime zone. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out by Shie, this initial cooperative action contributed to the considerable 
reduction in the number of reported attacks in the Straits and the territorial sea of the 
littoral states during that time.
247
  
 
In the closing years of the twentieth century, the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 
was identified as a main factor contributing to the rise of piracy. This trend continued 
until the mid-2000s but started to decline sharply after the littoral States fortified their 
cooperative action in response to the tension among the international community over 
the dramatic increase in piracy in the Straits. Issues such as the nexus between piracy 
and maritime terrorism that began to be discussed immediately after the 11 
September, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States have been given wide coverage 
                                                                                                                                       
if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which zone was 
established. 
3.  The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of 
its own State or of of a third States.   
See discussion on hot pursuit in Chapter 3 (para 3.3.3); Also Yann-Huei Song, ‘Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca: Littoral 
States’ and Regional Responses in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds.) Maritime Scurity in the 
South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation (2009 Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, Surrey) 109, 125. 
246  Stefan Eklof (2006) 47-48 and 54. 
247  Shie (2006) 174; 2009 Annual Report of the ICC-IMB-PRC, 5. 
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by the media and academic commentators.
248
 At the same time, the shocking number 
of piracy and armed robbery attacks in 2001, coupled with the increase in violence 
used during the attacks, inevitably led to the allegation that the Straits were vulnerable 
and a potential target for maritime terrorists.
249
   As a result, the littoral States have 
been put under pressure to ensure safety and security of navigation along the Straits. 
Thus, the littoral States increased their individual and joint patrols to enhance 
cooperation in managing security in the Straits.
250
 In 2004 the three littoral States 
reached a trilateral agreement on the coordinated patrols of warships together with 
aerial surveillance which was launched on 13 September 2005. The former is known 
as MALSINDO (Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia) while the latter is known as ‘Eyes in 
the Sky (EiS).’ They have since been codenamed the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) 
together with the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG).
251
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5.1.3.1  THE MALACCA STRAITS PATROL (MSP)  
I. MALSINDO (MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE-INDONESIA)
252
 
MALSINDO, which was launched on July 20 2004, is the expansion of the naval 
patrols of MALINDO, initially implemented between Malaysia and Indonesia in June 
2001.
253
 There are about seventeen warships from the three states operating as the 
MALSINDO patrol with the goal to better utilise their resources to combat piracy on a 
year-round basis.
254
 Thus, control points have been set up in Belawan and Batam 
(Indonesia), Lumut (Malaysia) and Changi (Singapore).
255
 Since they agreed on 
coordinated patrols rather than joint patrols, they have reminded each other not to go 
beyond their territorial areas.
256
 In other words, it should be noted that, in such 
coordinated patrols, the warships of the participating countries are prohibited from 
carrying out patrolling activities in another participating country’s territorial waters.257 
Furthermore, the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, has 
emphasized that MALSINDO will limit the ‘hot pursuit’ rights to the sovereign waters 
of participating states.
258
 Here, it is seems that the littoral states still view one another 
cautiously, as matters of sovereignty are paramount. For Christoffersen, MALSINDO 
                                               
252  It is also known as the Malacca Straits Surface patrol (MSSP): Storey (2009) 41. 
253
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255  Another control point was set up in Phuket after Thailand agreed to joint EiS; Yann-huei SONG 
‘RMSI and Enhancing Security in the Straits of Malacca’  in Shicun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds) 
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256  AS Erickson (2009) 62. 
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Straits Times Interactive, July 21, 2004; See also Yann-huei SONG (2009) 124. 
258  AS Erickson (2009) 62. 
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has been created as a means of preventing intervention by outside powers.
259
 
However, the littoral states encourage other states to contribute in terms of technology 
and intelligence-sharing but not by their physical military presence.
260
 
 
II. EYES IN THE SKY (EIS) 
In order to enhance security in the Straits, Najib Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia and its Defence Minister at that time, proposed additional joint aerial 
surveillance known as ‘Eyes in the Sky’ (EiS) during the Shangri-la Dialogue held in 
June 2005. This joint patrol was launched at the Royal Malaysia Air Force base in 
Kuala Lumpur. Operationally, each littoral state of the Straits will provide two 
maritime patrol aircraft to patrol the waterway of the Straits every week and they will 
not be allowed to cross over to the land. Furthermore, they are allowed to fly no closer 
than three nautical miles from participating states’ land. As compared to MALSINDO, 
which is only a ‘coordinated patrol’, the EiS program has been confirmed as a ‘joint 
patrol’ in which each patrol aircraft will have a Combined Maritime Patrol Team 
(CMPT) on board, consisting of a military officer from each of the participating 
countries.
261
 Each participating state will establish EiS Operations Centres (EOCs) 
and their role will be to coordinate the flight schedules of the patrolling aircraft taking 
off from their respective airbases. If any piracy or sea robbery is suspected, the CMPT 
                                               
259  Gaye Christoffersen, ‘Chinese and ASEAN responses to the US Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative’ in Guoguang Wu and Helen Landsdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism Foreign 
Policy and Regional Security (Routledge New York, 2008) 127-145, 135; ‘India’s offer to 
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Piracy and transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh  ( ISEAS Singapore 2011) 
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260  Ann Marie Murphy, ‘United States Relations with Southeast Asia: The Legacy of Policy 
Changes’ in AM Murphy and Bridget Welsh (eds.) Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia 
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261  ibid. at 125; Interaction among world powers can be source of strength: Minister Teo’ Channel 
News Asia, August 4, 2005. 
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will broadcast the information to ground-based agencies known as Monitoring and 
Action Agencies (MAAs). The follow-up responses will be undertaken by each state 
upon receiving the report.
262
 According to Najib, at the initial stage, the program will 
mainly involve the littoral states and Thailand, but it may be extended to include other 
extra-regional states including the US provided that the sovereignty principles of the 
littoral states are respected.
263
  
 
5.1.3.2     THE MSP: OUTSIDER RESPONSES AND COMMENTS 
The littoral states later fortified the cooperative measures and subsumed both 
MALSINDO and EiS into one overarching framework known as ‘The Malacca Straits 
Patrol’ (MSP). The admission of Thailand in September 2008 to the MSP has boosted 
the cooperative initiative to secure the Straits, especially when most of the ships 
approaching the northern entrance to the Straits will navigate through an area close to 
Thailand’s territorial sea.264  The terms of reference and standard operating procedures 
were signed by the littoral states in April 2006.
265
 To comprehend the patrol program, 
the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) is also included in the MSP with the purpose 
of improving coordination and situational awareness at sea among the littoral states; 
this is called MSP-IS and it is a data-sharing system that allows users to share 
information about any suspicious incidents on ships.
266
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At the early stage, the implementation of MSP attracted extensive feedback from the 
media and commentators. The operation of the trilateral agreement of MALSINDO, 
for example, has been criticised for failing to curb the piracy problem in the Straits. In 
fact, a senior Indonesian navy officer also acknowledged that the coordinated patrols 
are ‘a serious policy shortcoming’, and ‘a potential cause for confusion, inefficiency 
and misallocation of resources.’267 The IMB also described the coordinated patrols as 
‘ridiculous’ and commented on the possible futility of the operation since it has 
limited the ability of the law enforcement agencies to cross one another’s territorial 
sea boundaries while pursuing the pirates.
268
 In commenting on this, Mak believes that 
the disparity in the capabilities of each participating state in maritime enforcement 
will hamper the main aim of MALSINDO to tackle the piracy problem. This is 
particularly evident when he explains that, despite the fact that Malaysia and 
Singapore are doing a good job in securing the Straits, Indonesia, an archipelagic state 
and the most pirate-infested area in Southeast Asia, still lacks capacity in maritime 
enforcement; thus, the coordinated patrols will be useless.
269
 He further suggested that 
the littoral States should compromise more on sovereignty issues, thus allowing the 
better-equipped enforcement agencies of other participating states to help patrol the 
states that have low capacity, in order to address the issue efficiently.
270
 Apparently, 
the coordinated patrols of the Straits has also raised doubts about whether the littoral 
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States  sincere in their wish to combat piracy or merely want to show the world their 
capacity to oversee the Straits as a vital shipping lane for the international community, 
thus avoiding foreign intrusions.
271
   
 
Like the MALSINDO coordinated patrol, the Eis has also received criticism. Ong-
Webb, for example, believes that EiS suffers from several inherent limitations in its 
operational effectiveness. Two maritime aircraft per week is insufficient to cover a 
large area of the Straits,
272
 especially as different states contribute aircraft of varying 
capacities. He further elaborated that Malaysia’s Hercules C130 has a top search 
speed of 380 knots and a flight endurance of up to fourteen hours as compared to the 
Singapore Armed Forces Fokker 50 MPA which has a search speed of 200 knots and a 
flight endurance of eight hours. The tendency for piracy or armed robbery incidents to 
take place after midnight when the darkness severely hampers the aerial surveillance 
has also been raised by Ong-Webb. This is particularly true when the pirates in the 
Straits use the surrounding small islands to launch attacks and hide from the 
authorities. Indonesia, an archipelagic state with thousands of islands, is said to be the 
pirates’ heaven. Thus, rather than mainly focusing on the EiS operations, when 
aircraft are not permitted to fly within three nautical miles of the land area of the 
littoral States, the coastal surveillance of each county’s own territory should be seen as 
more important since the pirates must come ashore somewhere to dispose of their 
gains.
273
 Abhyankar believes that a reduction in the number of piracy and armed 
robbery attacks in Indonesian waters would contribute to a dramatic change in the 
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situation in the Straits and Southeast Asia.
274
 Mak also shares this view when he 
recommends tackling the piracy and armed robbery problem at source, that is, in 
Indonesia.
275
 
 
Nevertheless, despite all the criticisms it appears that the initiatives taken by the 
littoral states in the trilateral agreement of MSP is still on-going and is finally showing 
a fruitful and exciting result for them and the international community. The IMB-PRC 
and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has reported an overall downward trend in their 
statistics for piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Straits. In fact, as a result of the 
littoral States’ proactive and fortified action in securing the Straits, the JWC removed 
the Straits from Lloyd’s list of ‘war risk zones’ classification in 2006.276 Since then, 
the Straits has been reported to have experienced a dramatic reduction and has 
recently has achieved a ‘close-to-zero incident level.’277  
 
5.1.4 EXTRA-REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE STRAITS 
Much of the past research on Southeast Asian piracy has more enthusiastically 
recognized the anti-piracy efforts of extra-regional stakeholders over intra-regional 
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions.
278
 Although the intra-regional efforts are 
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mentioned, they are regarded as ineffective or inadequate in solving the problems.
279
 
As the case of the Straits,  Mak believes that the overarching problem in reaching 
security agreements in the Straits is the clash of interests between the key littoral 
States of Malaysia and Indonesia on the one hand, and the international users, in 
particular the maritime nations, on the other hand.
280
 Thus, it is difficult for the littoral 
States to agree on any proposal from the extra-regional powers to secure the Straits. 
They have a sceptical view that the outside powers’ interference in the problems of the 
Straits will either directly or indirectly erode their sovereignty. Their responses were 
clearly shown following the proposal by the US to establish a Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI) and the Japanese initiative on the establishment of 
ReCAAP. 
 
5.1.4.1       THE UNITED STATES’ SECURITY INITIATIVES                             
The September 11 attacks have boosted the United States’ security strategy not only 
within the United States but also at the international level where the United States 
interest is at stake. Various security initiatives and regulatory frameworks have been 
originally sponsored by the United States. These include the Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI), the implementation of the  ISPS Code, the 1988 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Most 
of the United States’ initiatives are preventive in nature and some have argued that 
                                                                                                                                       
Piracy in Southeast Asia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21 (1998): 87-112;  Keyuan Zou, 
‘Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea’ EAI Background Brief no.19 (24 August 
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they are too concerned with mere potential risk.
281
 Boutilier described this situation as 
a ‘curious paradox’ that used the theory of the link between the real threat of piracy 
and the potential risk of terrorism at sea.
282
 It is the threat of piracy and armed robbery 
with growing levels of violence that constitutes the real challenge to the shipping 
industry and the coastal states. However, this threat has been associated with the 
potential risk of maritime terrorism. In fact, the United States has emphasised this idea 
and has cajoled the international community through their initiatives on the basis of 
the war against terrorism. 
 
The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)  
RMSI was one of the US’s ideas in response to the potential terrorist threat in the 
Straits. It is noteworthy that, due to the Straits’ significance as a strategic sea lane of 
communication and their long-established use for international navigation, it has 
become the US’s primary concern in terms of anti-piracy and anti-terrorism initiatives. 
RMSI was first proposed by Admiral Thomas B Fargo, the former Chief of the US 
Pacific Command on 31 March 2004 during his testimony before the House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee.
283
 This idea is based on the concept of ‘a 
coalition of the willing.’284 It is meant to promote the cooperation among the naval 
forces in the Asian region, in particular the Straits of Malacca, to suppress the 
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escalating illegal activities and transnational threats that have been increasingly 
disrupting the peace and security of surrounding states, the seafarers and the 
stakeholders.  Fargo was reported to have said that RMSI would involve not only 
intelligence-sharing with Southeast Asian States but also the deployment of US 
Marines and Special Forces to assist the littoral states particularly, to deal with the 
maritime threats.
285
 RMSI has gained Singapore’s full support. Singapore believes that 
the idea of suppressing piracy and helping with the war against terrorism is crucial, 
since this state perceives itself as a terrorist target.
286
 Thus, Singapore is more open 
than its counterparts to welcoming the extra-regional players to help bolster maritime 
security in the Straits.  
 
However, Malaysia and Indonesia have had doubts since the idea of RMSI was first 
reported by the mass media in April 2004. The Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister cum 
Minister of Defence, who is currently the Prime Minister, said that “control of the 
Strait(s) is the sovereign prerogative of Malaysia and Indonesia, and US military 
involvement is not welcome.”287 Meanwhile, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, Marty Natalegawa, also opposed the US plan by emphasising that the 
waters of the Straits are part of the territorial waters of the littoral states which are 
definitely under their own sovereignty and responsibility.
288
 He added that any 
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cooperative measures to combat transnational crime in the Straits would need the 
littoral States’ permission.289 Indonesia’s navy chief, Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, 
also alleged that the foreign powers including US were interested in the Straits 
because of their strategic importance, rather than because of terrorism fears.
290
    
 
According to Storey, there are four reasons for the negative reaction by Malaysia and 
Indonesia to the United States’ RMSI.291 First, they believe that the RMSI plan is an 
intervention that intrudes upon their sovereignty. Second, they are concerned that the 
physical presence of United States Military forces might unleash real terrorism by 
anti-American groups. The same concern is also highlighted by Hong Nong when he 
says that this would rather provoke terrorist incidents in the Straits.
 292
  Third, the 
RMSI might imply that they (the littoral States) are incapable of protecting the Straits. 
Finally, RMSI is an affront to the littoral states’ declaration to be jointly responsible 
for securing the Straits and their stand of not recognising foreign interference. It is not 
surprising that the littoral States’ sceptical view is largely based on the perceived 
encroachment onto their sovereignty and national security.
293
 Both states believe that 
they possess the capacity to ensure security in the Straits without any deployment of 
extra-regional forces. The intention of intercepting transnational maritime threats in 
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RMSI was also viewed by China as a violation of the right of transit passage 
prescribed under Articles 34 and 38 of the 1982 Convention.
294
As a state experiencing 
rapid economic development which is closely linked with the Straits waterway, China 
doubts the US initiative in RMSI. Instead it prefers the collaborative mechanism with 
the littoral Straits within the framework of the International Law of the Sea.
295
  
 
The reaction of Indonesia and Malaysia has prompted the United States to clarify its 
plan on RMSI which, according to them, has been misrepresented.
296
 They attempted 
to clarify their true intention regarding RMSI during the Shangri-La Dialogue in 
Singapore in early June 2005.
297
 Following this explanation, Malaysia and Indonesia 
were inclined to show support for extra-regional assistance, including the US, in terms 
of the acquisition and sharing of intelligence and technology rather than physical 
deployment of foreign forces.
298
 Malaysia, for example, has entered into an agreement 
to conduct military exercises in the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). The 
FPDA consists of five states, namely Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore 
and the United Kingdom.  
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297  The third International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Conference. See: Hong 
Nong (2009) 44. 
298  Hong Nong (2009) 44. 
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In short, it appears that the proposed RMSI cannot be implemented effectively without 
the cooperation of both Malaysia and Indonesia.  It is obvious that the sentiment of 
protective national security and sovereignty consistently highlighted by Malaysia and 
Indonesia forms the basis of this impasse. The former Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) highlighted that; 
‘Asia is a very big continent and different parts of it experienced very 
different problems through the ages. During the period of Great Games of 
the Europeans, there were constant threats of conquest and colonization. In 
fact many parts of Asia, East, Central, South and West, were colonized or 
hegemonised by powerful European nations.’299 
 
It appears that past foreign military intervention in the Straits has had a deep impact 
on both states. Furthermore, piracy was the excuse used by the colonial power to 
physically deploy military force in the Straits and interfere in the internal affairs of 
states surrounding this area.
300
 This was stated by Malaysian Vice Admiral Ramlan 
Mohamed Ali: 
“Malaysia has been colonised four times, three times by Europeans, and in all 
cases they arrived under the pretext of fighting piracy. So you can understand 
why we are particularly sensitive to these issues.” 301 
 
Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia strongly believe that the cooperation between the 
littoral states as well as the stakeholders’ compliance and the support of the existing 
regulatory regime will be sufficient to ensure maritime security in the Straits. The 
MSP is one of the littoral states’ efforts to fortify security cooperation in the Straits; 
they believe it is an ideal initiative to secure the Straits from piracy and maritime 
terrorism. 
                                               
299  Mahathir Muhamad ‘Security Problems in Asia and their Possible Impact on World Stability’ 
Keynote address at the 1st International Conference by Centre for Defense Information Studies 
(CDIS) in Havana Cuba on 21 April 2008. 
300  Cross-refer to Chapter 2. 
301  JF Bradford ‘Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Response’ 26 [2004] Contemporary Southeast Asia, 480-505,501. 
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5.1.4.2       THE JAPANESE SECURITY INITIATIVES  
The Straits are an important navigational route for Japan’s trade and commerce, as 
they are for the US. As fifty per cent of its energy resources and some ninety per cent 
of its oil are conveyed through the Straits, Japan’s concern over the safety and security 
of the Straits is undeniable.
302
 Japan has been actively supporting the maintenance of 
safety and security of navigation in the Straits in terms of funding, capacity-building, 
and information- and intelligence-sharing. In fact the government of Japan, the 
Nippon Foundation, the Japan Maritime Foundation and the Japanese Association 
related to the maritime industries are the main contributors to the Straits of Malacca 
Council (MSC) whose function is to maintain safety of navigation and environmental 
protection of the Straits.  Japan’s efforts in this include donating buoy-tenders to 
coastal states and executing hydrographic surveys in the Straits.
303
 The MSC was 
established in 1969.
304
  Although the 1982 Convention, which came into force in 
1994, has encouraged cooperation between user states and littoral states to contribute 
                                               
302  Andrin Raj ‘Japan’s Initiative in Security Cooperation in the Straits of Malacca on Maritime 
Security and in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism’ (2009) The Japan Institute for 
International Affairs (JIIA) 13 at http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/090331-
Andrin_Raj.pdf  accessed on 20 March 2011; However, according to Ashley, about 60 per cent 
of Japan’s oil shipments flow through this sea area: J Ashley Roach ‘Enhancing Maritime 
Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2005) 59 Journal of International Affairs 97, 
100. 
303  Bradford (2004) 486. 
304  The MSC was established for the purpose of the route maintenance in the Straits. Its principal 
activities include hydrographic surveys and production of navigational charts (1969-1975), 
installation and maintenance of aids to navigation (1969), clearance of navigable channels 
(1973-1981), donation of oil skimming vessels and buoy tenders (1975,1976, 2002, 2003), tide 
and current observations (1976-1979) and donation of revolving funds for combating oil spills 
from ships (1981). The principal activities that are ongoing are maintenance of aids to 
navigation, research and studies on safe navigation and improvement of navigational conditions, 
technology transfer on the aids to navigation to the countries concerned as well as other 
activities to promote the international cooperation among the countries concerned. 
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to the cost of safety and security, as stipulated in Article 43, thus far Japan remains the 
major contributor to the MSC.
305
   
 
Apart from the issue of safety of navigation in the Straits, Japan has also shown its 
concern over the security issues resulting from the piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in the Straits.  Even though Japan acknowledges the legal definition of piracy in 
the 1982 Convention, Japan’s National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) prefers to 
define piracy or ‘modern piracy’ broadly to include ‘all acts of robbery, seizure of 
cargo, and seizure of vessels in ports and harbours, territorial waters, exclusive 
economic waters, and on the high seas’ for the benefit of Japan’s policy-makers.306 
The flourishing of piracy attacks, particularly in Southeast Asia, on transiting ships in 
the early twenty-first century was considered a serious problem to Japan as one of the 
major maritime nations that have tremendous interest in the Straits. According to 
Valencia, between 1994 and 2005 about 140 Japanese ships were attacked in the 
Straits.
307
 Bradford also reveals that there were 125 piracy attacks on ships related to 
Japan between 1998 and 2003.
308
 Furthermore, according to the Nippon Foundation, 
Japan’s estimated economic loss due to the piracy incidents is USD 10 to USD 15 
million per year.  
  
                                               
305  Art 43 is the basis for ‘Cooperative Mechanism’ between the users and coastal states on safety 
of navigation and environmental protection including for burden-sharing purposes. 
306  Takai Susumu, ‘Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of Navy’ NIDS Security Reports, 
no.4, NIDS, Tokyo, March 2003, 38-58;  John F Bradford, ‘ Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in 
Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Response [2004] 26, no.3  
Contemporary Southeast Asia ,480-505, 482; 
307  MJ Valencia ‘Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Similarities, Differences and their 
Implications’ in D Johnson and M Valencia Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and 
Responses (ISEAS, Singapore 2005)106. 
308  Bradford (2004) 483; the term ‘ships related to Japan’ includes those registered under Japanese 
Law, owned by Japanese Companies, or manned by Japanese crews. 
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 Among the high-profile attacks on Japanese ships that drew the attention of the 
international community to the alarming incidents of piracy in the Straits were the 
attacks on the Nagasaki Spirit in 1992, the Tenyu in 1998, the Global Mars in 2000 
and the Arbey Jaya
309
 in 2001, as well as the most well-known incident, the hijacking 
of the Alondra Rainbow in 1999. The pirate attack on the crude oil carrier Nagasaki 
Spirit caused a collision with the container vessel Ocean Blessing, which set alight 
100,000 tons of Japan-bound petroleum at the northern entrance to the Straits.  It was 
speculated that the collision was due to the inability of the Nagasaki Spirit’s master 
and crew to control the ship following the pirates’ attack on their ship.310 This caused 
an environmental disaster in the Straits. Meanwhile, the hijacking of the merchant 
vessel Alondra Rainbow, which was loaded with 7000 tonnes of aluminium ingots, 
after it had left the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjong for the port of Miike, Japan, on 
22 October 1999, has illustrated the importance of cooperation between the shipping 
industry and the coastal states’ authorities.311 The crew members had been set adrift 
on a life raft in the Bay of Bengal and were found later by Thai fisherman.  The 
hijacked ship was repainted as the Mega Rama and was first seen by MV Al Shuhaada 
after its hijacking was reported and broadcast. After two months, it was finally 
captured by an Indian naval vessel, the INS Prahar, in the Indian Ocean with fifteen 
                                               
309  The incident occurred on April 25 during which three Japanese crew members went missing: T 
Susumu, ‘Suppression of Modern Piracy and the Role of Navy’ NIDS Security reports, No.4 
(March 2003) 38-58 at page 42  
http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2002_2.pdf accessed on 12 April 
2012. 
310  Brian Fort ‘Transnational Threats and the Maritime Domain’ in GG Ong-Webb (ed.) Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (ISEAS Singapore 2006) 34; Bradford 
(2004) 486. 
311  Lindsay Black ‘Navigating the boundaries of the interstate society: Japan’s response to piracy in 
Southeast Asia’ in Glenn D.Hook (ed.) Decoding Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The 
Koizumi Administration and Beyond (Routledge, Oxon 2011)  79. 
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Indonesian pirates on board.
312
 Since India has no specific Piracy Act, all the pirates 
were punished under the Indian Penal Code. The violence of piracy was also 
illustrated by the attack on the Tenyu in 1998, a year before the hijacking of the 
Alondra Rainbow. The Tenyu was a Japanese-owned and Korean-manned vessel. In 
this incident, the whole crew disappeared and it is suspected that they were all 
murdered.
313
 
 
Thus, for Japan, whose maritime trade is largely dependent on the Straits waterway, 
threats to the safety and security of the Straits cannot be tolerated.
314
 Similar to the 
initiative in managing the safety of navigation through MSC, Japan also supports the 
need to ensure the maritime security of the Straits with regard to piracy and terrorism. 
In fact, Japan has convened several international and regional conferences on 
combating piracy and armed robbery against ships including the ‘International 
Conference for the Control of Piracy’ calling for regional cooperation to suppress 
piracy, ‘International Conference of All Maritime-Related Concerns, both 
Governmental and Private, on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ 
held from March 28 to 30, 2000, and ‘Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000: Regional 
Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’ held from April 
27 to 29, 2000. It was during the International Conference in March 2000 that the 
‘Tokyo Appeal’ was issued; this emphasised Japan’s concern over the security 
                                               
312   --New Straits Times, 29 November 1999; J Abhyankar ‘Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at 
Sea’ in Swati Parashar (ed.) Maritime Counter-Terrorism: A Pan-Asian Perspective (Pearson, 
Longman New Delhi 2008) 175; Lindsay Black ‘Navigating the boundaries of the interstate 
society: Japan’s response to piracy in Southeast Asia in Glenn D.Hook (ed.) Decoding 
Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The Koizumi Administration and Beyond (Routledge, Oxon 
2011)  79. 
313  J Abhyankar ‘Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at sea’ in GG Ong-Webb Piracy, Maritime 
Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (ISEAS, Singapore 2006) 4-5. 
314  Japan imports approximately 99 per cent of its petroleum and 70 per cent of its food by sea. The 
Straits of Malacca alone carry 80 per cent of Japan’s petroleum imports: Bradford (2004) 485. 
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problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships which it believed could only be 
tackled by cooperative measures.
315
 Japan’s effort has not stopped there. Following 
these conferences, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Nippon Foundation organised 
a series of Expert Meetings to meet the goal of combating piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in Tokyo, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Manila between 2000 and 
2003.
316
 In November 2001, during the ASEAN-plus Three Summit (APT) in Brunei, 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi conveyed the idea of setting up the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).    
 
i. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
This instrument is the first multilateral agreement of its kind and has three basic 
elements, namely Information-Sharing between the contracting states, Capacity-
Building and Cooperative Arrangements. The Information-Sharing Centre (ISC) has 
been formed as a platform for exchange of information among the contracting parties 
of ReCAAP. Singapore has been chosen as the centre for this purpose.
317
 According to 
its preamble, the ReCAAP aims to ‘significantly contribute towards the prevention 
and suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.’318 It embraces the 
                                               
315  See Appendix for the full text of the Tokyo Appeal. 
316  Valencia (2005) 106-107. 
317  Art 4 of ReCAAP creates an information Sharing Center (ISC) which is located in Singapore. 
Recently, Singapore has renewed its commitment to host the ReCAAP ISC for another five 
years: TN Shamsiah, ‘Singapore to Host ReCAAP ISC for another Five Years’ Bernama.com 
March 07, 2012 at http://maritime.bernama.com/printable.php?id=650518 accessed on 4 April 
2012. 
318  ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/About%20ReCAAP%20ISC/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf  
accessed on  12 April 2012. 
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definition of piracy provided in the 1982 Convention and definition of armed robbery 
against ships as entailed in the IMO’s Code of Practice for the Investigation of Armed 
Robbery against ships.
319
 Article 3 clause 1 of the ReCAAP lays down the general 
obligations of the contracting parties as follows:  
1. Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with its national laws and 
regulations and applicable rules of international law, make every effort 
to take effective measures in respect of the following: 
a) to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; 
b)  to arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery 
against ships; 
c) to seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed 
robbery against ships, to seize ships taken by and under the 
control of pirates or persons who have committed armed 
robbery against ships, and to seize the property on board such 
ships; and 
d) to rescue victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery 
against ships. 
  
Against this backdrop, the ReCAAP ISC lays out its functions, the basic framework of 
which focuses on information-sharing which provides alerts against imminent threats 
of piracy and armed robbery. 
320
 It also provides statistics and reports based on the 
information gathered. The focal point that needs to be established by each state party 
will encourage smooth coordination between states’ agencies, be they navy, 
coastguard agency or marine police.
321
 Ho notes several roles of a focal point which 
include the following:
322
 
1. managing the piracy and armed robbery incidents within 
its territorial waters; 
2. acting as a point of information exchange with the ISC; 
                                               
319  Art 1 of the ReCAAP. (See Appendix for full text). 
320  Art 7 of ReCAAP: the ISC serves as an information exchange platform, and collects and 
analyses information transmitted by the contracting states. 
321  Art 9 of the ReCAAP requires the contracting states to designate national focal points 
responsible for the communication with the ISC. 
322  Joshua Ho, ‘Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: Boosting ReCAAP’s Role’ 69 
(2008) RSIS Commentaries 2. 
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3. facilitating its country’s law enforcement for piracy and 
armed robbery with neighbouring focal points. 
 
If any incidents are reported to any of the focal points and the ISC, the Information 
Network System will help an affected state to respond to the report and suppress 
piracy in a timely manner. ReCAAP also generates capacity-building that promotes 
the sharing of best practices among the contracting parties through training and 
workshops. It also encourages the mutual cooperation of government and non-
government bodies, which has a direct or indirect impact on the menace of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. Article 10 provides that the contracting parties may 
request other contracting parties to cooperate in detecting persons who have 
committed acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships and, finally, they may be 
extradited to the countries that have jurisdiction to prosecute them as stipulated in 
Article 12.  It clearly shows respect for and non-interference with a state’s 
jurisdiction.
323
 Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that ReCAAP does not extend to 
providing enforcement mechanisms, nor does it envisage coordinated or joint patrols 
among contracting countries. 
324
 Thus, it might be concluded that ReCAAP is a good 
instrument for formalising cooperation and coordination among the contracting states, 
but it still needs robust support from the states to enforce the law at their national 
levels in order to effectively combat piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
 
 
 
                                               
323  Art 2(5) ReCAAP; See also Robin Geis and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: 
The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (OUP, 
Oxford 2011) 46-47. 
324  JF Bradford ‘Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Response’ 26 [2004] Contemporary Southeast Asia, 480-505,492. 
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ii. The Effect of Non-Ratification of Malaysia and Indonesia to ReCAAP 
ReCAAP was agreed by sixteen countries in 2004, open for signature on 28 February 
2005 and came into force on 4 September 2006.
325
 ReCAAP ISC was formally 
recognised as an International Organisation on 30 January 2007.
326
 Until recently, 
seventeen Asian countries had signed the agreement. Unfortunately, Malaysia and 
Indonesia remain signatories that have yet to ratify the ReCAAP.
327
 The hesitation of 
Malaysia and Indonesia to ratify the ReCAAP agreement has been seen as the main 
obstacle to the highest degree of information-sharing to suppress the problem of 
piracy.
328
 This is due to the fact that the increasing number of incidents of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships during that time had mostly taken place in the territorial 
waters of both states and the straits used for international navigation such as the Straits 
of Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Makassar. Failure to share the information on piracy 
attacks in such areas would be detrimental to the main purpose of ReCAAP or would 
at least limit its effectiveness.
329
 According to Storey, the concerns over sovereignty 
have been a strong impediment to these two states joining the ReCAAP.
330
 On the 
other hand, Ho has pointed out that, although Malaysia and Indonesia have not yet 
ratified the ReCAAP agreement, the willingness of the maritime agencies of both 
                                               
325  ReCAAP was officially launched in Singapore on 29 December 2006; Ramli Hj Nik and 
Sumathy Permal ‘Security Threats in the Straits of Malacca’ in HM Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar 
Husin Profile of the Straits of Malacca (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, 2008)197; ReCAAP fact sheet. 
326  ReCAAP Press Release. 
327  The seventeen Contracting Parties are: the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei 
Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam. 
328  Joshua Ho ‘Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia’ the ReCAAP Information-Sharing 
Centre, Marine Policy 33(2009)432-434 
329  Yoichiro Sato ‘Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation, Asia 
Pacific Center for Security Studies September 2007 
330  Ian Storey ‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation’ in 
Daljit Singh (ed.) Southeast Asian Affairs 2009 (ISEAS, Singapore 2009) 42. 
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states, namely the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and the 
Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board (BAKORKAMLA), to cooperate in 
sharing information with ISC will help to bridge the gap.
331
 Indeed, both states, 
although they have not yet ratified the ReCAAP Agreement, have agreed to cooperate 
at the highest level.
332
 A recent instance of their open-ended cooperation was the 
information-sharing and cooperative action between MMEA and ISC and other focal 
points that led to the recovery of a missing Singapore-flagged barge, Callista, and a 
tug, Asta, on 6 February 2010.
333
 During this incident, the shipping agent reported to 
the ReCAAP Focal Point in Singapore that they had been attacked and hijacked by 
armed pirates while underway north of Tioman Island, Malaysia. Upon receipt of the 
information about the incident, the ReCAAP ISC immediately alerted all its focal 
points, the MMEA, the Indonesia authorities and the shipping community. They were 
advised to exercise vigilance and report sightings of the missing vessels to the nearest 
coastal states, and law enforcement agencies were encouraged to step up surveillance 
and inform their relevant authorities to look out for the missing vessels should they 
arrive at their ports. On 17 February the barge was located and recovered off Tioman 
Island. Eleven crew members were found in a life raft and rescued by the Royal 
Malaysian Navy. Then, on 25 February 2010, the tug boat was located by the 
Philippines Coast guard with seven suspected pirates onboard.
334
Such incidents have 
                                               
331  ibid. 
332  Batam Meeting of the foreign ministers of the three littoral states in August 2005; Joshua Ho. 
‘Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: Boosting ReCAAP’s Role’ 69 (2008) RSIS 
Commentaries 2. 
333  ReCAAP ISC Special report of the hijacking of Tug Boat Asta and Barge,Callista (March-June 
2011) see: 
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Reports/Special%20Report%2029%20Jun%2011.pdf  
accessed on 12 April 2012. 
334  ReCAAP ISC Special report on Hijacked/Missing Tug Boats and Barges in Asia (March-June 
2011) 5-6; ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report (1 January-30 June 2010) 
Second Quarter 2010, page 26. 
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illustrated the successful regional cooperation between the ReCAAP ISC and the non-
contracting party, Malaysia. It is submitted that, although it is well agreed that 
Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s formal ratification of ReCAAP would definitely 
strengthen its objective to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships in the 
region, it appears that what is more important is the cooperation and awareness of one 
particular state on any issue at hand. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
Piracy, as a never-ending problem for the world’s maritime trade at large, has 
attracted the attention not only of scholars, commentators and the media, who are 
always arguing about the adequacy of legal framework and international regulations 
as prescribed in the 1982 Convention and other international instruments, but also of 
the real players among the stakeholders, especially the maritime nations. For the latter, 
what is important is the proactive role in tackling the issue at hand. It does not matter 
whether an attack on a ship is legally defined as piracy under international law or 
simply armed robbery, which can occur in a port or territorial sea of a state, since 
criminals have never respected legal boundaries. Thus, this chapter has scrutinised the 
extent to which the states at regional level are overcoming the problem through their 
regional security initiatives and their responses to extra-regional initiatives. 
Considering the importance of the Straits to the world’s maritime trade, the hands-on 
cooperative action by the littoral states together with the stakeholders, state users, and 
international and regional organisations is crucial. The debate about the role of 
regional institutions such as ASEAN and ARF in managing security in the region is 
also controversial since many of the regional conflicts are not dealt with through these 
203 
 
institutions. As Goh usefully assumed, the states in the region do not tend to treat 
these institutions as a medium for resolving security problems but instead rely on 
bilateral efforts.
335
   Notwithstanding the sceptical views on the efficacy of ASEAN 
and ARF forums in facilitating cooperation among the Southeast Asian states, this 
medium is believed to be ‘the most important governmental forum for multilateral 
security dialogue and cooperation in the Asian Pacific.’336 It may be true that, in spite 
of the ASEAN dialogue and workshops that have taken place since the early 1990s, 
not much has been achieved in terms of regional cooperation to combat cross-border 
crimes such as piracy; however, the regular meetings have turned out to be a medium 
for boosting awareness and a sense of responsibility in the participating states on the 
importance of maintaining safety and security in the region. In fact, their functions 
should not be analyzed in isolation, but simultaneously with the security efforts that 
have been pursued by the regional states. 
 
As far as the Straits of Malacca is concerned, after examining the cause and effect of 
the threat of piracy in the Straits and the trend of the attacks in an earlier chapter, it 
may be suggested that, apart from the formal legal framework at international and 
domestic levels, the cooperative efforts between states in the region and stakeholders 
have proved to be one of the most effective ways of combating piracy and armed 
robbery in the Straits. This may be achieved when all stakeholders disregard 
contrasting perceptions of their internal issues for the betterment of the safety and 
security of the Straits.
337
 Furthermore, after a period of almost twenty years, reports 
show that the declining number of piracy attacks in recent years is the outcome of 
                                               
335  Goh (2008) 117. 
336  ibid. 
337  ibid. 
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bilateral and trilateral cooperation and strategies among the coastal states of the 
Straits, particularly in the MSP.
338
  The success of the cooperative action undertaken 
by the littoral states has been highlighted by Mukundan, the director of IMB as 
follows: 
“In addition to gathering statistics, the report also indicates the 
efficiency of law enforcement in combating piracy. Our 
findings indicate that actions taken by law enforcement 
agencies, notably in the Malacca Straits and India, have made a 
major contribution to keeping these figures down. Co-operation 
between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is now better than 
ever before and has played a key role.” 339 
 
This in fact contradicts the argument that the regional states are too reliant on the 
extra-regional powers.
340
 Yet, it is undeniable that the help of extra-regional states 
such as the US and Japan has also contributed to this success. From the above 
discussion, it appears that Japan’s counter-piracy initiatives have received great 
support from the Asian states as compared to the US initiatives. According to 
Valencia, Japan’s initiatives in aiding indigenous efforts have had some successes. For 
example, the Indonesian government accepted Japanese technical and financial 
assistance to create its coastguard service.
341
 It may be submitted that the littoral states 
are more ready to accept material and technical assistance from these states to help 
them improve their capacity-building rather than deploy foreign naval vessels or 
coastguards within or near their territorial areas. For them, especially Malaysia and 
                                               
338  TR Shie, ‘Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-ASEAN 
Cooperation’ in GG Ong-Webb Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 
(Singapore, ISEAS 2006) 171. 
339  See IMB-ICC, 02 May 2006  ‘IMB Releases Latest Piracy Statistics’ at  www.icc-
ccs.org/news/425-imb-releases-latest-piracy-statistics. accessed on  November 12, 2011. 
340  Shie (2006) 166. 
341  Valencia (2005) 107. 
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Indonesia, the sovereignty issue must be respected by other countries since they are 
still capable of maintaining safety and security in the Straits. 
 CHAPTER 6 
THE MALAYSIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON  
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA 
 
The increasing challenges of transnational maritime crime in the globalised and 
interconnected nature of the world today demand comprehensive and effective 
security measures in the form of international and regional instruments. Ultimately, 
however, individual states will bear the burden and responsibility of coping effectively 
with this issue. While chapter five discussed regional, trilateral and bilateral maritime 
security arrangements and strategy in the Straits in detail, this chapter specifically 
examines the Malaysian legal framework in response to transnational maritime crime, 
particularly piracy and armed robbery against ships. The first part of this chapter 
provides an historical overview and background of the Malaysian legal system. In 
addition, since Malaysia is also a party to the 1982 Convention and other maritime-
related treaties, this chapter will discuss the pertinent legal issues within the wider 
context of ocean governance in Malaysia. Following this, the implications of the 
establishment of a new enforcement agency, namely MMEA, to govern Malaysia’s 
maritime sector is discussed. This study of the law governing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery in Malaysia will be completed using examples of the incident of attack in the 
Straits and finally the analysis of the Bunga Laurel’s incident that become Malaysia 
first case on high seas piracy. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia is arguably a maritime nation as ninety per cent of its trade is seaborne.
1
 It 
has a vast area of maritime space with approximately 148,307 square kilometres of 
territorial sea area, 589,450 square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
4,490 kilometres of coastline.
2
 Its geographical peculiarity which encompasses the 
South China Sea in between Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak as well as 
its strategic location along the Straits of Malacca has indirectly defined the importance 
of the sea, particularly to the Malaysian economy. In fact, most of Malaysia’s major 
ports are situated in the Straits themselves. In 2008, Port Klang, one of Malaysia’s 
best-known ports, was the fifteenth largest container port in the world.
3
  
 
The Straits is undeniably important, not only for the shipping industry but also for 
other economic concerns such as the livelihoods provided by the fishery industry and 
the tourism industry. Realising the steady increase in the Straits’ importance as strait 
used for international navigation and its contribution to the local industries, Malaysia 
is strongly committed to ensuring the safety and security of this strategic sea lane of 
communication (SLOC). It had spent more than RM200 million in a ten-year period 
                                               
1  Juita Ramli, A New Maritime Legal Regime for Malaysia within the Context of Ocean 
Governance, a paper  presented at MIMA National Conference on Ocean Governance in 
Conjunction with the Year of Ocean, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 16-17 June 1998, MIMA 
p.10; Zulkifli Abu Bakar ‘Enhancing Maritime Security-Law Enforcement in Malaysia’ paper 
presented during 24th Asia-Pacific Round Table, Kuala Lumpur, 7-9 June 2010; Cf. Singapore 
Ministry of Defence Pointer Journal 2007 v33l: Eighty per cent of Malaysian trade passes 
through the Straits of Malacca. See www.mindef.gov.sg/ accessed on 11 July 2011. 
2  J.N Mak, Maritime Security and Ocean Governance: A Study in Comprehensive Security. A 
paper presented at National Conference on Ocean Governance in Conjunction with the year of 
the Ocean 1998 at MIMA, 1998, 2. 
3  Joshua Ho ‘Cooperative Mechanisms in the Malacca Straits’ in Realising Safe and Secure Seas 
for All: International Maritime Security Conference 2009 (Select Publishing Singapore 2009) 
167. 
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(1990-2000) for the purpose of installing and maintaining navigational and security-
related facilities in the Straits. Any threat of disruption to the Straits’ traffic and  the 
surrounding area which might be caused by maritime trans-border crimes such as 
piracy and armed robbery, the potential organised crime of terrorism as well as the 
risk of environmental degradation caused by collisions between ships and oil spills, 
would have a devastating impact, particularly on Malaysia and the other littoral states. 
The risk is real and proximate to the littoral states.
4
  As a result, the task of protecting 
the Straits has been prioritised, and this has constantly challenged the effectiveness of 
Malaysian policy, regulations and legal framework.  
 
6.2 MALAYSIAN MARITIME LEGAL REGIME: AN OVERVIEW 
6.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
5
 
In the ninth century C.E, maritime trading between the Southeast Asian neighbour 
countries, including India, China, Japan and Arab countries was already in existence.
6
 
Commodities such as ceramics, gold, iron pots, lead, and silken textiles were imported 
by these foreign traders in exchange for local items such as cotton, pearls, clothes and 
others. Since maritime travel and trade became the lifeline of people throughout the 
continent, it contributed towards the flourishing of Malacca and its empire which was 
situated along the Straits of Malacca. Most importantly, Malacca became one of the 
greatest emporiums of the early fifteen century. It was thought necessary to introduce 
specific laws governing maritime affairs between the traders due to the increasing 
                                               
4   The incident of MT Nagasaki Spirit  on 20 September 1992 (BT Shipping Times, October 2, 
1992). 
5  Cross-refer to Chapter Two. 
6  Eusebio Z.Dizon ‘Underwater/ maritime Archaeology in Southeast Asia’ in Southeast Asia: A 
historical encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East.. 1361-1364;’ similarities were found among 
archaeological artifacts and features in Southeast Asian countries suggesting contact among 
peoples within the region.’ 1361. 
209 
 
volumes of foreign ships from various places arriving at the port of Malacca to take 
advantage of its prosperity. Thus, a set of laws governing maritime affairs among the 
local and foreign traders were set up alongside laws on adat (local culture) and 
religious belief. 
 
It is interesting to note that, as early as 1276, the Malacca Sultanate, which was the 
sovereign power in the Malay archipelagos, had already established a set of maritime 
laws known as ‘Undang-Undang Laut Melaka’ or the Malacca Maritime Code.7  This 
Code formed one of the six parts of the ‘Undang-Undang Melaka’ or the Laws of 
Malacca.
8
 Meanwhile, Borham stated that the laws of Malacca were divided into two 
parts: the Undang-Undang Melaka and Undang-Undang Laut Melaka. These laws had 
been drafted during the reign of Sultan Mahmud Syah.
9
 Later, they were amalgamated 
with other Malay rules and regulations to form ‘Undang-Undang Melaka’. Windstedt 
translates Undang-Undang Laut Melaka as ‘the Maritime Laws of Malacca’. This set 
of laws provides and describes laws and regulations for the safety of a ship at sea. The 
existence of such laws clearly demonstrates the importance of having established and 
well-administered laws, especially in maritime affairs where people from different 
                                               
7  This Code was found and translated by Sir Stamford Raffles in The Maritime Institutions of the 
Malays, translated from the Malayu Language which was published in 1820, pp. 130-158. See 
also Tunku Sofia Jewa Public International Law: A Malaysian Perspective, Vol II Pacifica 
Publications, 1996 Kuala Lumpur 885-913. 
8  Also known as ‘Malacca Code’: Juita Ramli ‘A New Maritime Legal Regime for Malaysia 
within the Context of Ocean Governance’ paper presented at the MIMA National Conference on 
Ocean Governance in conjunction with The Year of the Ocean, MIMA, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 16-17 June 1998; The term Undang-Undang Melaka has fourteen different names: 
Liaw Yock Fang, ‘Naskah Undang-Undang Melaka: Suatu Tinjauan’ Sari 25 (2007) 85-94. 
9   Badriyah Hj Salleh, ‘Undang-Undang Laut Melaka/ Malacca Maritime Code’ in Ooi Keat Gin 
(2004) eds. Southeast Asia: A historical encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor (1360-
1361) Santa Barbara: California.  cf.  Liaw Liaw Yock Fang ‘Naskah Undang-Undang Melaka, 
SARI 25 (2007) 85-94, 86. The original text of The Laws of Malacca were the Royal rules 
during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Syah (1422-144), later improved by Sultan Muzaffar 
Syah (1445-1458).  
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parts of the world are commuting and communicating with one another to create 
economic relationships. 
 
Although, at that time, there were no specific laws dealing with the crime of piracy or 
armed robbery at sea, these laws covered a range of maritime affairs and security 
including laws on crime committed on board junks or prahu.
10
 As discussed in earlier 
chapters,
11
 the openness concept of free trade that had been practised in the Straits of 
Malacca became the main factor contributing towards the triumph of the ports located 
along the Straits. However, the thriving of the Malay states was disrupted with the 
coming of the Portuguese who invaded the city of Malacca in 1511.  Wood suggests 
that the reason behind the Portuguese occupation was the desire to control the Straits 
of Malacca, the location of which was very strategic as the centre for trade throughout 
the Southeast Asian region.
12
 They built a gigantic fort to defend Malacca from any 
threat posed by their enemies, especially the attacks by the ex-ruler of Malacca who 
tried to repossess Malacca. This clearly demonstrated the courage of the Portuguese in 
their determination to stay and rule Malacca. The high taxes imposed on traders using 
the Straits of Malacca along with religious intolerance caused the foreign traders to 
flee to other ports such as Acheh. In 1641, the Dutch, in collaboration with the ex-
ruler of Malacca in Johor, seized control of Malacca.
13
 Nonetheless, their occupation 
of Malacca and the Malay Peninsula was generally accepted. This was due to their 
tolerance of the traditional culture and the religion of the local people, which had been 
                                               
10  Prahu is a Malay term referring to a vessel. TS Jewa,  Public International Law: A Malaysian 
Perspective, Vol II (Pacifica Publications, 1996 Kuala Lumpur) 885-913. 
11  Cross-refer to Chapter 1 and 2. 
12  AJ Wood ‘History and Movement of Peoples: Early Malay States and the First European 
Intervention’ in Marshall Cavendish Corp. Eds.World and Its Peoples: Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Brunei (Marshall Cavendish Corporation, New York 2008) 1176-1177. 
13  ibid. 
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ignored during the Portuguese rule. However, Dutch power gradually declined during 
the Napoleonic Wars in Europe (1793-1815).  
 
Meanwhile in the late seventeenth century, the British, who had been expanding their 
trading company known as the East India Company (EIC) in Bencoolen, Sumatra, 
slowly increased their influence in the Malay Peninsula, initially occupying Penang. 
This area is an island situated off the north coast of the Peninsula and the Straits of 
Malacca. It was claimed that the island of Penang had been ceded in 1786 by the 
Sultan of Kedah as a result of the treaty between this local ruler and Captain Francis 
Light.
14
  
In Fatimah v Logan
15
 Judge Hackett stated the following: 
‘In 1786, Penang, being then a desert and uncultivated island, 
uninhabited except by a few itinerant fishermen, and without any fixed 
institution, was ceded by the Rajah of Quedah to Captain Light, an 
Officer of the E.I. Co., for and on behalf of the Company. On the 
occasion of taking possession of the Island, Captain Light published the 
following proclamation.  
PROCLAMATION 
These are to certify that, agreeable to my orders and instructions from 
the Hon’ble the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, I have this 
day taken possession of this Island called Pooloo Penang, now named 
the Prince of Wales’ Island, and hoisted the British Colours in the name 
of His Majesty George the Third, and for the use of the Hon’ble English 
East India Company this 11
th
 day of August, 1786, being the eve of the 
Prince of Wales’ birthday. 
     In the presence of the underwritten, 
              FRANCIS LIGHT.’16 
 
One of the issues discussed before the court in the case of Fatimah v Logan was very 
important for determining what laws should be applied in Penang. If it was the case 
                                               
14  An Introduction to the Study of the Law Administered in the Colony of the Straits Settlements 
[1974] 16 MLR 4-51, 4. 
15  Per Hackett, J. 258 in Fatima v Logan 1 KY. 255 
16  Fatimah v Logan  I KY 255, per Hackett J, 258. 
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that this island had been ceded to the British EIC while it was uninhabited and 
uncultivated, English law would be the law of the land. Furthermore, the British EIC 
settled the island until the population had increased.
17
 In fact, the introduction of the 
1807 Charter of Justice in Penang apparently strengthens the claim that English law 
had been applied in the Island of Penang formally. 
 
In 1795, the British occupation of the Malay Peninsula then spread to the state, 
famous during the fifteenth century, that had lent its name to these globally important 
straits, namely the state of Malacca. They occupied Malacca for several years before it 
was returned to the Dutch in 1801.
18
 Meanwhile, the British strengthened their 
position at the southern entrance to the Straits. Thus, to that end Sir Stamford Raffles 
reached an agreement in 1819 with the local ruler to make Singapore as Britain’s 
trading station. The development of Singapore was very successful as it was 
transformed from a small fishing village into an affluent trading town and popular 
port.
19
 Complete British control over Singapore and Malacca and some other Malay 
states was achieved in 1824 through a treaty with the local ruler (Sultan of Johor) and 
the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of the same year. The latter 1824 Treaty divided the Malay 
Archipelago area into two parts. The British were given control over the Malay 
Peninsula while the Dutch were in control of the Indonesian archipelago.   
 
It is thus important to understand the historical background and the influence of the 
colonial powers on the Malaysian legal system. Furthermore, the effect of 
                                               
17  ibid. 258. 
18  Wu Min Aun, The Malaysian Legal System, (2nd edn Longman, Kuala Lumpur1990) 7. 
19  An introduction to the study of the law administered in the colony of the Straits Settlements, 
[1974] 16 MLR 4-51, 12. 
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colonization that began from the sea along the Straits has influenced legal decisions 
and policies of the government of Malaysia to this day in all matters, especially the 
issue of security in the Straits. 
 
6.2.2 EARLY RECEPTION OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
MALAYSIAN LAW 
The Western exploration and exploitation followed by the colonization in Southeast 
Asia directly and indirectly affected and changed the Malay traditional law and 
administration.  In fact, Malaysian historians believe that the Malaysian legal system 
has been shaped by the English legal system through the residency system which was 
introduced by British. The first statutory reception of English law in the Straits 
Settlement was the Royal Charter of Justice of 1807 which established ‘The Court of 
Judicature of Prince of Wales’ Island (which Penang was known as at that time). This 
1807 Charter and the later 1826 Charter (in Malacca) and 1855 Charter introduced 
English law and the court system, wherever it was suitable for the local circumstances. 
When colonial law contradicted local custom, this custom would be referred to. 
However, Aun asserted that, although English law was formally applied in the Straits 
Settlement, in practice it was very difficult to implement, in view of the cultural and 
religious background of the local people. The English-trained administrators and 
magistrates had totally different approaches to administering justice over local cases.
20
 
In 1868 the Civil Law Ordinance replaced the previous Charter of Justice but still left 
the Malay customary law and Islamic law to be practised. In the case of Ong Cheng 
Neo v Yap Kwan Seng
21
, English law was only recognised in the Malay Courts ‘in so 
                                               
20  Wu Min Aun, The Malaysian Legal System, (2nd edn Longman, Kuala Lumpur1990) 7.  
21  (1897) 1 SSLR Suppl p.3. 
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far as it has been adopted.’ The English law had to be applied only when there was a 
lacuna in the local law. Although the English administrators appeared to have been 
given ample scope to practise the local customary law alongside the English legal 
system, many English law models including those used by the British in the East India 
Company, such as the 1902 Criminal Procedure Code and the 1905 Penal Code, were 
applied directly without consideration of local law and custom. Lord Dunedin, in the 
Privy Council case of Haji Abdul Rahman v Mohamed Hassan
22
, opined that: 
‘The learned judges...have been too much swayed by the doctrines of 
English equity, and not paid sufficient attention to the fact that they 
were dealing with a totally different land law...’23 
 
Despite such statement of Lord Dunedin, the English legal system continued to 
embrace and shape the legal system in the Malay States. A year before the Malay 
States were granted independence from the British administration,
24
 the Civil Law 
Ordinance 1956 was introduced in place of the earlier Ordinance.  In 1963, the 
Federation of Malay States including Singapore changed its name to ‘Malaysia’ in 
order to symbolise the unity of multicultural races.
25
 Nine years after this, the English 
law was still being recognised, with the Civil Law Act 1956 (revised 1972) replacing 
the 1956 Ordinance. Most of the laws, such as the Rubber Shipping and Packing 
Control Ordinance 1949, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1950, Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance 1952, Federation Light Dues Act 1953, Penang Port Commission Act 
                                               
22  (1917) AC 216. 
23   1917) AC 216; read the discussion put forward by Wu Min Aun (1999) 22-25. 
24  Cross refer to Chapter 1 and 2. 
25  Wu Min Aun (1999) 25. 
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1955, and the Port Authorities Act 1963, which were actually taken from the British 
legislation, are still in use to this day with a few amendments or none at all.
26
  
 
6.2.3 THE RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MALAYSIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
Generally most of the countries which were previously under the colonial rule of the 
British, follow the common law system. Normally, they apply a dualist theory for the 
application of international law in their national legal system.
27
 As opposed to the 
monism, the theory of dualism, does not automatically transform international law to 
become part of the national legal system.
28
 The dualist approach considers 
international law and national law as two separate legal systems. Thus, the 
international law will become part and parcel of the national law only after it is 
formally adopted into the national legislation. 
 
According to Hamid, the reception of international law in Malaysia may be classified 
into two; namely the reception of international treaties and the reception of the 
customary international law.
29
 He argued that the Malaysian Federal Constitution has 
explicitly vested in Parliament the power to implement treaties as stated in Article 
74(1):
30
 
                                               
26  Juita Ramli, ‘A new Maritime Legal Regime for Malaysia within the Context of Ocean 
Governance’ paper presented at the MIMA National Conference on Ocean Governance in 
conjunction with the Year of the Ocean, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 16-17 
June 1998, 3-4. 
27  H Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th edn, vol.1, Peace (Longman, London 
1955) 37;  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (6th edn OUP, Oxford 2003) 
53. 
28  ibid. 
29  AG Hamid, Public International Law(3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Petaling Jaya 2011) 62. 
30  ibid. 
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Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the ‘Federal List’ or the ‘Concurrent List.31’ The 
‘Federal List’ in the Ninth Schedule includes: 
1. External Affairs, including- 
(a) Treaties, agreements and conventions with other 
countries and all matters which bring the Federation 
into relations with other countries; 
(b) Implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions 
with other countries;...
32
 
 
Also in the Article 76(1), which provides exceptional power of the Parliament to make 
law in certain circumstances, namely ‘...for the purpose of implementing any treaty, 
etc between the Federation and any foreign country.’33 In the case of Kelantan v 
Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al Haj,
34
 the High Court 
affirmed that, it is the exclusive power of the executive in the federal government to 
make law in respect of external or foreign affairs.  Therefore it may be concluded that 
the Parliament is responsible to implement international treaties by enacting or 
domesticating such treaties within the national legal framework. In other words the 
general rule is that ‘[a] treaty to be operative in Malaysia, therefore, needs legislation 
by Parliament.’35 This is also called as the ‘doctrine of transformation’ which mainly 
used the dualist approach. However, it is noteworthy that it may be a situation where a 
treaty may be implemented locally without formal reception, such as the treaty for 
cultural exchange between neighbouring states.
36
  
                                               
31  Federal Constitution of  Malaysia. 
32  ibid. 
33  Art 76(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
34  [1963] MLJ 355 (Federation of Malaya High Court). 
35  Hamid (2011) 63. 
36  ibid. Heliliah Yusof, ‘Internal Application of International Law and Singapore’ (1969)1 
Singapore Law Review, 62-71,65. 
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As regard to the reception of customary international law in Malaysia, Hamid views 
that, the practice were inconsistent. Although during pre-independence period, there 
was several practice of directly adopting customary international law as part of the 
law of the land without enacting the national statute as decided in the law cases,
37
 the 
situation of the post-independence period incline towards the ‘doctrine of 
transformation.’38 In the case of PP v Narogne Sookpavit,39 the Thai fishermen were 
arrested within three miles
40
 of the Malaysian coast and charged under section 11(1) 
of the Malaysian Fisheries Act 196. The defence counsel argued that the respondents 
have the right of innocent passage as stated in the Article 14 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea.
41
 Such Convention was customary international 
law and therefore part and parcel of the Malaysian law.
42
 However the judge in this 
case decided that:   
Even if there was such a right of innocent passage and such right was 
in conformity with customary English law or customary international 
law as it is applied in England, the passage by the accused persons in 
the circumstances of this case could not be regarded as innocent 
passage since it contravened Malaysia domestic legislation.
43
 
 
                                               
37  See Sockalingam Chettiar v Chan Moi [1974] MLJ, Malayan Union CA, per Evans J, (judge 
referred to the Hague Regulations); Olofsen v Government of Malaysia [1966] 2 MLJ 300, OCJ 
Singapore (the court directly applied the rule of customary international law relating to the 
immunity of a sovereign state; PP v Oie Hee Koi [1968] 1MLJ, PC appeal from Malaysian 
Federal Court (the Privy Council applied customary international law on prisoners of war in the 
1949 Geneva Convention).  
38  Hamid (2011) 63. For a comprehensive discussion on the reception of international law in 
Malaysia see Hamid (2011)  at page 48-72. 
39  [1987] 2MLJ 100, HC, Johore Bahru. 
40  During that time Malaysia has not yet expanded its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. 
41   PP v Narogne Sookpavit [1987] 2MLJ 100, HC, Johore Bahru; Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law (6th edn OUP, Oxford 2003) 305. 
42  ibid. 
43  ibid. 
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It is appear from the case that despite an established rule of customary international 
law on the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, the judge has not decided the 
case accordingly. It is put forward by Hamid that, in practice the maritime 
enforcement agencies in Malaysia recognise such right. In turn, the Malaysian ships 
also have the benefit of the same when they are passing through the territorial seas of 
other states.  
 
In the case of PP v Wah Ah Jee
44
 which followed the dictum in the English case of 
Mortensen v Peters, the court also held that:   
 ‘In the court we have nothing to do with the question of whether the 
legislature has or has not done what foreign powers may consider a 
usurpation in a question with them. Neither are we a tribunal sitting to 
decide whether an Act of the Legislature is ultra vires as in 
contravention of generally acknowledged principles of International 
law. For us an Act of Parliament duly passed by Lords and Commons 
and assented to by the King, is supreme, and we are bound to give 
effect to its terms...’45 
 
It may be assumed that, the Malaysian court was reluctant to apply customary 
international law due to the latter inconsistency with the local law. For 
Malaysia, the general rule on the reception of international law is that, in the 
event of discrepancy between these two laws, the domestic law shall prevail. 
 
                                               
44  (1919) 2 FMSLR 193, 11. 
45   ibid. 
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Interestingly, on the other hand, Lord President Salleh Abas in his judgment on the 
extra-territorial jurisdiction of Malaysian Penal Code in the case of PP v Rajappan
46
 
had directly referred to the rule of customary international law and also the decision of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case.
47
 He ruled that: 
International law also recognises that a State has the power to punish 
its nationals or its permanent residents for criminal acts committed by 
them outside its territory. But to translate this principle into municipal 
law a clear provision must be made to this effect in its municipal law.
48
 
 
It is important to highlight that, although the Lord President in this case had rightly 
given consideration to the established rule of customary international law, the 
underlined statement seems to show that, similar to the reception of international 
treaties,  a ‘doctrine of transformation’ is still needed for the customary international 
law to be formally applied in the Malaysian legal system 
 
However, it is suggested that it is prudent for Malaysia to accept and directly 
incorporate an established rule of customary international law. This is because, under 
the international law principles, the rule of customary international law is binding on 
all States. Unless Malaysia can prove that it is a persistent objector to such rule.
49
 
Otherwise, Malaysia may be liable for a breach of international law and consequently 
may be responsible for damages which include restitution and compensation.
50
 
 
 
                                               
46  [1986] 1MLJ 152, Supreme Court, Kuala Lumpur , 157. 
47  Hamid (2011) 68-69. 
48   PP v Rajappan [1986] 1MLJ 152, Supreme Court, Kuala Lumpur, 157 (Emphasis added). 
49  Hamid (2011) 70. 
50  ibid. 
220 
 
6.2.4 MALAYSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
A year after its independence, Malaysia had the opportunity to join the discussion on 
the international law of the sea for the first time, during the 1958 Convention in 
Geneva, as an independent and sovereign state.
51
 Malaysia then acceded to the first 
United Nations 1958 Convention on 12 December 1960 and adopted its Continental 
Shelf Act on 28 July 1966.
52
  Malaysia responded to this development by enacting 
several national laws for its maritime zone including the Proclamation of Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance 1969 for the extension of territorial waters from three 
nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. Ten years after that, Malaysia published its new 
map which is known as Peta Baru menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan and Pelantar 
Benua Malaysia (New Map showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf 
boundaries of Malaysia) on 21 December 1979.
53
 Later, the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of 200 nautical miles was officially proclaimed on 25 April 1980 and 
incorporated into the EEZ Act in 1984. The proclamation of the legislation pertaining 
to conservation, management and development of maritime and estuarine fishing and 
fisheries was made via the Fisheries Act 1985. After a lengthy debate on the 
importance and need for Malaysia to ratify the 1982 UNCLOS, the instrument of 
ratification of the 1982 Convention was signed on 2 October 1996, and deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 14 October 1996. 
 
As a littoral state of the Straits and a state that is party to the United Nations and its 
law of the sea, Malaysia’s commitment to dealing with maritime security has steadily 
intensified. The continuing incidents of piracy and armed robbery and other threats 
                                               
51  Juita Ramli (1998) 7. 
52  Cross-refer to Chapter 2. 
53         See Appendix. 
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taking place in the region have been given due attention by all the littoral states. This 
in turn has shown the dramatic decrease in the number of incidents in the Straits. This 
example clearly explains the role of the law and its enforcement. Indeed, in order to 
ensure security at sea, Malaysia has harmonised the international law and conventions 
with the national law and regulations, including the law pertaining to the safety and 
security of the Straits. These laws have clearly been enacted in order to ensure that the 
maritime area remains secure and safe for all users and to preserve the environment 
and sustain natural resources in the face of any threat that might affect Malaysia’s 
economic wellbeing. At the same time, Malaysia has yet to become a party to a 
number of International Conventions such as the 1988 SUA Convention on coping 
effectively with the problem of piracy and any crime associated with it, including 
maritime terrorism. 
54
 
 
6.2.4.1  TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MALAYSIA 
As discussed in the second chapter, the most controversial subject that had prolonged 
negotiations on a settled international law of the sea previously was the question of 
determining the territorial sea of a state. Malaysia extended its territorial sea to 12 
nautical miles in August 1969
55
 pursuant to the 1958 Geneva Convention. The 1958 
Convention, which stipulates 12 nautical miles as the maximum extension of 
                                               
54   Interview with Mohd Helmy Ahmad, Principal Assistant Secretary, Maritime Security and 
Sovereignty Division, Prime Minister’s Department (Putrajaya, 11 November 2010). 
55  Malaysia’s Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.7 of August 1969. The original version 
of the Ordinance (no.7) stated: 3(11) It is hereby declared that the breadth of the territorial 
waters of Malaysia shall be twelve nautical miles and such breadth shall be measured in 
accordance with Arts 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 and 13 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958).cf. amended version on Ordinance No.11 1969: The breadth of 
the territorial waters of Malaysia shall be 12nm and such breadth shall, except in the Straits of 
Malacca, the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea, be measured in accordance with Arts 3,4 and 6-13 of 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 
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territorial sea of a state, was then adopted in 1982 Convention. Article 3 of the 1982 
Convention states that:  
‘Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up 
to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines 
determined in accordance with this convention.’56  
 
In the same year of the extension of territorial breadth, on 27 October 1969 Malaysia 
agreed on the delimitation of continental shelf with Indonesia which includes the 
agreement on their borders in the Straits of Malacca. Ten years after claiming 12 nm 
of territorial sea, Malaysia published its New Map or Peta Baru which defined the 
measurement of its territorial waters from the baseline of the low water mark without 
determining the exact coordination. The validity of this claim has, however, been 
challenged for its failure to comply with the rule of international law.
57
 Valencia 
pointed out several reasons for its invalidation. Firstly, Malaysia, in establishing its 
1979 New Map, has failed to provide due publicity on the inferred straight baseline. It 
is required under Articles 4 and 6 of the 1958 Convention that when a state is 
determining its maritime zone, due publicity on the baseline used should be given 
accordingly. The absence of due publicity on the baseline used to determine its new 
maritime map therefore contradicts the international law of the sea. Secondly, the 
inferred straight baseline used by Malaysia is unnecessary. Article 7 of the 1982 
Convention states the following: 
(a)  In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut 
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points 
                                               
56  Art 3, 1982 Convention. 
57  MJ Valencia, Validity of Malaysia’s Baselines and Territorial sea claim in the northern Malacca 
Strait, 27 (2003) Marine Policy 367-373. See also Image (Cayman Islands RC No.267531) and 
Sun Cruises Limited, Sun Vista Limited and Sembawang Ship Management Pte Ltd. Suit No. 76 
of 2002/w. 
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may be employed in drawing the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured. 
 
(b)The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any 
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the 
sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked 
(emphasis added) to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters.
58
 
 
Valencia argues that this article has been ‘misused’ due to the lack of a precise legal 
definition of the requirement to have ‘deeply indented and cut into’ or ‘fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’ and ‘general direction of the coast’ or 
‘closely linked’. The normal baseline should be used instead of a straight baseline 
since the islands of Malaysia, especially Pulau Jarak and Pulau Perak, are not located 
close to the coast. Furthermore, the fact that they are uninhabited islands may imply 
the non-existence of economic interest.
59
 He also highlights the recent case between 
Qatar and Bahrain on territorial and maritime delimitation issues before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) which upheld the decisions of two other ICJ cases 
previously decided.
60
 In these cases, the ‘disproportionate effect of small islands’ were 
eliminated.
61
 Thirdly, there was an inconsistency in Malaysia’s position.  In 
Malaysia’s 1979 New Map there is no clear demarcation of where the territorial 
waters of Malaysia were drawn. Valencia concludes that the Malaysian practice is to 
treat water in the landward area all the way to the coast as its territorial waters rather 
than its internal waters. Consequently, this contravenes Article 5.1 of the 1958 Geneva 
                                               
58         Emphasis added. 
59  Art 7(5) :’…[E]conomic interest to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of 
which are clearly evidenced by long usage.’ 
60  The North Sea Continental Shelf Case ICJ Reports 1969, p.36, para.57 and Continental Shelf 
Libyan Arab Jamahirya/Malta Judgment ICJ Reports 1985, p.48, para.64; Valencia (2003) 370-
371. 
61  Valencia (2003) 371. 
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Convention which requires that ‘waters on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.’62  
 
However, for Malaysia, the absence of an objective test to determine the distance or 
location of an island of a state may not result in the invalidity of its claim.
63
 Moreover, 
Malaysia has already signed an agreement with Indonesia, as a neighbour state, on 
both states’ maritime zone delimitation following the release of the 1979 New Map 
without arguing about the baseline used at that time.
64
  
 
Although Indonesia did not dispute Malaysia’s 1979 New Map for the purpose of 
delimitation of the continental shelf, in February 1980 Indonesia disputed Malaysia’s 
base point for the measurement of its territorial sea, especially in the maritime zone of 
the Straits of Malacca.
65
 Due to the narrowness of the Straits, especially in the 
southern part of the Straits at less than 12 nautical miles, it is unsurprising that a solid 
agreement between the littoral States, whose territorial jurisdictions are overlapping in 
the northern part of the Straits, has not yet been reached. The determination of precise 
delimitation of territorial jurisdiction is important, especially for identifying whose 
law is to be applied when disputes arise. It is interesting to note that the obscurity 
regarding the boundaries of territorial waters in this area has made it a piracy-prone 
area.   
 
                                               
62  Valencia (2003) 373. 
63  cf. ‘states should be guided by the general spirit of Art 7’; see Valencia (2003) 370. 
64  Although not disapproving of such a measurement, Indonesia rejected Malaysia’s attempt to use 
the 1979 agreement between them as an acknowledgement of Malaysia’s straight baseline. See 
Valencia (2003) 372. 
65  Valencia (2003) 372. 
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6.2.4.2  MALAYSIA’S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) 
Two years before the adoption of the 1982 Convention, Malaysia had proclaimed its 
intention to benefit from an EEZ area, a development already practised by many 
states. Hussein Onn, the second Prime Minister of Malaysia, stated on 25 April 1980 
the following:
66
 
AND WHEREAS a number of States have taken action in pursuance of 
the existing law and practice and have made declaration in regard to 
their exclusive economic zones: 
 
NOW THEREFORE WE, Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al Musta’in Billah 
Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Abu Bakar Yang di-Pertuan Agong of the 
States and territories of Malaysia, hereby declare and proclaim that the 
Federation of Malaysia shall have- 
... 
(b) jurisdiction with regard to- 
... 
 (iii) the preservation of the marine environment in the 
exclusive economic zone which is hereby established and that such 
exclusive economic zone extends to 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (emphasis 
added) 
 
This was the basis of the Malaysian EEZ Act 1984 which was enacted two years after 
the adoption of the 1982 Convention and came into force on 1 May 1985. Under the 
1982 Convention, the EEZ legal framework is established under Part V which covers 
Articles 55 to 75. This part is considered to have been successful in reaching a 
compromise between the interests of exploring and conserving the marine resources 
by the coastal states on one hand, and the interest of other states in navigational 
freedom on the other.
67
  It is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea which 
                                               
66  Tunku Sofiah Jewa 673-674. 
67  Mazen Adi, ‘The Application of the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Mediterranean 
Sea’ (2009) Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, The 
United Nations, New York, 21. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/adi
_0809_syria.pdf accessed on 16 May 2010.  
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covers 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the extent of the territorial 
sea is measured.
68
 Adi emphasized that the EEZ does not give exclusive sovereignty 
to the coastal states but only sovereign rights (to explore and exploit the adjacent 
marine resources for economic purposes), jurisdiction and duties.
69
  While the coastal 
states have been granted power to enforce their law and regulations to ensure 
compliance with the EEZ, the rights of navigation and overflight of other states is 
definitely preserved. Section 10 of the EEZ Act 1984, for example, conferred on 
Malaysia the sovereign right to enforce its law in response to acts that might threaten 
the coastal environment such as the discharge of oil or pollutants from a vessel. Non-
compliance with such coastal state laws might make a person, owner, occupier or 
master of a vessel liable to a fine of not exceeding one million ringgit.
70
  
 
The Fisheries Research Institute of Malaysia disclosed that the combines EEZ 
between Peninsular Malaysia and the West Malaysian states of Sabah, Sarawak and 
Federal Labuan, which are separated by the South China Sea, is approximately 
548,800 kilometres.
71
 However, it is interesting to note that, like the issue of 
Malaysian territorial waters, the problem of Malaysia’s EEZ is the same basic 
                                               
68  Art 57 of the 1982 Convention. Hamzah Ahmad, Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, A Study 
in Legal Aspects (Pelanduk Publication, Petaling Jaya 1988) 10. 
69  Adi (2009) 21. Art 56-60 of 1982 Convention. Art 58 addresses the right and jurisdiction of the 
coastal states and other states in the EEZ; Art 59 establishes principles for the resolution of 
conflicts in cases where the provisions of the Convention do not specifically attribute rights or 
jurisdiction to either the coastal state or to another state; Art 60 gives the coastal states a certain 
competence which goes beyond their sovereign rights over resources which include jurisdiction 
with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine 
scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. See Adi 
(2009) 22; The Law of the Sea, National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone, the 
Economic Zone and the Exclusive Fishery Zone. Office of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for the Law of the Sea, United Nations (1986) iv. 
70  s10 of the EEZ Act 1984;  Ghafur (2009) 16. 
71  ‘Deep-Sea Resources Research and Survey in Malaysia Water Area’ paper presented by 
Fisheries Research Institute Malaysia in Regional Workshop on Standard Operation Procedure 
and Development/Improvement of Sampling Gears for the Deep Sea Resources Exploration 25-
23 May 2009, Samut Prakan Thailand. 
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question of how Malaysian territorial breadth is calculated. Apart from the argument 
put forward by Valencia, Herriman and Mohamed also assert that the large-scale map 
in the Peta Baru is ambiguous in terms of describing the calculation of the breadth.
72
 
They finally inferred that the term ‘territorial waters’ used in this map as well as in 
other legislation including the 1984 EEZ Act is intended to refer to the ‘territorial sea’ 
as intended by the 1982 Convention. This is based on municipal law such as Section 
3(2) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No.7, 1969, which states that the 
expression ‘territorial sea’ shall be construed as referring to ‘territorial waters.’73 
Again, in regard to a narrow area such as the southern Straits of Malacca where 
territorial jurisdictions overlap, the question of territorial breadth is extremely 
important in determining which law and jurisdiction should be applied.
74
 Although 
Malaysia continues to reaffirm that Malaysian territorial waters are parallel to the 
‘internationally recognised territorial sea’, the publication of Peta Baru75 seems to 
contradict this. The absence of geographical coordinates for its territorial sea baselines 
might call into question its territorial jurisdiction and sovereign rights in the maritime 
zone. On the basis of Peta Baru, it is argued that Malaysia intended its territorial sea 
to be calculated based on a straight baseline. This, however, might still be considered 
invalid since Malaysia has never made a formal declaration on this as required by 
                                               
72  Max Herriman and Raja Petra Mohamed, ‘A Malacca Straits EEZ Boundary: Factor for 
Consideration’ in M.Shariff, FM Yusoff, N Gopinanth, HM Ibrahim and RA Nik Mustapha 
(eds.)  Towards Sustainable Management of the Straits of Malacca: Proceeding of International 
Conference on the Straits of Malacca, 19-22 April 1999, Malacca Malaysia (MASDEC UPM 
Serdang, 2000) 755-764. 
73    ibid. 758. MIMA Report on the Status of Maritime-Related National Laws and Maritime 
Conventions in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: MIMA January 1997. P44. 
74    See for example the case of Image (Cayman Islands RC No.267531)  v Sun Cruises Limited, 
Sun Vista Limited and Sembawang Ship Management Pte Ltd. Suit No. 76 of 2002/w. 
75    Printed by Directorate of National Mapping, Malaysia 1979, 1-PPNM SYIT (SHEET) 1. See 
Appendix. 
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international law.
76
 Moreover, some countries such Indonesia and United States have 
not recognised Malaysia’s straight baseline.77 Although Malaysia and Indonesia 
reached an agreement in November 1969 on the delimitation of continental shelf 
boundary in the south-eastern part of the Straits of Malacca based on the principle of 
equidistance recommended in international law,
78
 there has still unfortunately been no 
precise coordination of maritime boundaries for EEZ areas.
79
  
 
Although the EEZ Act 1984 mainly conferred jurisdiction over acts that affect the 
marine environment, piracy or armed robbery might also be held liable under this Act 
if their present in the EEZ area would threaten the safety of navigation and traffic or 
living resources and environment of the sea. It is submitted that pirates, in their 
attempt to attack a ship that leaves the said ship unattended and without navigation, 
                                               
76     Max Herriman and Raja Petra Mohamed, ‘A Malacca Straits EEZ Boundary: Factor for 
Consideration’ in M.Shariff, FM Yusoff, N Gopinanth, HM Ibrahim and RA Nik Mustapha 
(eds.)  Towards Sustainable Management of the Straits of Malacca: Proceeding of International 
Conference on the Straits of Malacca, 19-22 April 1999, Malacca Malaysia (MASDEC UPM 
Serdang, 2000) 755-764. 
77     Ibid. 
78     Both states have achieved an equitable and peaceful agreement. This principle of equidistance 
had been practised by states even before the 1982 Convention was concluded.  Art 74 of 1982 
Convention states that:  
(1) the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
referred to in Art 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to 
achieve an equitable solution.  
(2) If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.  
(3) Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit 
of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall 
be without prejudice to the final delimitation.  
(4) Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions 
relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
See also Brownlie (2003) 219-220. 
Art 111 of 1982 Convention; 
79  Sutarji Kasmin, Efficiency Measurement of Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agencies (UKM, 
Bangi 2009) 19. 
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consequently causing collisions with other ships and damaging the environment, 
might also be held liable under this Act. 
 
6.3 THE CHALLENGES OF THE THREAT OF PIRACY AND ARMED 
ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS FOR MALAYSIA’S ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
The Straits’ strategic location as an oil and gas chokepoint for external powers such as 
the United States, Japan and China have consistently triggered their concern over the 
security issue in the Straits, especially during the closing years of the twentieth 
century into the beginning of the new millennium.
80
 The threat perception has been 
heightened due the increase in piracy and armed robbery attacks against ships in the 
Straits and territorial seas of the littoral states. The external powers’ concern over this 
issue has either directly or indirectly imposed pressure on Malaysia as one of the 
littoral States principally responsible for maintaining the safety and security of this 
vital SLOC. The complexity of international law on maritime space has proved to be a 
key challenge to the enforcement of the law, especially when maritime trans-border 
crimes such as piracy and armed robbery against ships are involved. As discussed in 
an earlier chapter, legally speaking, piracy as defined in the 1982 Convention must 
occur on the high seas.
81
 However, most of the attacks in this region have occurred in 
the territorial seas of the littoral states; hence, under the international law they would 
not qualify as piracy. In narrow straits such as the Straits of Malacca, there is no area 
of high seas towards the southern part where the territorial waters of the littoral States, 
namely Malaysia and Indonesia, overlap. Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia have claimed 
that the IMB’s reports on the increasing number of piracy incidents in the Straits were 
                                               
80  See IMB Piracy Annual Report 2006. 
81  Art 101 of the 1982 Convention. On the issue of whether piracy may also occur in the EEZ (Art 
58(2) of the 1982 Convention), see discussion in Chapter 3 (para 3.3.1). 
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misrepresentations.
82
 Both states prefer to classify such attacks as ‘armed robbery 
against ships’ in accordance with the IMO’s definition rather than piracy, since the 
latter implication is rather detrimental to the security environment in the Straits. This 
was proved when the Straits were declared a war risk zone in Lloyd’s list of the 
Lloyds Market Association in 2005 due to the rising number of piracy incidents 
during that period.
83
 
 
Whilst it is reported that the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits has 
declined due to aggressive coordinated patrols among the littoral states,
84
 there are 
still many challenges compelling Malaysia to consistently improve its maritime legal 
regime and security forces. According to Zulkifli, First Admiral Maritime Malaysia, 
the security of the Straits is very important to the international community. It is the 
international perception that the security of the Straits is the responsibility of the 
littoral states and, because the name ‘Malacca’, which is one of the 13 states in the 
country, is synonymous with Malaysia, the pressure was greater on Malaysia to 
address this issue.
85
 Malaysia believes that piracy, a non-traditional security threat, 
requires continuous attention and effective law enforcement. The cooperative action 
jointly implemented by Malaysia and its counterparts, Indonesia and Singapore, such 
                                               
82  Zulkifli Abu Bakar ‘Enhancing Maritime Security-Law Enforcement in Malaysia’ paper 
presented during 24th Asia-Pacific Round Table, Kuala Lumpur, 7-9 June 2010; Interview with 
Mohd Helmy Ahmad, Principal Assistant Secretary, Maritime Security and Sovereignty 
Division, Prime Minister’s Department (Putrajaya, 20 February 2009, 11 November 2010, 10 
January 2011). 
83  For further discussion cross-refer to Chapter 4 (para 4.3.2.1). 
84  The Star Online ‘Drastic Drop in Straits Piracy’ Thursday April 21, 2011: ‘…the 2010 IMB 
Piracy Report showed that the threats in the Straits was now close to the zero incident level.’ 
http://thestar.com.my/services/printerfriendly.asp?file=/2011/4/21 accessed on 21 March 2012; 
‘As world piracy hits a new high, more ships are escaping Somali pirates, says IMB report’ Oct 
18, 2011 at ICC Commercial Crime Services at http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/969-as-world-
piracy-hits-a-new-high,more ships are escaping Somali pirates accessed on 6 January 2012. 
85  Zulkifli Abu Bakar ‘Enhancing Maritime Security-Law Enforcement in Malaysia’ paper 
presented during 24th Asia-Pacific Round Table, Kuala Lumpur, 7-9 June 2010. 
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as the MALSINDO and Eyes in the Sky,
86
 may not be achieved without each 
individual state being proactive internally and paying serious attention to tackling the 
issue before them.
87
  Thus, it may be said that efforts to tackle transnational crime 
should begin with the creation of an effective national criminal enforcement capability 
which may be able to address the issue wisely. 
 
6.3.1 THE NEW MALAYSIAN MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
(MMEA) IN RESPONSE TO PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY IN THE 
STRAITS 
According to Kasmin, ‘the maritime law enforcement is construed as the taking of any 
reasonable measures to ensure compliance or prevent any form of violations of any 
Acts or applicable written law.’88 In other words, in order to ensure compliance and to 
control criminal act and violence, it is important for a state to have an effective and 
adequate law and enforcement capability. Such capability is not only by patrolling 
maritime area, for preventing the crime, but also ability to stop, board and search a 
suspicious ship, 
89
  then arrest, put the perpetrators under a fair trial and finally punish 
them if found guilty under the local law.  
 
                                               
86  The Star Online ‘Drastic Drop in Straits Piracy’ Thursday April 21, 2011: ‘…the 2010 IMB 
Piracy Report showed that the threats in the Straits was now close to the zero incident level.’ 
http://thestar.com.my/services/printerfriendly.asp?file=/2011/4/21 accessed on 21 March 2012; 
‘As world piracy hits a new high, more ships are escaping Somali pirates, says IMB report’ Oct 
18, 2011 at ICC Commercial Crime Services at http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/969-as-world-
piracy-hits-a-new-high,more ships are escaping Somali pirates accessed on 6 January 2012. 
87  CR Woolley ‘Piracy and Sovereign Rights: Addressing Piracy in the Straits of Malacca without 
degrading the Sovereign Rights of Indonesia and Malaysia’ 8 [2010] Santa Clara J. Int’l L, 447-
472, 470. 
88  ibid. 39. 
89  Art 24 of the 1984 EEZ Act: ‘...[W]here he has reason to believe that an offence has been 
committed...’ 
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With the increasing complexity of maritime security over the past few years, the need 
for a more vigorous agency or body to facilitate the enforcement mechanism in 
dealing with piracy and armed robbery in the Straits is considered urgent. This is 
especially true considering the high operating costs of maintaining too many 
maritime-related agencies with a decentralised system which causes difficulties, 
raising the issues of overlapping duties and jurisdiction and inefficient enforcement.  
 
In Malaysia, the plethora of laws and scattered departments that manage maritime 
affairs were identified as one the biggest challenges facing the Malaysian Government 
in maritime law enforcement. Previously, there are fourteen ministries, four maritime 
councils, two maritime committees and 24 other government agencies had been 
responsible for enforcing various rules and regulations related to maritime affairs.
90
 
Among these agencies are the following: 
1. Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) 
2. Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) (Marine Operation Force, previously 
known as Marine Police) 
3. Royal Customs and Excise Department (RC & E Dept)  
4. Royal Malaysian Air Force 
5. Department of Immigration 
6. Department of Fisheries 
7. Department of Environment 
8. The Marine Department under the Ministry of Transport 
9. The National Security Division, Prime Minister’s Department 
                                               
90   Sutarji Kasmin, Efficiency Measurement of Malaysia’s Maritime Enforcement Agencies (UKM, 
Bangi 2009) 32. 
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Basically, these agencies have worked largely independently of one another. 
However, the regular patrols of Malaysian waters were undertaken by enforcement 
agencies such as the Marine Police, the Royal Malaysian Customs and the Fisheries 
Department which were coordinated by the Maritime Enforcement Coordination 
Centre (MECC).
91
 As for the purpose of the trilateral MALSINDO Patrol 
arrangement, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has played a primary role as the 
representative of Malaysia’s enforcement body together with the Royal Malaysian Air 
Force and the Police Air-Wing for air surveillance of the Straits.
92
  The RMN is 
mainly responsible of protecting the territorial and national sovereignty and security 
of Malaysia. Despite the existence of MECC, the fact that a range of agencies have 
been dealing with maritime affairs has led to different management of assets as well as 
interpretation of the law and regulations; this has imposed limitations on the effective 
enforcement of laws at domestic level.
93
  
 
Mak Joon Num once described the dilemma faced by the Royal Malaysian Navy in 
balancing its jurisdiction as a military authority or war-fighting body and a civilian 
law enforcement instrument that conducted specific tasks including maritime 
surveillance, sea patrols against maritime crime and search and rescue (SAR).
94
 Apart 
from piracy, trans-border smuggling of firearms, narcotics and illegal immigrants by 
sea were also handled by different enforcement authorities. For example, narcotics 
                                               
91  Mat Taib Yasin ‘Sharing the Burden of Maintenance of Navigational Safety and Security in the 
Straits of Malacca’ in Nazery Khalid (ed.) Proceedings of LIMA International Maritime 
Conference, Awana Porto Malai, Langkawi Malaysia, 4-5 December 2005 (MIMA Kuala 
Lumpur 2007) 24-37, 26. 
92  Mat Taib (2005) 26. 
93  AG Hamid ‘Malaysia’s Commitments under International Conventions and the need for a 
harmonised Legal Regime Regulating Marine Pollution’ [2007] 6 MLJ cxxiv, 10. 
94  Mak Joon Num, ‘Malaysia’s Naval and Strategic Priorities: Charting a New Course’ in Ross 
Babbage and Sam Bateman Maritime Change-Issues for Asia (Allen & Unwin, North Sydney 
1993) 117-125. 
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smuggling falls mainly under the jurisdiction of the Customs Department, whereas 
crimes involving firearms come under the police’s jurisdiction.95 In such cases, the 
conflict of jurisdiction may be identified as the main cause of the inefficacy of law 
and enforcement action. Taib highlights that, of the 37 sea robberies against ships in 
2004 in the Straits, 73 per cent of the incidents involved the use of firearms.
96
 He is of 
the view that ‘the low probability of being caught has mitigated the deterrence value 
of the death penalty for illegal possession of firearms.’97  To this extent, his 
proposition is acceptable since most of the acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in the Straits are committed by opportunist pirates, and the inefficiency of 
enforcement may be one of the reasons for their fearlessness and courage in repeating 
this crime.
98
 Kasmin also shares this view when he highlights that ‘inefficient 
Decision Making Unit (DMU) [or agency] are unable to eradicate illegal activities in 
their maritime Area of Responsibility (AOR) primarily due to their [in]ability to carry 
out sufficient sea patrol.’99 
 
Certainly, the main challenge for a state at national level is to develop and sustain law 
enforcement capability. To this end, Young suggests that state policy should have two 
main driving forces: ‘developing policing and operational maritime security 
capacities, and structural development, i.e. economic and political development.’ The 
state needs to increase its operational capacities such as having a sufficient quantity 
and quality of vessels to be able to patrol the sea and to quickly respond to the security 
                                               
95  Mat Taib Yasin, Threats to Malaysia From the Western Maritime Frontier: Issues and Option 
(MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 2006) 15. 
96  ibid. 
97  Mat Taib Yasin, ‘Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) through the Straits of 
Malacca: The need to Secure the Northern Approaches’ in The Security of Sea Lanes of 
Communication in the Indian Ocean Region (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 2007) 225-241, 234. 
98   Cross-refer to Chapter 4 (para 4.3.4) 
99  Kasmin (2009) 216. (Emphasis added). 
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threat of piracy and sea robbery. Thus, it appears that, in the Malaysian context, 
having various agencies dealing with the same issue has caused an uneconomical 
distribution of the resources and an inadequate number of experienced personnel, 
which has led to inefficiency of the management and in the implementation of the law. 
Kasmin suggests ‘two important aspects that form foundation of efficient command, 
control and coordination of the maritime enforcement system.’100 First is an 
‘integrated system’ to avoid ‘duplication of tasks, efforts, logistic support and base 
facilities.’ Second is ‘the role of the National Maritime Enforcement and Coordination 
Centre (NMECC) to be upgraded.’ Consequently, in order to resolve the overlapping 
of maritime jurisdictions and operations and to effectively police Malaysian waters, 
the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was finally established on 
February 15, 2005, about a year after the MMEA Act came into force. The 
establishment of MMEA as the Malaysian coast guard is expected to integrate the 
enforcement works of various agencies to ensure greater protection of safety, security 
and sovereignty of the Malaysian Maritime Zone (MMZ) as well as to improve 
coordination between the existing agencies. The reason for this is mentioned in the 
Hansard as the change from a ‘sectoral’ approach to maritime enforcement to a 
‘singular dedicated agency’ for the enforcement of all Federal laws relevant to the 
sea.
101
  
 
 
 
                                               
100  Kasmin (2009) 223. 
101  Records of the Malaysian Parliament’s Lower House of Representatives: Official Statement of 
‘Dewan Rakyat’ 11th Parliament, 1st term of 1st meeting No.17, Monday June 14 2004 : See 
Irwin UJ Ooi, ‘The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Malaysia’s Legal 
Response to the threat of maritime terrorism’ (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 70-91. 
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6.3.2    CONTROVERSY OVER THE CREATION OF MMEA 
6.3.2.1   ADDITION TO THE EXISTING MARITIME AGENCIES 
Although the main reason for the formation of the MMEA is to solve the problem of 
overlapping duties and jurisdictions by creating a single responsible agency, there is 
an argument that MMEA is an organisation that has been established as an addition to 
the existing maritime agencies and not as a replacement for them.
102
 This argument is 
made by referring to section 7(3) which states the following: 
 ‘…an officer of the Agency shall have, for the purpose of this Act, all 
the powers which any relevant agency may exercise under any federal 
law which is applicable in the Malaysian Maritime Zone.’103 
 
Moreover, MMEA appears to have wide-ranging powers under section 7(2) of the Act 
such as ‘to receive and consider any report of the commission of an offence,’104 and 
‘to stop, enter, board, inspect and search any place, structure, vessel or aircraft’105; 
these are similar to the powers conferred on the Marine Police in order to fight 
maritime crime.
106
 It might be assumed that the duties and powers granted in section 7 
are not granted solely to the MMEA officers, and those other existing authorities such 
as RMN, Marine Police, and Royal Malaysians Customs also share the same 
responsibilities.
107
  
 
 
                                               
102  Irwin UJ Ooi, ‘The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Malaysia’s Legal 
Response to the threat of maritime terrorism’ (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 70-91, 86. 
103  Emphasize added. 
104  s7(2) (a). 
105  s7(2) (b). 
106  Irwin UJ Ooi, ‘The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Malaysia’s Legal 
Response to the threat of maritime terrorism’ (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 70-91, 86. 
107  MMEA a appears to have wide-ranging powers under section 7 of the Act such as ‘to receive 
and consider any report of the commission’ and ‘to stop, enter, board, inspect and search any 
place, structure, vessel or aircraft’; these are similar to the powers conferred on the Marine 
Police in order to fight maritime crime. 
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6.3.2.2     LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND FAILURE TO BE COST-EFFECTIVE 
The fact that most of the officials in the MMEA are recruited from the experienced 
personnel in the RMN and that their assets mostly belong to the RMN
108
 has also 
caused unease in other government bodies, particularly the Marine Police, which was 
established in 1947 and is governed under the Police Act. This is probably because, 
previously, although Malaysia has various agencies dealing with maritime affairs, 
most of the successful arrests of maritime criminals such as sea robbers and illegal 
fishermen mainly resulted from the efforts and enforcement strategies of the Marine 
Police.
109
 Ah See told The Star that he was sceptical about the need to establish the 
MMEA since its legal framework and main duties are similar to those of the Marine 
Police.
110
 He added that the newly-formed agency (MMEA) requires extra 
expenditure as compared to the existing Marine Police who operate on a very low 
budget since their officers and logistics are inter-transferable within the force and are 
supported by all the departments in the police force.
111
 Moreover, they carry out the 
same kinds of duties as the land-based police, such as gathering intelligence, 
investigation, arrest of criminals and prosecution.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
108   ‘Maritime agency to take over as sole enforcement unit soon.’ (Bernama, June 9, 2011) at 
http://competition-regulation-malaysia.blogspot.com/2011/06/maritime-agency-to-take-over-as-
sole.html accessed on 12 April 2012. 
109  Khoo Ah See ‘Maintain Status Quo of Marine Police’ (The Star Online June 19, 2011)  at 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/6/19/focus/892495 accessed on 20 April 2012. 
110  ibid. 
111  ibid. 
238 
 
6.3.2.3      PROBLEMS OF RECRUITMENT AND COOPERATION OF THE 
EXISTING MARITIME BODIES 
The Marine Operations Force Commander, Isa Munir, told The Sun newspaper that 
“although the marine police have agreed to give MMEA 60 (20-metre length or more) 
patrol boats, it is unlawful for the personnel to be absorbed automatically without their 
consent.”112 This statement was a response to the news in Bernama a day earlier when 
it was reported that ‘a total of 1,420 staff and officers of the Royal Malaysian Customs 
and Marine Operation Force will be absorbed into the MMEA beginning August.’113 
The Marine Police’s views on their role and duty are also illustrated by Hamzah, 
Sabah Commissioner of Police, who said that not all the patrol boats of the Marine 
Police should be handed over to MMEA since they are still required by the police to 
maintain security, especially in cases involving crimes such as fights, murder or theft 
that often occur on islands off the coast of the country such as in Sabah and Labuan.
114
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
112  ‘Marine Police to be given option to join MMEA’ (The Sun, Petaling Jaya April 22, 2011) at 
http://www.thesundaily.my/news/local/marine-police-be-given-option-join-mmea accessed on 
20 April 2012. 
113  ibid. 
114  Jainudin Djimin ‘Not all patrol boats to be handed over to MMEA-SCP Hamza’ New Sabah 
Times, at http://www.newsabahtimes.com.my/nstweb/print/50395 accessed on 12 April 2012. 
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6.3.3   THE CHALLENGE OF MMEA AS MALAYSIA’S SOLE MARITIME 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY  
6.3.3.1    OVERCOMING THE OVERLAPPING OF DUTIES ISSUE. 
The establishment of MMEA as the Malaysian Coast Guard, which was announced in 
2002 by the Malaysian Federal Government, was the result of the government’s 
intention to have a single, efficient body that can integrate enforcement work and 
improve coordination between the existing agencies to ensure that good ocean 
governance in the Malaysian Maritime Zone (MMZ) is achieved. Ismail Omar, 
Deputy Inspector-General of Police, told a local newspaper that “it was determined 
that MMEA is the sole body for enforcement, compliance, checks and revention i 
Malaysian waters under the country’s maritime laws. MMEA’s operational domain 
starts from the coastline up to 200 nautical miles. However, the agency will not 
responsible for security at harbours and jetties.”115 He added that the role of police in 
maintaining national security and public order and the revention of crime..
116
 
However, MMZ, as defined under the 2004 MMEA Act, includes ‘the internal waters, 
territorial sea, continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and the Malaysian 
fisheries’ waters, and includes the air space over the Zone.’117 It is clear from the 2004 
Act that there is no intention to segregate or distribute powers between the existing 
agencies and the MMEA; rather it has been formed as the sole enforcement agency in 
Malaysia. This was confirmed by the Senior Assistant Commissioner and current 
Commander of the Marine Police, Isa Munir, in an interview with The Malay Mail.
118
 
However, the clear division between enforcement and duty areas, as argued by Isa, is 
                                               
115  Marhalim Abas, ‘Q&A: Moving to Different Waters’(The Malay Mail, Friday 9 Sep 2011)   
116   Ibid. 
117  Section 2 Interpretation of the 2004 MMEA Act. 
118  Marhalim Abas, ‘Q&A: Moving to Different Waters’(The Malay Mail, Friday 9 Sep 2011) 6. 
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still needed, since their service in securing national and public order and the 
prevention of crime remains relevant.
119
 Although the MMEA powers, as defined in 
the 2004 MMEA Act, include jurisdiction over internal waters, the current Marine 
Police powers as stated by Isa are identified as ranging from jurisdiction over the 
internal waters, such as rivers, lakes, dams, islands, harbours and jetties, to the 
territorial waters of Malaysia.
120
 Although the duties of the Marine Police and MMEA 
still seem to be overlapping, Isa emphasises that they ‘will not be involved in any 
enforcement duties’, especially in the area where MMEA has been positioned. 
Moreover, they will always cooperate with MMEA when necessary.
121
 Thus, it may 
be assumed that, despite the dissatisfaction expressed by some officials from several 
more established enforcement bodies as compared to this newly-formed MMEA, the 
initial intention of the Cabinet in establishing MMEA as an integrated enforcement 
agency or coast guard under the Prime Minister’s Department may be considered a 
success. This runs parallel to Bateman’s opinion that, nowadays, state coast guards 
have a wider function.
122
 They have been used as an instrument of foreign policy 
which may operate beyond the national boundaries, particularly in regional 
cooperative action such as MSP. 
 
 
 
                                               
119  ibid. 
120  ibid. 
121  ibid. 
122  Bateman, ‘Multiples Uses, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Role of Ports and Coast Guards’ 
in The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region (MIMA, Kuala 
Lumpur 2007) 274-275. 
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6.3.3.2      FUNCTIONS OF MMEA AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH THE 
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
The functions and powers of the MMEA are listed in Section 6 of the 2004 MMEA 
Act as follows: 
(1) The functions of the Agency shall be- 
(a) To enforce law and order under any federal law; 
(b) To perform maritime search and rescue; 
(c) To prevent and suppress the commission of an offence; 
(d) To lend assistance in any criminal matters on a request by a foreign 
State as provided under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Act 2002; 
(e) To carry out air and coastal surveillance; 
(f) To provide platform and support services to any relevant agency; 
(g) To establish and manage maritime institutions for the training of 
officers of the Agency; and 
(h) Generally to perform any other duty for ensuring maritime safety 
and security or do all matters incidental thereto. 
 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of the Agency shall 
be performed within the Malaysia Maritime Zone. 
 
(3)  Notwithstanding subsection (2), the Agency shall be responsible- 
(a) For the performance of maritime search and rescue; 
(b) For controlling and preventing maritime pollution; 
(c) For preventing and suppressing piracy; and 
(d) For preventing and suppressing illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, on the high 
seas.
123
  
 
Although subsection 2 of section 6 limits the functions of the MMEA to the MMZ, 
subsection 3 extends the jurisdiction of MMEA to the high seas provided that any 
actions are taken only for the purposes of conducting maritime search and rescue, 
controlling and preventing maritime pollution, and suppressing piracy and illicit 
trafficking of narcotic drugs. It is noteworthy that international law considered the 
high seas as areas in which every state has the right to enjoy the freedom of navigation 
and overflight and no state could claim or purport to subject any part of the high seas 
                                               
123  Emphasis added. 
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to its sovereignty.
124
 It is argued by Ooi that this provision seems to give MMEA 
extra-territorial jurisdiction over the high seas.
125
 However, this is not the case, since 
Malaysia still has the right to exercise its jurisdiction over the ships flying its flag, as 
provided in Article 94 of the 1982 Convention. Subsection 2(b) states that: 
‘(2) In particular every State shall: 
(b) Assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying 
its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of 
administrative, technical and social matters concerning the 
ship.’ 
 
This includes the jurisdiction to inquire into ‘every marine casualty or incident of 
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or 
serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage to ships or installations 
of another State or to the marine environment…’ The 1982 Convention also conferred 
the power to institute proceedings subsequent to certain acts, such as causing collision 
of ships, only against the authorities of flag states or the state of which such a person 
is a national.
126
 Other states have no such right because these incidents occur on the 
high seas beyond any state’s jurisdiction.127 Article 98 of the 1982 Convention also 
imposes a duty on all states, especially the coastal states, to render assistance to any 
persons found in danger on the high seas and to have a body capable of carrying out 
maritime search and rescue (SAR). It might be said that Section 7(3)(a) of the 2004 
MMEA Act has fulfilled this requirement and thus does not contravene the freedom of 
the high seas as guaranteed in the 1982 Convention.
128
 A similar right is also 
conferred by Malaysia’s Extra-Territorial Offences Act 1976 (ETOA 1976) which 
                                               
124  Art 87 and Art 89 of the 1982 Convention. 
125  Irwin UJ OOi (2007) 85. 
126  Refer to Art 97(1) and (2) of the 1982 Convention. 
127  Art 97(3) of the 1982 Convention. 
128  Art 87-Art 89 of the 1982 Convention. 
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gives extra-territorial power to Malaysia to enforce its law, not only on ships 
registered in Malaysia but also in regard to any offence committed by one of its 
citizens or permanent residents on board any ship or aircraft on or over the high seas 
or in any place beyond the limits of Malaysia.
129
 As for section 6(3) (c) on the 
responsibility of MMEA to prevent and suppress piracy on the high seas, there is 
clearly no such issue of claiming jurisdiction over the high seas. This is because 
piracy, as has been discussed in the earlier chapters, is a crime against humankind 
over which universal jurisdiction has been conferred.
130
 Thus, Malaysia, in response to 
frequent incidents of piracy worldwide, is moving positively by providing an effective 
domestic law enforcement agency, namely the MMEA, which is in keeping with the 
spirit of international law to ensure safety and security at sea. 
 
The MMEA also gained the right to exercise hot pursuit as prescribed in Article 111 
of the 1982 Convention under Section 7 of the 2004 Act. If an MMEA officer 
discovers or believes that an offence has been committed at sea, he/she has the right to 
arrest the offender.
131
 An example of the exercising of this right is the MMEA’s and 
RMN’s successful rescue of the MT Nautica Johor bahru on 28 October 2011.132 This 
vessel had been hijacked sixty nautical miles east of Tanjung Gelang Kuantan at about 
9.20 a.m. and was found by an MMEA helicopter at about 3.20 p.m., 85 nautical miles 
east of Pekan, Kuantan, with the new name of MT Icajo. It was approaching the EEZ 
                                               
129   s2 (1) of Extra-Territorial Offences Act 1976. 
130  For a detailed discussion, cross-refer to Chapters 3 and 4; also Art 100 of the 1982 Convention 
which imposed a duty on every state to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in the repression 
of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
131  s7 (2)(h) of the 2004 MMEA. 
132  Kuantan, 29 October 2011 ‘Kejayaan APMM dan TLDM menyelamatkan MT NAUTICA 
JOHOR BAHRU’  at 
http://www.mmea.gov.my/galerimm/images/stories/HQ/siaran_media/Rampasan%20kapal%202
011.pdf  accessed on 20 April 2012. 
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of Indonesia, moving towards the Anambas islands, and refused to stop even though it 
had been requested to do several times by the RMN vessel, KD Lekiu. The MMEA 
called BAKORKAMLA to report the incident and asked permission for the right of 
hot pursuit in Indonesian waters. Permission was granted within a short time. The 
hijacked ship was finally recovered but the pirates or hijackers were able to flee to the 
Anambas Islands in a small boat.
133
 It is undeniable that the successful exercising of 
hot pursuit in this incident was due to the cooperation of both states in order to 
suppress piracy and criminal acts in the Straits and South China Sea and their mutual 
respect for the right provided under the 1982 Convention. Ooi believes that the 2004 
MMEA Act is not exhaustive as it needs to be read together with other domestic 
statutes such as Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No.7, 1969, the Continental 
Shelf Act 1966, the Fisheries Act 1985, the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, the 
Police Act 1967, the Customs Act 1967, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002.
134
 Thus, when construing the wording of the 
Act, reference should also be made to these statutes according to their relevancy.   
 
The express power given to MMEA ‘to investigate any offence which it has reason to 
believe is being committed, or is about to be committed or has been committed’135 and 
‘to arrest any person whom it has reason to believe has committed an offence’136 
confers an advantage on MMEA officers in conducting their enforcement functions 
without having to determine which federal law is applicable to the maritime zone of 
Malaysia. However, similar to the view expressed by Ooi, since the Act also made 
                                               
133  ibid. 
134  Irwin UJ Ooi, ‘The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004: Malaysia’s Legal 
Response to the threat of maritime terrorism’ (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 70-91. 
135  s7(2)(d). 
136  s7(2)(h). 
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reference to the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) in appointing the officers of the 
MMEA, it is assumed that all the MMEA powers of investigation and arrest must be 
exercised in accordance with the rules provided in the CPC. 
 
As far as operational assets are concerned, MMEA initially operated with at least six 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and about eighty small and medium-sized vessels 
which were drawn from various agencies such as the Navy, Marine Police and the 
Fisheries and Customs Departments.
137
 It was also reported that Japan had donated a 
training vessel to the MMEA and the Japanese Coast Guard had at the same time 
organised a joint training exercise with six states in Southeast Asia including 
Malaysia.
138
 At present, MMEA has one hundred and thirty vessels and eight 
helicopters which, according to Mohd Amdan Kurish, the MMEA Director-General, 
are still insufficient considering the need to police 614,000 sq km of Malaysian waters 
and the run-down condition of some of these assets.
139
 The domestic enforcement 
authority’s lack of assets has been argued to be one of the obstacles to suppressing 
piracy in the Straits. However, for a newly-established coastal guard such as the 
MMEA, the shortcomings can be overcome gradually and the successful cooperation 
between MMEA and other national authorities of the littoral states has proved their 
capability to curb the upsurge of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Straits. 
 
                                               
137  Bateman ‘Multiple Uses, Maritime Law Enforcement and the Role of Ports and Coast Guards’ 
in The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region (MIMA, Kuala 
Lumpur 2007) 274-275. 
138  Andrew S.Erickson, ‘Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region’ in Shicun 
Wu, Keyuan Zou  (eds.) Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region:  
Regional Implications and International Cooperation (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Surrey 2009)51-
80,  63. 
139  --‘Maritime agency to take over as sole enforcement unit soon.’ (Bernama, June 9, 2011)  At 
http://competition-regulation-malaysia.blogspot.com/2011/06/maritime-agency-to-take-over-as-
sole.html accessed on 12 April 2012. 
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While, in terms of prevention, this cooperative mechanism might be regarded as a 
successful effort to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Straits, in 
terms of deterrence it might lead to questions about the adequacy and efficacy of the 
law in regard to enforcement and prosecution. This is identified as one of the 
weaknesses of the existing international law on piracy as laid down in the 1982 
Convention and the international customary law on universal jurisdiction over 
piracy.
140
 It is equally important to harmonise and update national laws according to 
the spirit and intention of the International Convention. Yasin contends that, unless a 
state has competent substantive and procedural laws ‘that enable the enforcement 
authorities to put up a strong legal case, and the judiciary to try and pass the 
appropriate sentences’141, all the successful cooperative action in fighting and 
arresting the criminals or pirates at sea will be meaningless. The absence of a law 
providing for punishable offences means that the arrested criminal may be set free and 
emboldened to repeat the same crime again and again.
142
 Therefore, it is submitted 
that there is an urgent need to strengthen national law so that it is competent to try and 
punish the maritime criminals, especially those engaging in piracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
140  Cross-refer to Chapter 3 (para 3.3). 
141  Yasin, MT, ‘Security of Sea lanes of Communication (SLOCS) through the Straits of Malacca: 
The need to secure the Northern approaches’ in D Rumley, S Chaturvedi and MT Yasin The 
Security of Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean region (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 
2007) 225. 
142  Juita ( 1998 ) 12-13. 
247 
 
6.4 PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS UNDER THE 
MALAYSIAN LAW  
It is interesting to note that cases of piracy have existed in Malaya (Malaysia) since 
the colonial period.
143
 In the 1840 case of R v Tunku Mohamed Saad & Ors,
144
 the 
issue before the court was whether the capture of Kedah was an act of piracy or a 
justifiable act of national reprisal against a national enemy? This was because the 
accused was a prince of Kedah (currently one of the states of Malaysia); thus, his act 
was justified since he was an independent sovereign prince and the act was one of 
retaliation with the sole object of regaining the Kingdom of Quedah (Kedah) from the 
Siamese. The court found him not guilty and argued that ‘such captures could not by 
the Law of Nations be deemed piratical.’145 It is noteworthy that such a case, should it 
occur nowadays, would not be considered piracy because the action would have been 
taken for political rather than for private reasons.
146
 Even though Tunku Mohamad 
Saad’s case was heard in the Straits Settlement of Penang, which was part of Kedah, 
the case was heard before a British judge and jury and the law applicable in such a 
case was the British law and not the Malay or Malaysian law.
147
 
 
As far as the Straits are concerned, most of the incidents of attacks against ships have 
taken place either within the territorial sea or internal waters of the littoral states, 
including in ports and harbours. In such cases, the criminals are legally classified as 
robbers and will be charged according to Malaysian domestic law, particularly the 
                                               
143  Cross-refer to Chapter 4 (para 4.3.1.1). 
144  Straits Settlements, Penang (1840) 2Ky.Cr.18 in S JayaKumar, Public International Law Cases 
from Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore University Press, Singapore 1974) 248. 
145        Judge held in R v Tunku Mohamed Saad & Ors, 
146  Cross-refer to Chapter 3 on development of the international law of piracy. 
147  Cross-refer to sections 6.1.1 and  6.1.2 for discussion on Malaysian Legal History. 
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Penal Code and Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act 1960. Nevertheless, should 
Malaysia wish to prosecute pirates whose crimes were committed on the high seas, the 
similar law might still be applied depending on the nature of the criminal act, and 
without the need for a specific law on maritime piracy.
148
 Generally, the laws that deal 
with the maritime safety and security of the Malaysian Maritime Zone include: 
 The Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 
 Police Act 1967 
 Penal Code 
 Criminal Procedure Act 
 Merchant Shipping Act (Oil Pollution) 1994 
 Merchant Shipping Ordinance Act 1952 
 Fisheries Act 1985 (Amendment 1993) 
 Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 
 Petroleum Mining Act 1966 
 Environment Quality Act 1986 
 Continental Shelf Act 1966 
 Customs Act 1967 
 Immigration Act 1959 (Amendment 1963) 
 Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act 1984 
 Telecommunication Act 
 Dangerous Act 1952 
 Explosive Act 1957 
 Protection Places Ordinance Act 1959 
 Internal Security Act 1960 (it has currently been repealed and replaced by a 
new bill) 
 Firearms Act 1960 
As a state party to the 1982 Convention, Malaysia is always willing to cooperate in 
fighting piracy regardless of whether it takes place on the high seas or in its territorial 
waters. This corresponds to the international law provision that requires states to 
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in suppressing piracy.
149
  Malaysia’s devotion 
and commitment to combating such crimes can be seen in several steps and actions 
undertaken at all levels, be they national, regional or international. As a littoral state of 
                                               
148  See discussion on the incident of MT Bunga Laurel in Chapter 6 (para 6.4.4). 
149  Art 100 of the 1982 Convention. 
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one of the busiest straits in the world, Malaysia’s responsibility to maintain and ensure 
safety and security of navigation in the Straits of Malacca as straits used for 
international navigation is apparent and crucial. Following is a further discussion on 
the domestic law applicable for prosecuting piracy and sea robbers in Malaysia.  
 
6.4.1 THE COURT OF JUDICATURE ACT 1964 (CJA) 
An act of robbery at sea is often called by local people an act of ‘piracy,’ before the 
law it is still regarded as ‘robbery’ or ‘armed robbery’ against ships. Thus, certainly 
the court in Malaysia has jurisdiction to try such perpetrators. The problem may arise, 
if similar acts occur beyond territorial sea, especially to states which lack domestic 
law that criminalise piracy. Nevertheless, in Malaysia, despite the non-existence of a 
specific law on piracy, the High Court has been granted criminal jurisdiction to try 
any person who has committed piracy on the high seas under the 1964 Court of 
Judicature Act. The CJA was enacted before the adoption of the 1982 Convention but 
six years after the 1958 Geneva Convention. Paragraph 1 of Section 22 of the Court of 
Judicature Act 1964 provides that:
150
 
(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to try--  
(a)  all offences committed-- 
i. within its local jurisdiction;  
ii. on the high seas on board any ship or on any aircraft 
registered in Malaysia;  
iii. by any citizen or any permanent resident on the high seas 
on board any ship or on any aircraft;  
iv. by any person on the high seas where the offence is piracy 
by the law of nations; and (emphasis added) 
                                               
150  s22 of Court of Judicature Act 1964. 
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This provision provides a means of prosecuting the crime of piracy committed by any 
person on the high seas and prevents the criminal from escaping justice merely 
because of the lack of jurisdiction.  
 
6.4.2 THE MALAYSIAN PENAL CODE 
Legally speaking, most cases reported in Southeast Asian waters including the Straits 
of Malacca are not piracy under international law but merely armed robbery against 
ships.
151
 Piracy under international law requires such an offence to have occurred on 
the high seas or any other place outside jurisdiction of any state. In cases of piracy 
where the perpetrator is caught by the Malaysian authorities, the punishment would be 
similar to other land-based crimes of armed robbery, gang robbery or theft as 
prescribed in the Malaysian Penal Code. Section 2 of the Penal Code envisaged 
generally that any crimes committed in any part of Malaysia’s jurisdictional area, 
whether on land or water, might be made liable under relevant provisions in the 
Code.
152
 The words ‘within Malaysia’ can have a wider meaning which might include 
similar offences at sea.
153
 Thus, apart from the legal conflict of meaning between 
piracy under international law and armed robbery against ships, the two offences bear 
a very great resemblance in terms of the nature of the acts. Boarding another vessel 
illegally, taking possession of the goods of persons and ships, and threatening or 
causing hurt to the crews are among the elements shared by piracy and armed robbery. 
                                               
151  Interview with Captain Maritime Mamu Said Alee, Director of Maritime Policy and 
International Relation, MMEA (Kuala Lumpur 23rd February 2009). 
152  Section 2 of the Malaysian Penal Code reads as follows: ‘Every person shall be liable to 
punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the 
provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Malaysia.’ 
153  Norfadhillah Mohamad Ali and Hendun Abd Rahman Shah, ‘Piratical Activities in the Malacca 
Strait: The UNCLOS, Malaysian Legal Framework and Islamic Point of View’ [2006] 5 MLJA 
140,142. 
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Thus, they will incur similar punishments under the Malaysian Penal Code which 
would be determined according to the facts of each individual case. Section 390 of the 
Penal Code states that: 
(1) In all robbery there is either theft or extortion. 
(2) Theft is ‘robbery’ if, in order to commit theft or in committing the 
theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away property 
obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or 
attempts to cause to any person death, or hurt, or wrongful restraint, or 
fear of instant death, or of instant hurt or of instant wrongful restraint. 
(3) Extortion is ‘robbery’ if the offender, at the time of committing the 
extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the 
extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt 
or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to put in fear then and 
there to deliver up the thing extorted. 
 
The offence of robbery would normally involve the act of theft or extortion or both.  It 
is noteworthy that, from 2005 to 2009, the number of attacks and attempted attacks in 
the Straits and all the littoral states reported by IMB has seen a sharp decrease from 
101 reported cases in 2005 to 76 in 2006, 62 in 2007, 46 in 2008 and just 42 in 
2009.
154
 In 2009 alone, all of the actual attacks reported were committed when the 
ship was berthed, at anchor or steaming.
155
  Interestingly, on many occasions the 
offences committed in port or while ships were berthed or at anchor would involve the 
theft of moveable things from persons or ships. Such an offence is covered under 
Sections 378 and 379 of the Penal Code.
156
   Section 378 defines theft as taking 
another’s moveable property intentionally without consent, while section 379 provides 
the punishment term of the offence which may carry up to three years imprisonment 
                                               
154  IMB Annual Piracy Report 2009, 5. 
155  ibid. 6. 
156  s378.Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any moveable property out of possession of any 
person without that person’s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to 
commit theft. 
s379. Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be 
extended to three years or with a fine, or with both, and for a second or subsequent offence, 
shall be liable to imprisonment or to a fine or whipping or any two of such punishments. 
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or a fine or both. The Legal Officer in the Royal Malaysian Navy, Azhar, said that it is 
unfair to blame the littoral states for failing to control the increasing number of 
reported incidents of piracy if the report used by IMB Piracy Reporting Centre 
includes the crime of petty theft onboard a ship in port.
157
 Piracy, as understood by the 
layman, resembles a cruel act of violence or depredation on the high seas, and is 
recognised by international law as an offence against mankind. To include petty theft 
as an act of piracy would seriously impact the state’s reputation and increase 
insurance premiums. In other words, using the term ‘piracy’ in all cases would have a 
severe effect on the good name of the state and the shipping industry. Attacks or 
robbery against ships at sea carried out with weapons normally involve the carrying of 
dangerous items such as guns, rifles, machine-guns, knives, or even automatic 
weapons which might make the offender liable under Sections 390 to 402 of the Penal 
Code. In Southeast Asia, the criminal tendency to violence is not as great as that found 
in the seas off Africa. Asian pirates normally use weapons to cause fear and to 
threaten the ships’ crews. However, they sometimes become violent if resistance by 
the crews is apparent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
157  Interview with Commander Azhar, Royal Malaysian Navy, 2006. 
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6.4.3 PROSECUTING ARMED ROBBERS AGAINST SHIPS UNDER 
MALAYSIAN LAW: CASE EXAMPLES 
 
6.4.3.1      MT NEPLINE DELIMA INCIDENT: 
A celebrated case that shows the success of Malaysian law, this time in prosecuting 
ten
158
 Indonesian pirates who had committed armed robbery against a Malaysian 
tanker laden with 6,300 tonnes of diesel, was the incident of MT Nepline Delima. The 
incident occurred at 4 a.m., on 14 June 2005 in the Straits, approximately 30 nautical 
miles south of the Langkawi Islands, Malaysia. The ship was en route to Myanmar 
from Port Klang
159
 when the pirates, armed with weapons
160
, managed to board the 
tanker, taking control of the ship before disabling the tanker’s distress signal.161 They 
forced the master of the ship to call all the crew members who were then bound and 
blindfolded before being locked in the cabin. They also caused a head injury to the 
master, and hit and slapped some crew members who resisted. Meanwhile, 
unbeknownst to the pirates, one of the crew members was able to escape the scene, 
jumping off the ship and taking the pirates’ speed boat to call for help. When they 
realised that one crewman had escaped with their boat, they tried to manoeuvre the 
ship towards international waters. However, the size of the tanker prevented it from 
                                               
158  IMB-PRC Annual Report 2005; Cf Lourdes Charles, ‘Twelve pirates and two crewmen 
suspected of being accomplices of the mastermind behind the hijacking of MT Nepline Delima 
were arrested’ The Star Online (Kuala Lumpur, 22 June 2005) at 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/6/22/nation/11285916&sec=nation accessed on 
12 April 2011. 
159  ibid. 
160  It was not specified in the IMB report what types of weapon were used.  It was mentioned that 
the pirates were wielding parangs, i.e. a kind of long, large knife. See Peter Gwin ‘The Straits of 
Malacca Dark Passage’ in National Geographic October 2007, 127-149,138. 
161  Peter Gwin ‘The Straits of Malacca Dark Passage’ in National Geographic October 2007, 127-
149,138. 
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fleeing quickly even at top speed.
162
 Fortunately, the crew managed to contact the 
Malaysian Marine Police on Langkawi Island who then rescued the ship with five 
police patrol boats including a PZ15 gunboat.
163
 All ten pirates were then arrested 
together with two crew members of the tanker who were accused of complicity with 
the piracy syndicates.
164
 Gwin, a journalist with the National Geographic magazine 
who had interviewed one of the pirates from the MT Nepline Delima, Ariffin (also 
known as ‘John Palembang’), also confirmed the involvement of the co-conspirators 
among the crewmen who had been sending text messages from the ship revealing the 
ship’s position, course and speed.165 It appears that such assistance from the crew of 
the tanker itself had made the plan to rob the tanker easier. The pirates or, legally 
speaking, the armed robbers against the ship were charged under Sections 395
166
 and 
397
167
 of the Malaysian Penal Code; they may be liable for terms of imprisonment for 
up to twenty years and whipping. Maznah Abdul Aziz, the judge of the Session Court 
in Kedah, sentenced this group of pirates, or robbers, to seven years’ imprisonment.168 
 
 
 
 
                                               
162  ibid. 
163  Charles, Lourdes ‘MT Nepline Delima were arrested’ The Star Online (Kuala Lumpur, 22 June 
2000) http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/6/22/nation/11285916&sec=nation 
accessed on 12 April 2011. 
164  Fairplay Publications Limited, 11. 
165  Peter Gwin ‘The Straits of Malacca Dark Passage’ in National Geographic October 2007, 127-
149. 
166  s395 of the Malaysian Penal Code is punishment for gang robbery 
167  s397 of the Malaysian Penal Code provides punishment for robbery when armed or with 
attempts to cause death or grievous hurt. 
168  --‘Seven years Jail for Nine Pirates’ Bernama (Kuala Lumpur, MMEA, 19 February  2006) at 
<http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-142667534/seven-years-jail-nine.html> accessed 
on 12 April 2011. 
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6.4.3.2  MT SKY JUPITER 
On 19 September 2011, at about 12.49 a.m., a merchant ship, MT Sky Jupiter, was 
attacked by a group of Indonesian pirates who were attempted to rob that ship in the 
southern part of the Straits. However, the Malaysian authorities were able to arrest 
those pirates and they have been charged with gang robbery under s395 of the Penal 
Code of Malaysia. All of them pleaded guilty. The court in Johor sentenced them to 
ten years’ imprisonment and four strokes of the cane after being satisfied by the 
prosecutor’s argument on the seriousness of the crime.169 The criminals, however, 
appealed to mitigate the sentence.  Taking into account that they ‘had threatened the 
country’s sovereignty by encroaching into the country’s waters to rob’170 and the large 
amount of weapons seized during the incident, Justice Abdul Halim Aman, a session 
court judge, then increased their sentences from ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment and 
five strokes. 
 
  
6.4.3.2  MT FRONT QUEEN 
This incident took place in the southern part of the Straits near Kota Tinggi, Johor, on 
9 March 2011. All the Indonesian pirates were arrested by the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) shortly after they robbed the ship MT Front Queen, a 
Majuro Island-registered ship.
171
 The MMEA personnel who were patrolling that area 
during the incident had acted promptly to rescue the ship after they heard the ship’s 
                                               
169  --‘Malaysia Court jails six Indonesian Pirates’ Agence France-Presse (1 October 2011) 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/14301/malaysian-court-jails-six-indonesian-pirates> 
    accessed on  12 March  2012.  
170  --‘Six Indonesian Pirates get longer jail term’ The Star Online (3 February 2012) 
:<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2012/2/3/courts/10667185&sec=courts> accessed 
on 22 March 2012.  
171   --‘Marine agency arrests seven Indonesians for sea robbery,’ (9 March  2011) 
http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2011/03/09/marine-agency-arrests-7-
indonesians-for-sea-robbery 
256 
 
emergency alarm at about 3.15 a.m. Zulkifli Abu Bakar, MMEA Southern Region 
Chief, told the reporter that when they came close to the ship, the seven Indonesian 
pirates aged between 28 and 33 years had tried to escape with the stolen items in their 
wooden boat. MMEA also found some weapons such as knives, axes and spanners, as 
well as masks.
172
 
 
6.4.4 CASE-STUDY: MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE IN PROSECUTING 
PIRACY: MT BUNGA LAUREL 
The pirate attack on the high seas off the Gulf of Aden against MT Bunga Laurel was 
a historic incident which resulted in Malaysia’s first prosecution involving high seas 
piracy.
173
 This is because most of the attacks that had been successfully prosecuted 
previously involved armed robbery at sea where the existing local law could be 
implemented easily. However, this case involved various parties, thus rendering the 
identification of the jurisdiction of the Malaysian court to try the case quite a complex 
matter. The vessel was in Japanese ownership and registered as a Panama-flagged ship 
but was chartered by the Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC).
174
 In 
addition, it was operated by 29 Malaysian crew members and 10 Filipinos. The ship, 
laden with chemical tanks, was attacked en route to Singapore.
175
 
                                               
172 ibid. Also see: ‘Malaysia arrests Indonesian pirates after attacking tanker’ BNO News, Kuala 
Lumpur March 10, 2011: <http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world/malaysia-arrests-
indonesian-pirates-after-attacking-tanker_100512501.html> accessed on March, 22 2012.  
173  The case is also considered the first ever Asian court trial of Somali pirates who are currently 
contributing the largest number of piracy incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre; 
See: IMB PRC Annual Report 2011;  MM Malek, ‘Malaysia needs to overcome major legal 
hurdles to fight high-seas piracy’ The Star  (Kuala Lumpur, 7 Feb 2011); --‘Malaysia holds 
seven Somali pirates after saving ship The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 22 January 2011). 
174 IMB report; MT Laurel’s Incident: The RMN Experience <http:// 
navy.mil.my/wpns2012/.../MT%20LAUREL%20INCIDENT.pdf> accessed on 25 September 
2012. 
175  ibid. cf there were 23 Filipino crew members on board the vessel: --‘Court has jurisdiction to 
hear case of seven Somali pirates’ The New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur, 24 September 2012). 
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Picture 2: The Incident of MT Bunga Laurel
176
  
 
During the incident on 20 January 2011, the Royal Malaysian Navy (Paskal), which 
was escorting MISC vessels for their protection in this highly prone piracy-infested 
area, successfully prevented the attempt by seven Somali pirates to hijack the ship and 
kidnap the crew for ransom. Since Somalia is known as a weak state, the issue of who 
should take on the burden of apprehending the perpetrators and prosecuting acts of 
piracy arose.
177
  As a weak state with no functioning central government, for almost 
                                               
176
  K. Ashraf Kammed, Sharidan M. Ali, Shaun Ho Zuhrin Azam Ahmad, The Star (22 January 
2011). 
177  Cross-refer to Chapter 4; Somalia is regarded as a ‘failed state’ which since the 1990s has been  
under the management of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG): see  DR Rothwell and T 
Stephens  The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 432. 
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20 years Somalia has had no legal and judicial capability to suppress piracy; thus, the 
Malaysia Navy could not deliver the pirates to the Somali government for further 
action. Moreover, unlike the European Union and United States, which have adopted 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Kenya to receive and prosecute 
suspected pirates captured by the Kenyan authorities,
178
 Malaysia decided to bring the 
pirates to trial in a Malaysian court. Malaysia believes that subsequent legal action 
must be undertaken so that the perpetrators are not simply released without 
punishment. 
 
Does Malaysia have jurisdiction to try Somali pirates for acts committed outside 
Malaysian territorial sea?
179
 
Originally, the seven suspected Somali pirates were charged under Section 3 of the 
1971 Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act and Section 34 of the Penal Code in February, 
2011, before the Kuala Lumpur Magistrate’s Court.180 They were accused of 
discharging firearms at the Malaysian Navy during an attempted robbery of a 
Malaysian-operated vessel on the high seas in the Gulf of Aden (250 nautical miles off 
Oman). No pleas were recorded when the charge was read to them in this court. 
However, since such a charge carries a mandatory death penalty upon conviction, the 
case was transferred to the Kuala Lumpur High Court’s criminal division on 14 April 
2011. Moreover, as the case involved potential capital punishment, the Court ensured 
                                               
178  Kenya signed the MoU with the United States on January 16, 2009, with the European Union on 
March 6, 2009 and the United Kingdom on December 11, 2008: See James Thuo Gathii, 
‘Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured by Third States under Kenyan and 
International Law’ (2010) Loy.L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. (2010) Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, 101-140, 127. 
179  Unreported Case, 24 Sept 2012, Kuala Lumpur, High Court, Criminal Division,  Case Number: 
44-126-07/2012; an informal interview with one of the prosecuting officers of Attorney General 
Chambers, Lailawati held on 24 September 2012. 
180  Case Number: 450-23-2011. 
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that the pirates were represented by local counsel in order to preserve their rights in 
due process of law.  
 
Consequently, on 5 July 2012, Messrs Chooi & Co. filed  notice of a motion on behalf 
of a 16-year-old Somali juvenile, Kasayah Dhalin Hussein,
181
 to quash the charge on 
the basis that the High Court of Malaysia had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 
182
 The 
notice was supported by an affidavit affirmed in June, 2012, stating that the alleged 
offence occurred outside the territory of Malaysia. Moreover, the ship is not a 
Malaysian-flagged vessel. Following the application, the High Court heard the case on 
24 September 2012. 
 
The central argument revolved around the issue of whether the Malaysian High Court 
had jurisdiction to hear the case since it involved non-nationals attacking a non-
Malaysian-flagged ship beyond the Malaysian maritime zone. It was the argument of 
the defence counsel, Edmund Bon, that the prosecutor’s sanction to prosecute the 
foreign appellant was unfounded and blemished.
183
 Had the attack taken place in the 
Straits of Malacca, then only the Malaysian court would have had jurisdiction. 
However, in the present case, the location of the attack, which was thousands of miles 
                                               
181  Unreported Case, 24 Sept 2012, Kuala Lumpur, High Court, Criminal Division,  Case Number: 
44-126-07/2012. 
182  The Malaysian Insider: 12 July 2012 ‘Accused Somali Pirate contests local court’s jurisdiction.’, 
see: http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/litee/malaysia/article/accused-somali-pirate-contests-
local-courts-jurisdiction/ accessed on September 2012. 
183  ‘Applicant’s counsel Edmund Bon said the A-G's sanction to prosecute dated 11 Feb 2011, 
under Section 127(A)(1)(d) of the Criminal Prosecution Code should be set aside as it was 
baseless and flawed. “The incident is not proven to be a threat against Malaysian security as 
there was no sign that the ship was headed to Malaysia or planning to attack the country.’ Tariq, 
Qishin, ‘Seven Somalians accused of piracy offered lesser alternative charge.’ The Star, (24 
September 2012); Jennifer Gomez, ‘Court has Jurisdiction to Hear Case of Seven Somali 
Pirates’ The News Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur, 24 September  2012) accessed on 24 September 
2012. 
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from Malaysia, had hampered the jurisdiction of the Malaysian court. Moreover, at 
such a distance it is impossible to claim that Malaysian national security was affected. 
 
On the other hand, the deputy public prosecutor’s team led by Mohd Abazafree 
contended that Malaysia has jurisdiction to try the case under Malaysian national law, 
namely section 22 of the 1964 Court of Judicature Act and section 127(A)(1)(d) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code [Act 593]. The fact that the accused pirates had shot at the 
Malaysian navy, who were there to escort and protect a ship chartered by a Malaysian 
Company, was considered by the prosecutor to have affected the national security of 
Malaysia. Thus, the prosecutor has rightly issued sanctions for the purpose of 
prosecuting them before a Malaysian court.  Section 127 (A)(1)(d) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code [Act 593]
184
 reads as follow: 
127A. (1) Any offence under Chapter VI and VIA of the Penal Code, 
any offence under any of the written laws specified in the Schedule to 
the Extra-territorial Offences Act 1976 [Act 163], or any offence under 
any other written law the commission of which is certified by the 
Attorney General to affect the security of Malaysia committed, as the 
case may be- 
(a) on the high seas on board any ship or any aircraft registered in 
Malaysia; 
(b) by any citizen or any permanent resident on the high seas on board any 
ship or on any aircraft;  
(c) by any citizen or any permanent resident in any place without and 
beyond the limits of Malaysia; 
(d) by any person against a citizen of Malaysia;  
... 
May be dealt with as if it had been committed at any place within Malaysia: 
(emphasised added) 
It is clearly stated in the provision that, although the perpetrator is not a Malaysian 
citizen, an offence has been committed against a citizen of Malaysia. In the present 
                                               
184  See CPC (Amendment) Act 2006 [Act A1274]. 
261 
 
case, the offence referred to is the act of firing on the Malaysian navy by Somali 
pirates; thus, the power vested in the Attorney General to certify such an offence as 
affecting the security of Malaysia cannot be disputed. Consequently, it may therefore 
be dealt with as if it had been committed in Malaysia. The judge, after giving due 
consideration to the arguments of both the prosecuting officer and the applicant’s 
counsel, decided in favour of the prosecuting officer. The application was therefore 
dismissed. Thus, the Court was able to proceed with the trial of the Somali pirates 
under section 3 of the 1971 Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act as conferred by section 
22 of the 1964 CJA.
185
  
 
However, it is pertinent to note that the prosecuting officers’ arguments in establishing 
the jurisdiction of the Malaysian High Court and the validity of its sanction over such 
an extraterritorial offence in the present case have not raised any international law 
principles on piracy.
186
 Since the high court has affirmed its jurisdiction to try Somali 
pirates in this case, it seems to suggest that existing Malaysian legal framework is 
adequate to serve as a medium to prosecute and punish both piracy armed robbery at 
sea. In addition, Malaysian local law has embraced international law principles to 
facilitate efforts to suppress piracy wherever it occurs.  It is suggested that the 
prosecuting officers’ basis of prosecution would be more credible and persuasive were 
the public international principles on the law of piracy also to be raised. The universal 
jurisdiction over the crime of piracy as conferred by the customary international law 
has demonstrated the seriousness of the crime. Moreover, the Security Council of the 
UN has issued a Special Resolution on Piracy in Somalia to the extent that foreign 
                                               
185  Cross-refer to Chapter 6 at page ?? 
186  Based on an interview with DPP Lailawati on 24th September 2012 in the courtroom following 
the hearing of application made to quash the charge by defendant’s counsel. 
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armed forces are allowed to pursue the pirates within Somali waters.
187
 Thus, it would 
be against the spirit of the international law were the Attorney General’s sanction to 
prosecute the Somali pirates in the Malaysian High Court to be quashed.  The Bunga 
Laurel incident and subsequent trial is important to highlight the legal point used by 
the Malaysian court in establishing the basis of jurisdiction to prosecute piracy under 
Malaysian law.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 The safety and security of the Straits has always been Malaysia’s priority. As a state 
that is largely dependent on seaborne trade, Malaysia has responded positively to most 
recommendations and assistance given by IMO, other states and stakeholders. In fact, 
Malaysia’s adoption and ratification of the 1982 Convention indicates the country’s 
willingness to compromise its interests with other users over the Straits. As 
international law is mainly based on treaties between participating parties, a state is 
expected to comply with and adhere to such law. As a littoral state of one of the 
important straits in the world, Malaysia’s role of guaranteeing freedom of navigation 
and ensuring the safety and security of ships is crucial. In this context, Malaysia is 
undertaking this task prudently by steadily strengthening its policy and legal 
framework in terms of enforcement capability and adequacy of the law. Historically, 
laws regulating the sea in this state have existed for centuries. It is clear that the over-
dramatised concern expressed about the flourishing of incidents of piracy in the Straits 
                                               
187   Cross-refer to Chapter 3; On 16 December, 2008, the UN Security Council decided that: 
‘...States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast - for which prior notification had been provided by 
Somalia’s Transitional Federal government to the Secretary General - could undertake all 
necessary measures ‘appropriate in Somalia’...’ 
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in the early twenty-first century was not the sole reason for Malaysia to intensify its 
efforts to combat piracy in the Straits. In fact, the sea patrols within the Malaysian 
maritime zone were being enforced long before the incidents of piracy were reported.  
The Malaysian authorities have, over the years, caught and prosecuted armed robbers 
of ships; however, for Malaysia, these incidents are not ‘piracy’ as it is termed under 
international law because the attacks mainly occur in the territorial sea. Despite some 
criticism, it is believed that the recent establishment of the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) as a coastguard service may enable Malaysia to fully 
utilise its assets and manpower and at the same time effectively scrutinise the best 
cooperative mechanisms with other littoral states. It must be given a chance to play its 
role effectively in parallel with the objective of its formation. 
 
The above highlighting of various incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits 
has shown Malaysia’s capability of combating such crime either individually or, in 
some cases, with the help of other littoral states. It is important to emphasise that, 
since there are no formal law reports on such cases, most of the facts pertaining to the 
cases are taken from newspapers. Although it has no specific law on piracy, Malaysia 
has adequate legal provision to prosecute and punish both piracy and armed robbery 
against ships under the Penal Code, Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act and some other 
relevant laws. Certainly, it has no difficulty in prosecuting armed robbers since their 
crimes occur within state sovereign jurisdiction; however, when it comes to piracy 
there is a need to address some aspects provided under international law. Although 
pirates are considered enemies of mankind and universal jurisdiction is conferred to 
deal with them, in practice states will avoid invoking such jurisdiction. Malaysia is 
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one of the countries that never invokes such jurisdiction, not because there are no 
attacks on ships in its maritime area of the Straits but because no such crime of piracy 
has ever occurred in the Straits.  The attack on the Bunga Laurel by Somali pirates in 
February 2011 is considered the first piracy case ever to be prosecuted in Malaysia. 
Although the incident occurred on the high seas in the Gulf of Aden and not within the 
Straits of Malacca, the case has been highlighted in this chapter with the purpose of 
explaining the issue of the adequacy of Malaysian law to prosecute piracy. It is 
acknowledged that the plummeting number of cases of piracy and armed robbery 
attacks in the Straits is mainly due to the cooperation among the littoral states with the 
help of certain other maritime states. Thus, it is submitted that, in order to ensure the 
safety and security of the Straits, each party involved has to play its role, especially 
the littoral states. Without their full support for the system of law that was designed in 
collaboration with other states and their courage in consistently improving their 
internal security approach and legal framework, the problem of piracy will never end 
nor even decrease. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
History has shown the existence of piracy since time immemorial. Although 
contemporary piracy is radically different from former types of piracy,
188
 the same 
threat to shipping industries continues to exist.  The efforts to curb the problem of 
piracy have long been an important agenda at international, regional and national 
levels. In fact, one of the points highlighted during the early period of codification of 
the international law concerns the issue of piracy. It is undeniable that piracy exists in 
almost every part of the world. However, various extra-legal factors underlie the 
emergence of piracy and they differ from one region to another. 
 
General principles governing a State’s rights and duties in different maritime zones 
are well established under the 1982 Convention. For straits used for international 
navigation, such as the Straits of Malacca which are recognised as one of the 
important straits in the world, the duties of the littoral States to ensure safety and 
security of ships transiting the Straits are crucial. This is especially true when the 
Straits, which is located mostly in the territorial sea of these States has long been a 
piracy- and armed robbery-infested area and was once declared a war-risk zone. 
Although the 1982 Convention lays down several provisions on piracy and the 
customary international law has conferred universal jurisdiction over such crime, as its 
perpetrators are considered enemies of all humankind, in practice these measures have 
                                               
188   Cross-refer to Chapter 2 on the evolution of piracy in international law. 
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not entirely solved the problem. Consequently, the debate surrounding the issue of 
piracy is receiving wide coverage from various bodies around the world, especially 
the mass media and the stakeholders. It was the aim of this research to assess the 
different approaches to solving the problem of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits 
with an emphasis and focus on the Malaysian perspective and experience on this issue. 
To achieve the aim, the central question considered here is whether the existing 
international law and its instruments, regional and extra-regional cooperation, as well 
as the Malaysian legal framework and policies are adequate and capable of addressing 
this issue. 
 
This study has examined several related questions on the legal status of the Straits, the 
law on piracy in international law and specifically, the 1982 Convention, as well as 
responses to contemporary issues of piracy and armed robbery against ships at 
international, regional and national levels. The initial part of the thesis highlighted the 
significance of the Straits, before the study turns to the general principles of the 
international law of the sea and law of piracy that provide a backdrop for determining 
whether Malaysia is in compliance with the existing rules of international law.  
Following this, the second part looked at the regional and extra-regional responses as 
well as Malaysia’s capability and adequacy at regional and national levels in dealing 
with the issue at hand. 
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7.1 HAS THE AIM OF THIS STUDY BEEN ACHIEVED? 
It is pertinent to mention that the study of the legal analysis of piracy and armed 
robbery in the Straits of Malacca is motivated by the author’s curiosity to discover 
why the Straits became a piracy-infested area that was once declared as a zone at risk 
of ‘war, strike, terrorism and related perils’ by Lloyd’s Joint War Committee (JWC), 
and to what extent Malaysia, as one of the littoral states in the Straits, has resolved the 
issue. The following highlighted points are important to answer the concerns 
surrounding the issue of contemporary piracy and armed robbery against ships. The 
study is crucial and is expected to contribute to the on-going research on security of 
maritime space and navigational ships, particularly for Malaysia. Due to the scarcity 
of literature exploring Malaysia’s view on this issue, it is hoped that the thesis can 
provide a holistic and thoughtful view from which others can learn and which can be 
used for future research. 
 
7.2    RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.2.1 PROBLEM OF DEFINITION OF PIRACY 
 It is found that, as the Straits is used for international navigation, being strategically 
located at the connection point between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the issue of 
piracy has been a subject of concern for numerous parties, particularly the 
stakeholders.  The well-known attempt to measure the fluctuation and magnitude of 
piracy incidents all around the world, that is, the annual and quarterly reports issued 
by the Piracy Reporting Centre of IMB in Kuala Lumpur, has suggested that the main 
area contributing to the high percentage of piracy incidents in the world from the year 
2000 until the mid-2000s was the Straits and territorial waters of Indonesia.  However, 
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legally speaking it is not really ‘piracy’ that has become endemic in the Straits since 
piracy, as defined under Article 101 of the 1982 Convention, requires certain 
conditions to be fulfilled including the requirement for such crime to have occurred on 
the high seas and beyond the jurisdiction of any states. Both Malaysia and Indonesia 
have argued that, since the extension of the territorial seas of both states from three to 
twelve nautical miles, which is in parallel with the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, there 
is no longer a high seas corridor in the Straits. This means that, technically, there will 
be no piracy incidents in the territorial sea except ‘armed robbery against ships.’ It is 
noteworthy that this issue has arisen due to the different definition of piracy held by 
the IMB, the body responsible for issuing the statistics on piracy through the PRC. For 
the IMB, no distinctions exist between attacks on the high seas and in territorial 
waters. In addition, motive is irrelevant; be it for private ends or for political reasons, 
it may be considered as piracy by the IMB. Meanwhile, for Malaysia and its 
counterparts, the implication of the word ‘piracy’ is devastating and may cause 
erosion and detriment to their sovereignty. This is due to the fact that, under 
international customary law, piracy is subject to universal jurisdiction in which all 
states have the power to catch and prosecute the perpetrators, as it is regarded as a 
crime against humankind. Therefore, although the overwhelming reliance on the 
statistics produced by IMB has, to some extent, triggered international concern over 
the position of the Straits’ security, in the event of inconsistencies the legal definition 
of piracy in the 1982 UNCLOS should prevail.  
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7.2.2  APPLICABILITY AND RELEVANCE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
FOR CONTEMPORARY PIRACY 
It may be argued that the well-established principle of universal jurisdiction may or 
may not be suitable for contemporary piracy and armed robbery incidents. The 
historical foundation for this principle in piracy lies in the heinousness of the crime 
which occurs on the high seas and beyond the jurisdiction of any state. For this reason 
it is called ‘pirata est hostis generis humani’ which means ‘piracy is the enemy of 
humankind’. In the context of the littoral States of the Straits, such a basis of 
jurisdiction has rarely been invoked by the states. They normally prefer to use 
diplomacy or invoke other means of establishing jurisdiction in order to avoid 
controversial prosecutions, particularly since the 1982 Convention is silent on the 
method of prosecution and imposition of punishment and has not specified any 
penalties for the pirates. This issue demonstrates the weakness of the 1982 Convention 
in its failure to adequately define the term ‘piracy’ and provide a basis for the 
prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of piracy. It leaves the matters of 
enforcement action, which relate to substantive and procedural process, to the 
individual states. This means that such a universal crime will not be subject to special 
courts or universal punishment; rather it will be punished according to the municipal 
law of an individual state.
189
 However, enforcement might be difficult or impossible to 
implement if a state does not have any local law regulating piracy or crimes 
resembling it. Thus, states need to further incorporate relevant law pertaining to the 
crime of piracy into their domestic legislation and to establish the jurisdiction of the 
local courts to try such crimes. Having said that, it is not expected that each state will 
                                               
189  Dubner (1979) 488 
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need to have similar, precise and identical rules of enforcement; rather, it will be 
sufficient for states to have consistent practical laws that meet the ultimate goal of the 
1982 Convention to combat and suppress piracy. As far as Malaysia is concerned, 
although it is empowered under Section 22 (1)(a)(iv) of the Court of Judicature Act 
1964 to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, its national courts 
have never asserted such jurisdiction. One of the reasons is that most of the attacks 
were not piracy but armed robbery against ships, for which the Malaysian Penal Code 
is applicable. Furthermore, Malaysia always adopts a cautious approach and thus 
prefers to apply other bases to establish criminal jurisdiction such as territorial 
principle, nationality principle and protective principle. It is also the practice of 
Malaysia to enact a domestic law to give effect to a treaty obligation rather than 
giving a straightforward effect to customary international law obligation. Thus, in the 
event of a request for the extradition of a pirate, which is based on the universal 
jurisdiction, it is still necessary to first satisfy section 6 of the 1992 Extradition Act 
that requires the offence to be punishable by both countries and for the extra-territorial 
criminal jurisdiction to be established. 
 
7.2.3   THE NEXUS BETWEEN PIRACY AND TERRORISM AND THE 1988 
SUA CONVENTION 
The rampant piracy attacks in the Straits have also led to the anecdotal view that there 
is a nexus between piracy and terrorism. Halberstam is an example of a well-known 
commentator whose idea on this nexus has often been quoted by others. In addition, 
Ong suggests that there are similarities between piracy and maritime terrorism in four 
areas. First is the implication of this crime for global security, second is the modus 
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operandi employed, third is the weapons used and fourth is the use of violence. 
Burgess goes further in suggesting that, similar to the crime of piracy, universal 
jurisdiction might also be applicable to terrorism.  However, the opponents of this 
view hold to the legal meaning of piracy in Article 101 of the 1982 Convention which 
clearly departs from political motives. Although there is no authoritative meaning of 
maritime terrorism, it is a well-established principle that the act of terrorism is carried 
out for political or ideological purposes and is always coupled with the threat of mass 
devastation. Thus, it is timely to acknowledge the opinion of Rubin and Good who 
hold that, while universal jurisdiction is no longer suitable for contemporary piracy, 
the idea of connecting these two crimes in order to invoke universal jurisdiction is also 
inappropriate.  
 
The declaration of the Straits as a ‘war-risk zone’ based on the perception that the 
peril of piracy in the Straits might equivalently lead to maritime terrorism has no valid 
or legal basis and is improper. According to Khalid, the risk of reported attacks in the 
Straits was less than 0.001 per cent of its total traffic volume.
190
  Raymond also agrees 
with this view, highlighting the finding that, of the total number of alleged terrorist 
attacks worldwide, maritime terrorist attacks have contributed only two per cent and 
none of the terrorist acts have taken place in the Straits.
191
 Thus, it is submitted that it 
is reasonable for Indonesia and Malaysia to give priority to national security issues 
which need immediate attention over the issue of potential terrorism. This does not 
                                               
190  ibid. This is based on 38 attacks in the Straits against 63,636 ships traversing the Straits in 2004 
as reported in 2004 IMB-PRC Annual Report; cf. S Bateman, CZ Raymond and J Ho ‘Safety 
and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for Action’ (May 2006) Institute 
of Defence and Strategic Studies Policy Paper, 20: ‘the proportion of ships attacked …ranges 
from 0.06 percent to 0.19 percent of the total number of ships using the Straits annually, but 
these are predominantly on vessels on local voyages.’ 
191  Apart from a small number of hostage-taking incidents: CZ Raymond ‘The Threat of Maritime 
Terrorism in the Malacca Straits’ (February 9, 2006) Vol.4 Terrorism Monitor issue 3. 
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mean that no action towards preventing this potential crime will be taken; rather, the 
real dangers that are rampant in the internal and territorial waters, including armed 
robbery against ships in port and at anchor, illegal immigration, smuggling and human 
trafficking, must be emphasised first. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the 1988 SUA Convention was adopted in Rome on 10 
March 1988 with a view to rectifying the definitional problem of piracy in the 1982 
Convention and to address the issue of maritime terrorism. The Achille Lauro 
incident, which involved a political motive, prompted the adoption and enforcement 
of the SUA Convention within a short period of time. Surprisingly, although it was 
adopted in 1988, six years after the adoption of the 1982 Convention, it came into 
force two years earlier than the 1982 Convention. In fact, the 1988 SUA Convention 
came under review in 2005 to further strengthen maritime security in order to respond 
to the terrorist attack on New York’s Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. The fear 
of a potential terrorist attack that might use floating ships to destroy important 
waterways, particularly the Straits, has raised the concerns of the international 
community on security conditions in the Straits. Due to the difficulty in distinguishing 
between the acts of piracy and terrorism when taking place at sea, the 1988 SUA 
Convention gave a wider definition to what would constitute an ‘unlawful act.’ This 
term will certainly include both crimes in its scope. It provides a basis of jurisdiction 
for the participating states to try or extradite the perpetrators. It is likely that the 1988 
SUA Convention is more advanced than the 1982 Convention in that it provides 
provisions which will help solve the problem of ‘catching and releasing’ the pirates 
and armed robbers, which is claimed to be rampant in the Straits. Although its attempt 
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to improve the provision for prosecution of pirates has been relatively successful, it is 
not able to solve the problem in the Straits effectively. This is primarily due to the fact 
that the main littoral States of the Straits, namely Malaysia and Indonesia, have thus 
far not been parties to the Convention. Consequently, they are not bound by the 
provisions of the 1988 SUA Convention. According to a Malaysian Government 
officer on the National Security Council, Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia has 
yet to ratify the 1988 SUA Convention pending amendment of related domestic law. It 
is suggested that, although not a party to the 1988 SUA Convention, Malaysia has 
complied with the rule of international law under the 1982 Convention in giving full 
cooperation to combat piracy. 
 
However, it appears that the lack of a legal definition of piracy is not the sole reason 
why piracy cannot be curtailed. It is not surprising that piracy still exists today, as the 
crimes of robbery on land, murder and so forth have not been eliminated totally either. 
Although both have certain weaknesses, it is suggested that the 1982 Convention and 
1988 SUA Convention can still generally be considered useful tools for combating 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. Hence, this is not the time to be overly 
concerned with the technical problem of the definition; rather, it is timely to find the 
best solution to rectify and improve the weaknesses in the existing international laws. 
Thus, states, as important entities in international law, are responsible for carrying out 
this duty. Without the cooperation of states, the objective of having a set of laws or 
treaties at international level will not be achieved.  
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7.2.4   ARE THE LITTORAL STATES AT FAULT FOR PIRACY IN THE 
STRAITS?  
It is argued by Sittnick that Malaysia and Indonesia have not sufficiently carried out 
their duty to suppress piracy and generally are not capable of ensuring the safety and 
security of the Straits from maritime crime.
192
 Consequently, he suggests that both 
States may be held responsible for a breach of international obligations.  His assertion 
has been strongly opposed by Hamid who argues that these States have from time to 
time fortified their efforts to secure the Straits from any risk of maritime crime.
193
 
Thus, they have exercised due diligence and cannot be made responsible for the 
growing threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. It is also argued that 
Sitnick’s suggestion was made in 2005, the year in which the cooperative efforts 
between the littoral States had just begun. In fact the littoral States have in many 
instances responded to the upsurge of piracy in the Straits, intensifying their efforts 
regionally and domestically in combating piracy and armed robbery. Although the 
IMB’s definition of piracy is broader than that of the 1982 Convention in terms of 
location of the attack, the IMB has, since 2005, received only trivial reports on piracy 
and armed robbery in the Straits. This dramatic reduction has prompted the media to 
recognise the success of the Straits States which have achieved ‘a close-to-zero 
incident level.’ This has undoubtedly resulted from the cooperative mechanisms 
between the littoral States. Mukundan, the director of IMB, also acknowledged that 
the reduction in piracy incidents in the Straits is due to the efforts of the littoral States; 
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& Policy Journal 761-767.  
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these efforts should be praised and other States may learn from them. In fact it is not 
surprising that this trend has become one the factors influencing the JWC to withdraw 
the Straits from Lloyd’s list of war-risk zones in August 2006.  
 
7.2.5  EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS UNDERLYING PIRACY AND ARMED  
ROBBERY IN THE STRAITS 
Piracy, a well-known crime that has been considered one of the oldest illegal 
professions, has affected the world community for centuries. Similar to the problem of 
defining piracy, the reason why the crime cannot be totally eliminated lies in the 
factors that led to its emergence, which differ from one state or region to another.  
Thus, apart from analysing the legal aspects of the issue of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in the Straits, it is important to examine the extra-legal factors 
underlying such crime in the Straits. The idea of designating pirates as enemies of 
mankind, which originated in the European region, was to ensure the freedom of 
navigation or Mare Liberum. Originally, the theory of Mare Liberum was propounded 
by a Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, to challenge Portuguese and Spanish domination
194
 of 
the sea routes to the East Indies, including the Straits.
195
 These European powers had 
colonised the states surrounding the Straits of Malacca around the year 1511 and 
claimed that any interference with their ships at sea would be considered piracy. In 
opposition to this idea, the English jurist John Selden had proposed the idea of Mare 
Clausum which recognised state power over some parts of the sea. While, during that 
                                               
194  At that time Portugal had been united with Spain. See RP Anand, ‘Maritime Practice in South-
East Asia until 1600 AD and the Modern Law of the Sea’ (1981) 30 ICLQ 442. 
195  DP O’Connell (IA Shearer (ed.)), The International Law of the Sea (vol 1, Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1982) 9; E Fletcher, ‘John Selden (Author of Mare Clausum) and His Contribution to 
International Law’ (1933) 19 Transactions of the Grotius Society, Problems of Peace and War 7; 
MB Vieira ‘Mare liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on 
Dominion over the seas’, (2003) 64 Journal of the History of Ideas, 361; PB Potter, The 
Freedom of the Seas in History, Law and Politics (Longmans, Green and Co, London 1924) 57. 
276 
 
time, the local rulers who prevented the main waterway surrounding their state from 
being illegally occupied by outsiders were regarded as pirates, the modern 
international law of the sea has now established the rule that the motive for attack 
must be for private ends.  
 
There appear to be various reasons that have led to the flourishing of contemporary 
piracy and armed robbery in the Straits, with money or private gain as the main 
motivation. According to the IMB, the attacks that are rampant in the Straits are low-
level armed robberies mostly carried out by opportunist pirates. Murphy, Young and 
Banlaoi agree that weak governance (legal and jurisdictional weakness), economic 
crisis and favourable geography are major factors in piracy.
196
 The lack of strong 
political will and unstable governance will embolden pirates to attack ships. The huge 
coastline coupled with weak port security and under-funded enforcement officers who 
practise corruption has made the situation even worse. Thus it is unsurprising that two 
of the largest archipelago states in the world - Indonesia and the Philippines - have 
been recognised as piracy hot spots. These states’ small islands provide plentiful 
hideouts for pirates.
197
 Based on the numbers of unreported cases of armed robbery 
against ships in the Straits, it is believed that most of the pirates or armed robbers of 
this kind are Indonesians operating from Indonesian islands such as Batam, Aceh and 
Riau.
198
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(Copenhagen: NIAS Press 2006) 5. 
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It is submitted on behalf of Malaysia that, since piracy and armed robbery in the 
Straits is a trans-border crime whose perpetrators are mainly nationals of another state, 
namely Indonesia, cooperation among the enforcement officers of the littoral States is 
crucial. It is suggested that, were the root causes of piracy to be tackled, this problem 
might be totally eradicated or at least reduced and managed efficiently. 
 
7.2.6 REGIONAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL EFFORTS 
It appears quite likely that piracy will remain a problem in the 21
st
 century. The 
question of how to best suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea in its modern form 
cannot be answered merely by examining the adequacy of the existing legal 
framework on piracy. It is the hope of the stakeholders that the Straits will remain safe 
and secure in order to retain their important function as the shortest sea route 
connecting the India and Pacific Oceans. Thus, when the report by the IMB and other 
media reports showed a dramatic increase in piracy in Southeast Asian waters, 
particularly the Straits, this situation urged every stakeholder to solve the problem 
collectively. At the regional level, ASEAN has played its role by hosting seminars and 
establishing ARF to further discuss the issue of maritime security and implement its 
plan of action. As argued by Jones and Smith, the preoccupation with mutual respect 
for sovereignty and equality as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of 
another state has been considered an obstacle impeding the regional cooperative 
mechanism.
199
 Many commentators are emphasizing that ASEAN regionalism, while 
frequently stating the need for mutual cooperation in tackling the security issues, has 
                                               
199  David Martin Jones and Michael LR Smith, ‘Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the 
Evolving East Asian Regional Order’ 32 [2007] 1 Journal of International Security, 148-
184,169; ADH Poole ‘Cooperation in Contention: The Evolution of ASEAN Norms’ YCISS 
working paper number 44 Jan 2007 p.1-2 in www.yorku.ca/yciss/whatsnew/documents/WP44-
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not really implemented it in actual practice.
200
 It has also been argued that there has 
never been a mechanism for resolving conflicting territorial claims among its 
members. The reason for this is simply the fact that suppressing such crimes requires 
some deterioration of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.
201
 Thus, the 
idea of regional multilateral security cooperation is limited to bilateral agreements 
between members. Despite this sceptical view, Severino comments that, for decades, 
ASEAN took some considerable steps towards realising certain regional goals.
202
  
Thus, to deprecate ASEAN’s efforts in tackling transnational issues such as piracy 
would be to overlook this organisation’s capability and potential competency. Despite 
the challenges to intra-ASEAN multilateral security cooperation, the bilateral defence 
and security ties have undergone a speedy expansion.
203
 Redha believes that, despite 
ASEAN’s shortcomings as a regional security organisation, it has been regarded as an 
umbrella under which member states may take up bilateral or multilateral security 
initiatives.
204
 More often than not, ASEAN states are able to display toleration and put 
aside their self-interests to show their commitment to security cooperation, especially 
when the threat exists within their area. 
 
Piracy incidents in the Straits had also raised the concerns of the extra-regional 
maritime nations, particularly the main users of the Straits, namely Japan and the 
United States. They have relentlessly planned and offered assistance to suppress 
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piracy in the Straits, including proposing the RMSI and ReCAAP. As far as RMSI, 
which was proposed by the United States, was concerned, initially Malaysia and 
Indonesia hesitated to accept their assistance for fear that this might affect their 
sovereignty over their parts of the territorial sea in the Straits.
 205
 Both states believed 
that they possessed the capacity to ensure security in the Straits without any 
deployment of extra-regional forces. However, they finally announced their 
willingness to accept help when the United States further explained that it was not 
their intention to deploy the US Army but merely to assist the littoral States in terms 
of funds, training and expertise in maintaining maritime security. As for the ReCAAP, 
which was propounded by Japan, the littoral States welcomed the idea of cooperation 
more than they had done with the RMSI. ReCAAP was agreed by sixteen countries in 
2004, opened for signature on 28 February 2005 and came into force on 4 September 
2006.
206
 ReCAAP ISC was formally recognised as an international organisation on 30 
January 2007.
207
 This instrument is the first multilateral agreement of its kind and has 
three basic elements, namely Information Sharing between the contracting states, 
Capacity Building and Cooperative Arrangement. It embraces the definition of piracy 
provided in the 1982 Convention and the definition of armed robbery against ships as 
entailed by the IMO’s Code of Practice for the Investigation of Armed Robbery 
against Ships. It clearly shows respect for and non-interference in a state’s 
                                               
205  In his speech, he stated: ‘we are looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special 
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jurisdiction.
208
 Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that ReCAAP does not extend to 
providing enforcement mechanisms, nor does it envisage coordinated or joint patrols 
among contracting countries. 
209
 Thus, it might be concluded that ReCAAP is a good 
instrument to formalise cooperation and coordination among the contracting states, 
but it still needs robust support from the states to enforce the law at their national 
levels in order to effectively combat piracy and armed robbery against ships.  
 
Nevertheless, Malaysia and Indonesia remain signatories that have yet to ratify the 
ReCAAP,
210
 which was considered to be to the detriment of the main purpose of 
ReCAAP.
211
 This is due to the fact that most of incidents of attacks against ships in 
the Straits during that time, took place within territorial seas of both states. According 
to Storey, the concern over sovereignty has been a strong impediment to these two 
states joining the ReCAAP.
212
 However, Ho pointed out that, although Malaysia and 
Indonesia have not yet ratified the ReCAAP agreement, the willingness of maritime 
agencies of both states, namely Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) 
and Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board (BAKORKAMLA), to 
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  Art 2(5) ReCAAP; See also Robin Geis and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: 
The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (OUP, 
Oxford 2011) 46-47. 
209   JF Bradford ‘Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Response’ [2004] 26 Contemporary Southeast Asia, 480-505,492. 
210  The seventeen Contracting Parties are: the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei 
Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet 
Nam. 
211  Yoichiro sato ‘Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation,’ Asia 
Pacific Center for Security Studies September 2007 
212  Ian Storey ‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Two Cheers for Regional Cooperation’ in 
Daljit Singh (ed.) Southeast Asian Affairs 2009 (ISEAS, Singapore 2009) 42. 
281 
 
cooperate in sharing information with ISC will help to bridge the gap.
213
 Indeed, both 
states, despite not yet ratifying the ReCAAP Agreement, have agreed to cooperate at 
the highest level.
214
 
 
7.2.7 MALAYSIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Malaysia’s endeavour in ensuring maritime security in the Straits is reflected in its 
reaction and strategy to suppress piracy and other maritime threats by not only 
participating in cooperative mechanisms with its counterparts, but also by 
strengthening its law and policy to ensure compliance with the spirit of international 
law. There is no doubt that the state is an important entity and vehicle for 
implementing international law and treaties; without it, the latter seems to have no 
function.  As a coastal state historically recognised as a great entrepôt in the region, 
Malaysia definitely regards the Straits as significant for its economic resources. Thus, 
protection of the Straits is not undertaken merely for the sake of gaining a good 
reputation in the eyes of the international community, as argued by some 
commentators; it is also in Malaysia’s interests.  
 
Philippe comments that, although international law empowered and mandated states to 
punish piracy through the acceptable rule of universal jurisdiction, the implementation 
of the international law over such crime is complicated as it would involve national 
legislation, political will, sufficient funds and assets, and efficient enforcement power 
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by a particular state.
215
 It is obvious that the states that possess sufficient funds and 
naval resources, actionable capacity-building and intelligence, as well as effective law 
enforcement and judicial finality, will have the ability to provide complete deterrence 
against such a threat.  
 
Malaysia believes that piracy, as a non-traditional security threat, requires continuous 
attention and effective law enforcement. The cooperative action jointly implemented 
by Malaysia and its counterparts, Indonesia and Singapore, such as the MALSINDO 
and Eyes in the Sky,
216
 might not have been achieved without each individual state’s 
internal pro-action and serious attempts to tackle the issue before them.
217
  Thus, it 
may be said that efforts to tackle transnational crime should begin with the 
establishing of good governance in each local state.  
 
In pursuance of this aim, enforcement powers allowing the initial arrest of persons, the 
instigation of criminal proceedings and the effective prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators are equally important for ensuring long-term success in the suppression of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
(MMEA) was established on February 15, 2005, about a year after the MMEA Act 
came into force, with the intention of providing a single but efficient body that could 
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integrate enforcement work and improve coordination between the existing agencies. 
The purpose of this is to ensure that good ocean governance in the Malaysian 
Maritime Zone (MMZ) is achieved. Although subsection 2 of section 6 limits the 
functions of the MMEA to the MMZ, subsection 3 extends the jurisdiction of MMEA 
on the high seas. This does not contravene the freedom of the high seas as guaranteed 
in the 1982 Convention.
218
 A similar right is also conferred in Malaysia’s Extra-
Territorial Offences Act 1976 (ETOA 1976) which gives extra-territorial power to 
Malaysia to enforce its law, not only on ships registered in Malaysia but also for 
offences committed by its citizens or permanent residents on board any ship or aircraft 
on the high seas or in any place beyond the limits of Malaysia.
219
 The extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of Malaysian court to try piracy cases that occurred outside Malaysia 
territorial water but against Malaysian national which considered as affecting national 
security is also provided under the new Amendment of Section 127(1)(A)(d) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code which has been upheld recently by the high court in the 
prosecution of seven Somali Pirates in MT Bunga Laurel’s incident.220 
 
Section 6(3) (c) makes it the responsibility of MMEA to prevent and suppress piracy 
on the high seas. Since piracy has generally been accepted as a crime against 
humankind and is subject to universal jurisdiction, this section is in line with the 1982 
Convention.
221
 MMEA also gained the right to exercise hot pursuit, as prescribed in 
Article 111 of the 1982 Convention, under section 7 of the 2004 Act. Thus Malaysia, 
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in response to frequent incidents of piracy worldwide, is moving positively to provide 
an effective domestic law enforcement agency, namely the MMEA, to ensure safety 
and security of navigation.  
 
As far as the Straits is concerned, most incidents of piracy or armed robbery against 
ships took place either within the territorial sea or internal waters of the littoral States, 
including in ports and harbours. In such cases, the criminals are legally classified as 
robbers and are normally charged according to Malaysian domestic law, particularly 
the Penal Code and Firearms (Increased Penalty) Act 1960. Nevertheless, even if 
Malaysia were to prosecute pirates whose crimes occurred on the high seas, the 
similar law might still be applied depending on the nature of the criminal act, and 
without the need for a specific law on maritime piracy.
222
 The punishment would be 
similar to other land-based crimes of armed robbery, gang robbery or theft as 
prescribed in the Malaysian Penal Code. Thus, it is submitted that, for similar acts of 
piracy or armed robbery against ships occurring in the territorial sea including the 
Straits and on the high seas where the extra-territorial principle and protective 
principle can be applied, the Malaysian Penal Code and other related provisions may 
still be applied without the need for a specific law on piracy. Nevertheless, as a dualist 
state,
223
 it is undoubtedly the case that, were Malaysia to enact a law on piracy, this 
would provide a strong basis for prosecution of piracy; such prosecutions would not 
be restricted to incidents occurring in the Straits but would also extend to other 
regions such as the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters.  
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7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships have continued since the 
historical period. This is a fact that must be accepted. But this does not mean that 
improvements to the existing law and instruments for combating the crime cannot be 
achieved. However, piracy or, as it is legally referred to, armed robbery against ships 
if occur within territorial sea can still be reduced and contained to prevent it spreading 
further, possibly leading to more disastrous impacts such as maritime terrorism. Thus 
the thesis recommends the following: 
 
7.3.1      A LESSON TO BE LEARNED  
 
At the time when this study began, in 2006, the Straits had been the main piracy-prone 
area in the world. Incidents of armed robbery against ships in the Straits and the 
territorial sea of the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia consequently attracted 
the attention of maritime nations, stakeholders and other interested parties. As they 
have regarded and used the Straits as a free passageway for their trade, security in the 
Straits is a grave concern for them. At this juncture, the littoral States had indirectly 
been compelled to tackle the issue by any means. Many efforts have been undertaken 
not only by the littoral States but also by other stakeholders at international and 
regional levels to safeguard the Straits against piracy and armed robbery. Some 
maritime States such as Japan and the United States are even willing to give material 
and technical assistance to Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in order to protect their 
economic interests in the Straits.  
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The enhanced cooperation in the Straits has finally resulted in diverting the upsurge in 
piracy attacks from the Southeast Asia region to the African region, particularly in the 
waters off Somalia. This is evident in the IMB Piracy Report (2000-2010). It may be 
submitted that it is the cooperative efforts between states in the region and the extra-
regional support that have contributed significantly to the reduction of piracy and 
armed robbery in this region, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. This is in 
compliance with the spirit of the Article 100 of the 1982 Convention where all states 
are required to ‘cooperate to the fullest possible extent’ in the suppression of piracy. 
Thus, other coastal states in other parts of the world must always be ready to give 
cooperate to combat such crimes. However, one must bear in mind that, although the 
African region may learn a lesson from the success in reducing piracy incidents in the 
Straits, the tactics or strategy used in the Straits may not be suitable for the African 
region. This is because the nature of attacks and the root causes of piracy differ from 
one region to another. The Security Council has issued Resolution 1918 which is 
specially designed to tackle the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The 
Resolution called on all states to prosecute piracy under their domestic laws and allow 
hot pursuit within Somali internal waters. The unprecedented right of hot pursuit in 
the territorial water is solely applicable to Somali territory, which is considered a 
failed state by the UN Security Council. Thus, this does not create any international 
customary right. Such a Resolution has never been invoked in the Straits because the 
littoral States which are directly responsible for the Straits are capable of dealing with 
the problem and have their own domestic laws for ensuring prosecution and 
imprisonment of perpetrators.  Such a reaction of concluding a special Resolution in 
response to piracy incidents in Somalia shows that the law and its enforcement on 
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piracy are changing according to the needs of society. The weak governance and legal 
system of a state may make the existing law meaningless and prosecution of the 
perpetrators difficult. 
 
Thus, it may be said that the 1982 Convention basically provides a legal foundation 
for the rule of law at sea against piracy.  In fact the customary international law and 
other instruments, such as the 1988 SUA Conventions, IMO, IMB and ReCAAP, 
establish a basis for cooperation among states and provide mechanisms for the 
betterment of enforcement action with one aim: to ensure continuous safety and 
security of navigation, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. Nevertheless, to some 
extent the existing 1982 Convention and 1988 SUA Convention are inadequate and 
need modification according to the needs of society, as happened in the case of piracy 
in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. This is important in order to secure a more effective 
legal framework. The UN Secretary-General’s suggestion to build the capacity of 
regional states to prosecute Somali pirates or establish tribunals at state, regional or 
international levels may be implemented, but the root causes of piracy cannot be 
neglected. 
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7.3.2   THE COOPERATIVE ACTION IN THE STRAITS AMONG STATES AND 
STAKEHOLDERS MUST BE MAINTAINED. 
The growing concerns of the international community in general over the threat of 
piracy in the important sea lanes of communication have provoked responses from 
states, especially those that rely on maritime trade. Since piracy does not respect the 
law and state borders, the inter-dependency between countries for secure seas is 
obvious, especially in dealing with trans-border criminals. It may be submitted that, in 
order to achieve effective cooperation between the littoral States and other 
stakeholders, the principles of maritime security cooperation that give primary 
responsibility for the security of the Straits to the littoral States while at the same time 
recognising their sovereignty must be enhanced. Besides multilateral efforts through 
regional instruments such as ASEAN, ARF and ReCAAP, bilateral defence 
cooperation, which has been claimed to be the most effective way of avoiding 
personal conflict, has served to strengthen mutual trust for a robust maritime security 
framework. In fact this cooperative action in the MSP has proved to be an effective 
way of reducing piracy and armed robbery against shops in the Straits. As far as the 
government of Malaysia is concerned, it is its policy to always welcome extra-
regional support but it prefers help in the form of financial support or the loan of 
equipment, intelligence-sharing and personnel-training for capacity-building. Such 
assistance is the most acceptable way of repressing piracy in the long term.  As the 
challenges of maritime security evolve, the States must always be ready to set aside 
their personal interests and fully support and collaborate with their counterparts to 
ensure effective implementation of their plan of action. 
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7.3.3 APPLICATION OF ‘BURDEN-SHARING’ IN THE MAINTENANCE OF 
BOTH SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS 
Although the safety and security of the Straits is acknowledged as primarily the 
responsibility of the littoral States, the help of the international community, 
particularly the Straits’ users, is very welcome. The manifold increase in traffic yearly 
has exponentially increased the cost of maintaining the Straits for safe and secure 
navigation of ships. It is projected that the number of ships using the Straits will 
increase to triple the number of ships using it in early 2000. It appears that the heavy 
traffic may cause not only environmental degradation due to pollution from ships and 
ships grounding but also collisions between ships that have lost steering control due to 
piracy attacks on board. The likelihood of piracy or armed robbery attacks against 
ships increases when they have to slow down at certain points in the Straits due to the 
shallow waters. Thus piracy, as well as being regarded as a threat to the security of 
shipping, may also affect the environment in the Straits, consequently interfering with 
safety of navigation.  
 
Although Article 43 of the 1982 Convention encourages cooperation by agreement 
between states bordering a strait and user states, it is limited to ‘the establishment and 
maintenance of navigational safety or other improvements in aid of international 
navigation, and also for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
ships.’224 It does not specifically mention cooperation for securing ships against 
maritime crime although the terms ‘safety’ and ‘security’ arguably carry similar 
meanings.
225
  
                                               
224  Art 43 of the 1982 Convention. 
225  Cross-refer to Chapter 4 (para 4.2). 
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In terms of ensuring safe and sustainable navigation through the Straits, the littoral 
States have devised several mechanisms including the establishment of the Tripartite 
Technical Experts Group (TTEG) since the 1970s and STRAITREP (the mandatory 
ship reporting system used in the Straits) under the auspices of the IMO. The effort to 
facilitate safe and unimpeded passage in this waterway has long been undertaken with 
the help of Japan. In fact, Japan is a user state that has contributed generously to the 
maintenance of navigational safety in the Straits over many years. This is because the 
cost of having such smooth facilities and systems requires the investment of millions 
of dollars for training manpower and infrastructure development for the benefit of all.  
 
According to Najib Tun Razak, Malaysia has spent more than RM200 million
226
 for 
the purpose of maintaining and upgrading various navigational aids in the Straits over 
the years.
227
 This is a relatively huge amount for developing countries such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia to bear over a long period, while the Straits have been used by 
thousands of ships from all parts of the world. Although Malaysia acknowledges the 
status of the Straits as a strait used for international navigation in which transit 
passage applies, it also needs the cooperation of the user states to ensure the prolonged 
use of the Straits for the benefit of all. It is against this backdrop that Malaysia and 
Indonesia suggested expanding the scope of burden-sharing set out in Article 43 of the 
1982 Convention to include expenses related to the management of security in the 
                                               
226        USD64,198,000.00 (Current exchange rate 14 June 2013). 
227  The Eng Hock, ‘Malaysia seeks to limit maritime traffic in Straits of Malacca’ The Star (Kuala 
Lumpur, October 22, 2008). 
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Straits.
228
 Were this to be done, the user states would need to contribute to the cost of 
maintaining security in the Straits as well. Japan also supports this cooperative idea as 
timely because the idea that the safety and security of ships’ navigation through the 
Straits should be provided free of charge is already ‘out of date and must be 
changed.’229 Malaysia and Indonesia have proposed that some sort of fee be levied on 
ships using the Straits to fund the management of security in the Straits. However, 
Beckman argues that this would raise the perception that the user states should have a 
say in the utilisation of the fund in return for their contributory fees.
230
 This would 
definitely not be accepted by Malaysia and Indonesia as they would perceive the 
extra-regional interference as a threat to their sovereignty.
231
 In this matter, 
considering that agreement was reached leading to the establishment of the Malacca 
Straits Council (MSC) in 1969, it may be possible to set up a similarly functioning 
body for the purpose of managing a fund for the maintenance of security against 
maritime crime. The MSC was established for the purpose of maintenance of 
navigational aids and preservation of the marine environment; through the Nippon 
Foundation, Japan contributed two thirds of the total amount of the MSC fund.
232
 
Other contributors include the Japanese government and an association of related 
industries including the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and the Petroleum 
                                               
228    Yann-huei Song ‘Security in the Straits of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative: Responses to the US Proposal’  in  Michael D. Carsten Global Legal Challenges: 
Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and Natural Disasters (82 U.S Naval 
War College International Law Studies)  97-156 at 7 and 141 . 
229  Hiroshi Terashima, Executive Director, OPRF (Ocean Policy Research foundation) at the 
Seminar on Maritime Terrorism and the Straits of Malacca, on September 19 2005. Cited from 
OPRF ‘OPRF Blueprint for a New Cooperative Framework on the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore’ (OPRF, Tokyo 2006) 6. 
230   OPRF ‘OPRF Blueprint for a New Cooperative Framework on the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore’ (OPRF, Tokyo 2006) 7. 
231   Hashim Djalal ‘The Malacca-Singapore Straits Issue’ in MN Basiron and A Dastan (eds.)  
Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca’ (MIMA, Kuala 
Lumpur 2004) 270-289, 288. 
232  This is based on information up to the year 2005. See http://www.nmc.com.sg/MSC.pdf.; 
Hashim Djalal (2004) 286. 
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Association of Japan.
233
 Japan’s concern over the Straits is not limited to the issue of 
maintaining navigational safety. On many occasions, Japan has also voiced security 
concerns; for instance, it convened the discussion on combating piracy in the region in 
Tokyo in 2002, conducted a joint anti-piracy exercise with the Royal Brunei Marine 
Police and helped with the drafting of a Coast Guard Code for Indonesia. 
234
 It is 
pertinent to highlight that, while Japan has given significant financial support to the 
management of the Straits over the last 30 years, other user states or actual users are 
also expected to contribute to the betterment of their interests and security in the 
Straits.
235
 There should be no issues of regionalism or internalisation of the Straits. 
Provided that IMO approval is received, the suggestion to establish a fund through the 
imposition of fees on actual users, either voluntarily or compulsorily, might still be 
implemented to cater for the growing importance of the Straits to global trade. 
 
7.3.4 THE AWARENESS OF THE USER STATES ON ENHANCING THEIR 
SHIPS’ SECURITY 
While the rights and duties of the coastal states seem to be fairly balanced with those 
of the user states as stipulated in the 1982 Convention, in practice this is not the case. 
History has recorded that it takes longer for the 1982 Convention to reach a consensus 
on balancing the two groups’ interests.236 The coastal states or, in the context of the 
Straits, the littoral States had attempted to limit the freedom of navigation through the 
Straits for fear of degradation of their sovereignty and, more importantly, the 
sustainable marine environment due to pollution from ships. Meanwhile, the user 
                                               
233   ibid.  
234  M J Valencia ‘Security Issues in the Malacca Straits: Whose security and Why it Matters’ in MN 
Basiron and A Dastan (eds.) Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of 
Malacca’ (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 2004) 91-110, 95. 
235  Djalal (2004) 288. 
236  Cross-refer to Chapter Two. 
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states, perhaps rightly referred to as the maritime nations, struggled for the freedom of 
navigation through the Straits so that their maritime trade would not be impeded.  
 
It appears that the identification of what constitutes a user state is rather complicated. 
Oegroseno asks the following questions on this issue: ‘Are we to classify them based 
on frequency of traffic, amount of goods, value of goods, or strategic interests? Or are 
we to classify them based on some other standards, such as proximity?
237
 These 
questions correctly point out that no specific definition of ‘user states’ is provided in 
the 1982 Convention. Thus, it is not surprising that, thus far, it has not been possible 
to implement the recommendation to impose fees or voluntary contributions on the 
user states under the principle of burden-sharing. However, it is important to 
emphasise that more transparent value must come from the responsible user states or 
stakeholders in responding to the issues of safety and security of the Straits. It is not 
appropriate to rely totally on the cooperative action and legal framework designed by 
the littoral States and then point the finger at the littoral States when piracy and armed 
robbery attacks occur in the Straits. It is argued that a lack of awareness by the ship’s 
owner or crew on ensuring the security of their ship while transiting this bottleneck 
might also contribute to this problem. Subsequent to this, IMO has issued guidelines 
to shipowners on precautionary steps they should take to prevent their ships from 
being attacked by pirates or armed robbers either at anchor, in ports or underway, as 
well as the implementation of the ISPS Code.
238
 It is in fact their responsibility to 
ensure that preventive measures have been taken, especially since they are navigating 
                                               
237  AH Oegroseno ‘Straits of Malacca and the Challenges Ahead: Indonesian Point of View’ in MN 
Basiron and A Dastan (eds.)  Building a Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of 
Malacca’ (MIMA, Kuala Lumpur 2004) 28-45, 33. 
238  See IMO MSC.1/Circ.1334. 
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a seaway that is vulnerable to attacks of piracy and armed robbery. This includes 
‘providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and 
protect their ships’239, particularly when they have small crews. The lesson learned 
from the number of attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery against ships is that 
the prompt action of the crews can thwart the attacks. Therefore, it is suggested that, 
as potential victims, the user states or flag states whose ships ply the Straits must 
always be committed and ready to comply with the rules and regulations enforced by 
the littoral States and the guidelines of the IMO in order to deter and suppress piracy 
and armed robbery attacks in the Straits. Eventually, such assistance will help the 
local authorities to police the Straits and enforce their laws effectively. 
 
7.3.5 STRENGTHENING DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AGAINST SHIPS. 
International law governs the relationships between states and imposes certain rights 
and duties on them to ensure harmonisation among all states of the world.  To attain 
that aim, it is ultimately the role of an individual state to observe the law which is 
regulated or customarily adopted by the international law. The 1982 Convention is an 
example of a comprehensive international law governing the sea to which most states 
are parties. It can also arguably be regarded as having evolved into customary 
international law, and non-parties to the Convention have also applied the provisions 
stipulated in it.
240
  Despite its remarkable achievement, it still arguably lacks 
enforcement power in certain areas, particularly in combating piracy. It leaves 
                                               
239  See IMO  MSC.1/Circ.1334. Annex p.4 
240  Cross -refer to Chapter 3. 
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domestic laws to produce suitable mechanisms to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
Thus, a concrete legal framework that has a robust substantive and procedural law as 
well as good policy and enforcement propensity is needed for that purpose.  
 
The growing concerns over the crime of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the 
Straits have impelled the state to strengthen its law. This is important in order to 
ensure that the perpetrators are punished accordingly as a means of deterrence. To 
release them without charge will encourage them to repeat the crime without fear. It 
has been pointed out that, while some states have adequate law enforcement 
capacities, others have resource problems which may impede their efforts to suppress 
piracy and other maritime trans-border crime. This includes the absence of effective 
legislation to deal with such crimes.
241
 
 
However, catching and charging the pirates or armed robbers in the Straits has become 
problematical due to the geographical area of the littoral States, especially Indonesia 
which contains thousands of islands. In such a situation, the pirates, who are mostly 
Indonesian, are able to quickly reach their hiding places after attacking the ships. This 
makes the enforcement of authority fairly difficult since the right of hot pursuit ceases 
at the territorial sea of a foreign state. Although the littoral States have made 
arrangements for coordinated patrols, these have been criticised since each state is 
responsible only for its own territory. According to an officer at the Malaysia 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), this problem has recently been solved when 
the three littoral States reached a consensus on a less stringent approach to the right of 
                                               
241  IMO Resolution A 26/Res.1025. 
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inter-territorial hot pursuit. However, a contradictory view was obtained personally 
from an officer in the Maritime Policy at the Prime Minister’s Department who said 
that, while joint air patrols are already being deployed through the ‘eyes in the sky’ 
(EiS), the boat patrol (MSSP) has yet to be implemented.  
 
As mentioned in this thesis, it is important to note once again that almost all of the 
reported attacks in Southeast Asian waters, particularly the Straits, are not piracy but 
rather armed robbery against ships. Thus, when the perpetrators are arrested, they will 
be charged according to the local law applying in the area where the crime occurred. If 
it occurs within the Malaysian Maritime Zone (MMZ), the Malaysian Penal Code and 
other relevant laws such as the Armed Offence Increase Penalty Act will be applied. 
However, in cases of piracy such as the MT Bunga Laurel, where Somali pirates were 
arrested on the high seas off Somalia by the Malaysian Navy, the Malaysian law may 
still be applicable. Nevertheless it is recommended that the government of Malaysia 
enact more comprehensive legislation that deals exclusively with the issue of piracy 
globally such as Maritime Security Act.  At the same time, Malaysia should be 
prepared to become party to 1988 SUA Convention to enhance the basis for 
prosecution of piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
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7.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In conclusion, to respond to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, and in 
particular in relation to issues of suppressing piracy and armed robbery in the Straits 
of Malacca, the overall analysis conducted allows the author to conclude that, with the 
assistance of international instruments, regional states and other stakeholders, the 
littoral States have successfully reduced the number of incidences of piracy in the 
Straits. Zooming in on the smaller context, this means that, despite several criticisms, 
Malaysia, which has been given special attention in the thesis, has the capability and 
adequate law to protect and secure the Straits and subsequently to criminalise the 
perpetrators of crime, be it piracy or armed robbery against ships. With the adoption 
of the 1982 Convention and other treaties, together with its national law and agencies, 
Malaysia arguably has an adequate legal framework to investigate and prosecute 
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The requirement to give full 
cooperation in suppressing piracy, as required by Article 100 of the 1982 Convention 
and IMO Guidelines and Resolutions such as Resolution A.1025 (26) on the Code of 
Practice for the investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
has been complied with. The supportive and cooperative attitude of the government of 
Malaysia in improving its enforcement capacities and legal framework is evident from 
the establishment of MMEA and the prosecution of armed robbers and pirates in the 
Malaysian judicial system over the years. Although Malaysia has been preoccupied 
with other obvious internal security threats, to some extent Malaysia has compromised 
its national interests in order to ensure the safety and security of ships passing through 
the Straits. This conclusion appears to be supported by the analysis of Malaysia’s legal 
framework conducted in Chapter Six. Apart from the analysis of the legal regime in 
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international law
242
 and the domestic laws focusing on Malaysia, the statistical data 
discussed in Chapter Four may constitute a standard for determining the efficacy or at 
least adequacy of laws, action and cooperation of the littoral States and other 
interested parties in maintaining a comprehensive security environment in the 
management of the Straits.
243
 This will ultimately enable the author to confirm the 
hypothesis that, the adequate domestic legal framework criminalising piracy and 
cooperative action among states at regional and international levels are the key factors 
in the successful and dramatic reduction of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
242  Cross-refer to Chapters One and Two of the thesis. 
243  This is parallel with the aspiration of Malaysia: see Keynote Address by Mohd Najib Abd 
Razak, at the launching of the Centre for Straits of Malacca on 21 October 2008, in MIMA 
Bulletin (2008) 15 (3), 31. 
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janvier 1997)  
109.  Romania (17 December 1996)   109.  Roumanie (17 décembre 1996)  
108.  Brunei Darussalam (5 November 
1996)  
 108.  Brunéi Darussalam (5 novembre 
1996)  
107.  Malaysia (14 October 1996)   107.  Malaisie (14 octobre 1996)  
106.  Palau (30 September 1996)   106.  Palaos (30 septembre 1996)  
105.  Mongolia (13 August 1996)   105.  Mongolie (13 août 1996)  
104.  Haiti (31 July 1996)   104.  Haïti (31 juillet 1996)  
103.  New Zealand (19 July 1996)   103.  Nouvelle-Zélande (19 juillet 1996)  
102.  Mauritania (17 July 1996)   102.  Mauritanie (17 juillet 1996)  
101.  Panama (1 July 1996)   101.  Panama (1 juillet 1996)  
100.  Netherlands (28 June 1996)   100.  Pays-Bas (28 juin 1996)  
99.  Sweden (25 June 1996)   99.  Suède (25 juin 1996)  
98.  Norway (24 June 1996)   98.  Norvège (24 juin 1996)  
97.  Ireland (21 June 1996)   97.  Irlande (21 juin 1996)  
96.  Finland (21 June 1996)   96.  Finlande (21 juin 1996)  
95.  Czech Republic (21 June 1996)   95.  République tchèque (21 juin 1996)  
94.  Japan (20 June 1996)   94.  Japon (20 juin 1996)  
93.  Algeria (11 June 1996)   93.  Algérie (11 juin 1996)  
92.  China (7 June 1996)   92.  Chine (7 juin 1996)  
91.  Myanmar (21 May 1996)   91.  Myanmar (21 mai 1996)  
90.  Bulgaria (15 May 1996)   90.  Bulgarie (15 mai 1996)  
89.  Slovakia (8 May 1996)   89.  Slovaquie (8 mai 1996)  
88.  Saudi Arabia (24 April 1996)   88.  Arabie saoudite (24 avril 1996)  
87.  France (11 April 1996)   87.  France (11 avril 1996)  
86.  Georgia (21 March 1996 )   86.  Géorgie (21 mars 1996)  
85.  Monaco (20 March 1996)   85.  Monaco (20 mars 1996)  
84.  Republic of Korea (29 January 
1996)  
 84.  République de Corée (29 janvier 
1996)  
83.  Nauru (23 January 1996)   83.  Nauru (23 janvier 1996)  
82.  Argentina (1 December 1995)   82.  Argentine (1 décembre 1995)  
81.  Jordan (27 November 1995)   81.  Jordanie (27 novembre 1995)  
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80.  Samoa (14 August 1995)   80.  Samoa (14 août 1995)  
79.  Tonga (2 August 1995)   79.  Tonga (2 août 1995)  
78.  Greece (21 July 1995)   78.  Grèce (21 July 1995)  
77.  Austria (14 July 1995)   77.  Autriche (14 July 1995)  
76.  India (29 June 1995)   76.  Inde (29 juin 1995)  
75.  Slovenia (16 June 1995)   75.  Slovénie (16 juin 1995)  
74.  Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (28 
April 1995)  
 74.  Bolivie (État plurinational de) (28 
avril 1995)  
73.  Croatia (5 April 1995)   73.  Croatie (5 avril 1995)  
72.  Cook Islands (15 February 1995)   72.  Iles Cook (15 février 1995)  
71.  Italy (13 January 1995)   71.  Italie (13 janvier 1995)  
70.  Lebanon (5 January 1995)   70.  Liban (5 janvier 1995)  
69.  Sierra Leone (12 December 1994)   69.  Sierra Leone (12 décembre 1994)  
68.  Singapore (17 November 1994)   68.  Singapour (17 novembre 1994)  
67.  Mauritius (4 November 1994)   67.  Maurice (4 novembre 1994)  
66.  Germany (14 October 1994)   66.  Allemagne (14 octobre 1994)  
65.  Australia (5 October 1994)   65.  Australie (5 octobre 1994)  
64.  The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (19 August 1994)  
 64.  Ex-République yougoslave de 
Macédoine (19 août 1994)  
63.  Viet Nam (25 July 1994)   63.  Viet Nam (25 July 1994)  
62.  Sri Lanka (19 July 1994)   62.  Sri Lanka (19 July 1994)  
61.  Comoros (21 June 1994)   61.  Comores (21 juin 1994)  
60.  Bosnia and Herzegovina (12 
January 1994)  
 60.  Bosnie-Herzégovine (12 janvier 
1994)  
59.  Guyana (16 November 1993)   59.  Guyane (16 novembre 1993)  
58.  Barbados (12 October 1993)   58.  Barbade (12 octobre 1993)  
57.  Honduras (5 October 1993)   57.  Honduras (5 octobre 1993)  
56.  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
(1 October 1993)  
 56.  Saint-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines (1 
octobre 1993)  
55.  Malta (20 May 1993)   55.  Malte (20 mai 1993)  
54.  Zimbabwe (24 February 1993)   54.  Zimbabwe (24 février 1993)  
53.  Saint Kitts and Nevis (7 January 
1993)  
 53.  Saint-Kitts-et-Nevis (7 janvier 1993)  
52.  Uruguay (10 December 1992)   52.  Uruguay (10 décembre 1992)  
51.  Costa Rica (21 September 1992)   51.  Costa Rica (21 septembre 1992)  
50.  Dominica (24 October 1991)   50.  Dominique (24 octobre 1991)  
49.  Djibouti ( 8 October 1991)   49.  Djibouti (8 octobre 1991)  
48.  Seychelles (16 September 1991)   48.  Seychelles (16 septembre 1991)  
47.  Marshall Islands (9 August 1991)   47.  Iles Marshall (9 août 1991)  
46.  Micronesia (Federated States of) 
(29 April 1991)  
 46.  Micronésie (États fédérés de) (29 
avril 1991)  
45.  Grenada (25 April 1991)   45.  Grenade (25 avril 1991)  
44.  Angola ( 5 December 1990)   44.  Angola (5 décembre 1990)  
43.  Uganda (9 November 1990)   43.  Ouganda (9 novembre 1990)  
42.  Botswana (2 May 1990)   42.  Botswana (2 mai 1990)  
41.  Oman (17 August 1989)   41.  Oman (17 août 1989)  
40.  Somalia (24 July 1989)   40.  Somalie (24 juillet 1989)  
39.  Kenya (2 March 1989)   39.  Kenya (2 mars 1989)  
38.  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(17 February 1989)  
 38.  République démocratique du Congo 
(17 février 1989)  
37.  Antigua and Barbuda ( 2 February 
1989)  
 37.  Antigua-et-Barbuda (2 février 1989)  
36.  Brazil (22 December 1988)   36.  Brésil (22 décembre 1988)  
35.  Cyprus (12 December 1988)   35.  Chypre (12 décembre 1988)  
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34.  Sao Tome and Principe (3 
November 1987)  
 34.  Sao Tomé-et-Principe (3 novembre 
1987)  
33.  Cape Verde (10 August 1987)   33.  Cap-Vert (10 août 1987)  
32.  Yemen (21 July 1987)   32.  Yémen (21 juillet 1987)  
31.  Paraguay (26 September 1986)   31.  Paraguay (26 septembre 1986)  
30.  Guinea-Bissau (25 August 1986)   30.  Guinée-Bissau (25 août 1986)  
29.  Nigeria (14 August 1986)   29.  Nigeria (14 août 1986)  
28.  Kuwait (2 May 1986)   28.  Koweït (2 mai 1986)  
27.  Trinidad and Tobago (25 April 1986)   27.  Trinité-et-Tobago (25 avril 1986)  
26.  Indonesia (3 February 1986)   26.  Indonésie (3 février 1986)  
25.  Cameroon (19 November 1985)   25.  Cameroun (19 novembre 1985)  
24.  United Republic of Tanzania (30 
September 1985)  
 24.  République-Unie de Tanzanie (30 
septembre 1985)  
23.  Guinea (6 September 1985)   23.  Guinée (6 septembre 1985)  
22.  Iraq (30 July 1985)   22.  Iraq (30 juillet 1985)  
21.  Mali (16 July 1985)   21.  Mali (16 juillet 1985)  
20.  Iceland (21 June 1985)   20.  Islande (21 juin 1985)  
19.  Bahrain (30 May 1985)   19.  Bahreïn (30 mai 1985)  
18.  Tunisia (24 April 1985)   18.  Tunisie (24 avril 1985)  
17.  Togo (16 April 1985)   17.  Togo (16 Avril 1985)  
16.  Saint Lucia (27 March 1985)   16.  Sainte-Lucie (27 mars 1985)  
15.  Sudan (23 January 1985)   15.  Soudan (23 janvier 1985)  
14.  Senegal (25 October 1984)   14.  Sénégal (25 octobre 1984)  
13.  Cuba (15 August 1984)   13.  Cuba (15 août 1984)  
12.  Gambia (22 May 1984)   12.  Gambie (22 mai 1984)  
11.  Philippines (8 May 1984)   11.  Philippines (8 mai 1984)  
10.  Côte d'Ivoire (26 March 1984)   10.  Côte d'Ivoire (26 mars 1984)  
9.  Egypt (26 August 1983)   9.  Égypte (26 août 1983)  
8.  Belize (13 August 1983)   8.  Bélize (13 août 1983)  
7.  Bahamas (29 July 1983)   7.  Bahamas (29 juillet 1983)  
6.  Ghana (7 June 1983)   6.  Ghana (7 juin 1983)  
5.  Namibia (18 April 1983)   5.  Namibie (18 avril 1983)  
4.  Jamaica (21 March 1983)   4.  Jamaïque (21 mars 1983)  
3.  Mexico (18 March 1983)   3.  Mexique (18 mars 1983)  
2.  Zambia (7 March 1983)   2.  Zambie (7 mars 1983)  
1.  Fiji (10 December 1982)   1.  Fidji (10 décembre 1982)  
    
  
 
 
  
The 1979 New Map of Malaysia 
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Sheet 1 (Peninsula Malaysia) - Shows the Maritime Boundaries of Malaysia and Neighbouring 
States and the related treaty/agreement 
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Sheet 2 (West Malaysia) - Shows the Maritime Boundaries of Malaysia and 
Neighbouring States and the related treaty/agreement 
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The Malaysian Maritime Zone 
Source: Website of the National Security Council, Prime Minister Department, Malaysia 
 
Perairan Dalaman  
(Internal waters) 
97,306.83 km2 
37, 571 bn2 
Laut Wilayah 
(Territorial waters/sea) 
63,665.3 km2 
24,581.85 bn2 
Pelantar Benua 
(Continental Shelf) 
476,761.87 km2 
184,082.22 bn2 
Zon Ekslusif Ekonomi 
(Exclusive economic Zone) 
453,186.18 km2 
174,979.43 bn2 
Pesisir Pantai  
4492 km 
- 1737 km (Sem. Malaysia) 
- 2755 km (Sabah/Sarawak) 
Nisbah Darat dan Laut 1 : 2 
  
